Exploring the applications of second-generation mindfulness-based interventions for improving health and human functioning: a mixed-methods investigation by Van Gordon, W
1 
 
 
Exploring the Applications of Second-Generation Mindfulness-Based Interventions for 
Improving Health and Human Functioning: A Mixed-Methods Investigation 
 
 
William Van Gordon, BSc, MSc 
Psychology Department, Nottingham Trent University, Nottinghamshire, UK, NG1 4BU  
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of Nottingham Trent University for 
the degree of Doctorate of Psychology 
December 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
© William Van Gordon, 2017 
This work is the intellectual property of the author. You may copy up to 5% of this work for 
private study, or personal non-commercial research. Any re-use of the information contained 
within this document should be fully referenced, quoting the author, title, university, degree 
level, and pagination. Queries or requests for any other use, or if a more substantial copy is 
required, should be directed to the owner of the Intellectual Property Rights. 
 
 
Recommended citation: 
Van Gordon, W. (2017). Exploring the Applications of Second-Generation Mindfulness-Based 
Interventions for Improving Health and Human Functioning: A Mixed-Methods Investigation 
[PhD Thesis]. Nottingham: Nottingham Trent University. 
 
Keywords: 
Mindfulness, Second-Generation Mindfulness-based Interventions, Meditation, Meditation 
Awareness Training, Buddhist-Derived Interventions, Mindfulness-Based Interventions, 
Emptiness, Ontological Addiction, Buddhism, Workaholism, Work Addiction, Sex Addiction, 
Fibromyalgia, Psychopathology, Job Performance, Civic Engagement, Stress, Anxiety, 
Randomised Controlled Trial 
 
Aspects of this doctoral project received support from: 
Nottingham Trent University 
Awake to Wisdom Centre for Meditation and Mindfulness Research 
 
 
3 
 
 
Table of Contents 
Declarations           5 
List of Publications          7 
List of Tables and Figures         15 
List of Abbreviations          16 
General Abstract          17 
Chapter 1: General Introduction         19 
 
SECTION A. CONTRIBUTION TO THEORY 
Chapter 2: Mindfulness in mental health: A critical reflection    27 
Chapter 3: There is only one mindfulness: Why science and Buddhism   37 
need to work together 
Chapter 4: Towards a second-generation of mindfulness-based interventions  57 
Chapter 5: Buddhist emptiness theory: Implications for psychology   63 
Chapter 6: Ontological addiction: Classification, etiology, and treatment   87 
Chapter 7: Corporate use of mindfulness and authentic spiritual transmission:   115 
Competing or compatible ideals? 
 
SECTION B. CONTRIBUTION TO RESEARCH 
Chapter 8 (Studies 1 and 2): Meditation Awareness Training for the treatment of   135 
fibromyalgia syndrome: A randomised controlled trial 
Chapter 9 (Study 3): Meditation Awareness Training for individuals with fibromyalgia 170 
syndrome: An interpretative phenomenological analysis of participant’s experiences  
Chapter 10 (Study 4): Meditation Awareness Training for the treatment of sex addiction:  199 
A case study 
Chapter 11 (Study 5): Meditation Awareness Training for the treatment of workaholism: 225 
A controlled trial 
 
SECTION C: CONTRIBUTION TO PRACTICE 
Chapter 12: Mindfulness and the Four Noble Truths      251 
 
Chapter 13: General Conclusion         282 
References            289 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To Professor Mark Griffiths for his inspirational example and ongoing mentorship 
To my teacher and dearest friend, Dr Edo Shonin 
To the path of direct awareness, that carries the pure in heart across the ocean of suffering 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
Declaration of Originality 
I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and that, to the best of my knowledge 
and belief, it contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree 
or diploma of a university or other institute of higher learning. 
 
 
Signed: (William Van Gordon)      Date: 18th December 2017 
 
 
Statement of Ethical Compliance 
All of the studies conducted as part of this doctoral thesis were subject to an in-depth 
assessment of their ethical implications. Ethical approval for all studies was provided by the 
Nottingham Trent University College of Business, Law, and Social Sciences Research Ethics 
Committee. I declare that I have not deviated from the terms of the ethical approval issued by 
this Committee. 
 
Signed: (William Van Gordon)      Date: 18th December 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
Author Contribution Statement 
I confirm that I am responsible for the conception, design, and writing of all chapters included 
in this thesis. I conducted the literature reviews, designed the research, collected and analysed 
the data, and prepared the first-draft of each chapter. 
Some of the empirical and theoretical findings from this thesis have been published in 
peer-reviewed journals. In such instances, I confirm that I was the primary and corresponding 
author, and was responsible for responding to reviewers and making any revisions to the paper. 
Professor Mark Griffiths was the Director of Studies for this doctoral project and his role as 
co-author on papers submitted for publication involved: (i) making suggestions on the 
presentation and refinement of the material included in the paper, (ii) providing suggestions for 
some additional content of the paper (which may or may not be included in the chapters that 
comprise this doctoral thesis), (iii) providing advice on responding to comments from the 
journal reviewers and editor, and (iv) providing advice on the selection of a suitable journal to 
target for publication. The role of any other co-author of a paper based on findings from this 
doctoral thesis was limited to providing editorial input and commenting on drafts. Two 
exceptions to this are Thomas Dunn who provided statistical support for the controlled trials 
and Edo Shonin who conducted an independent audit of findings from specific analytical 
components. 
Signed:      Signed: 
  
William Van Gordon                  Mark Griffiths (Director of Studies) 
Date: 18th December 2017                          Date: 18th December 2017 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
List of Publications 
As referred to in the Author Contribution Statement, this PhD thesis resulted in a number of 
peer-reviewed journal outputs. In the following list of publications, a ‘*’ denotes published 
works that are largely based on the content (whether in full or in part) of specific chapters 
included in this PhD thesis. In the case of all published papers designated with a ‘*’, I am the 
first author. The final published versions of these papers may not exactly replicate the contents 
of the chapter in this thesis upon which they were originally based. I acknowledge that the 
copyright of the final version of any published works arising from this doctoral thesis resides 
with the copyright holder(s) of those works.  
All other papers shown below (i.e., those not marked with a ‘*’) have been published in 
connection with this doctoral project, but are more loosely based on the theoretical and/or 
empirical findings of the thesis. Consequently, in the list of publications that follows, I may or 
may not be the first author of papers that are not designated with a ‘*’.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
 
List of Publications 
*Van Gordon, W., Shonin, E., Dunn, T., Garcia-Campayo, J., & Griffiths, M. D. (2017). 
Meditation Awareness Training for the treatment of fibromyalgia: A randomised 
controlled trial. British Journal of Health Psychology, 22, 186-206. 
*Van Gordon, W., Shonin, E., Lomas, T., & Griffiths, M. D. (2016). Corporate use of 
mindfulness and authentic spiritual transmission: Competing or compatible ideals? 
Mindfulness and Compassion, 1, 75-83. 
*Van Gordon, W., Shonin, E., & Griffiths, M. D. (2016). Buddhist emptiness theory: 
Implications for psychology. Psychology of Religion and Spirituality. Advance Online 
Publication, DOI: 10.1037/rel0000079. 
*Van Gordon, W., Shonin, E., & Griffiths, M. D. (2016). Meditation Awareness Training for 
the treatment of sex addiction: A case study. Journal of Behavioral Addiction, 5, 363-372. 
*Van Gordon, W., Shonin, E., & Griffiths, M. D. (2016). Meditation Awareness Training for 
individuals with fibromyalgia syndrome: An interpretative phenomenological analysis of 
participant’s experiences. Mindfulness, 7, 409-419. 
*Van Gordon, W., Shonin, E., & Griffiths, M. D. (2016). Ontological addiction: Classification, 
etiology, and treatment. Mindfulness, 7, 660-671. 
*Van Gordon, W., Shonin, E., Dunn, T., Garcia-Campayo, J., Demarzo, M., & Griffiths, M. 
D. (2016). Meditation Awareness Training for the treatment of workaholism: A non-
randomised controlled trial. Journal of Behavioral Addiction, 6, 212-220. 
*Van Gordon, W., Shonin, E., & Griffiths, M. (2015). Towards a second-generation of 
mindfulness-based interventions. Australia and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, 49, 
591-591. 
9 
 
 
*Van Gordon, W., Shonin, E., & Griffiths, M.D. (2015). Mindfulness in mental health: A 
critical reflection. Journal of Psychology, Neuropsychiatric Disorders and Brain 
Stimulation, 1(1), 102. 
*Van Gordon, W., Shonin, E., Griffiths, M. D., & Singh, N. N. (2015). There is only one 
mindfulness: Why science and Buddhism need to work together. Mindfulness, 6, 49-56. 
*Van Gordon, W., Shonin, E., Zangeneh, M., & Griffiths, M. D. (2014). Work-related mental 
health and job performance: Can mindfulness help? International Journal of Mental 
Health and Addiction, 12, 129-137. 
*Van Gordon, W., Shonin, E., Griffiths, M. D., & Singh, N. N. (2015). Mindfulness and the 
Four Noble Truths. In: E. Shonin, W. Van Gordon, & N. N. Singh (Eds). Buddhist 
Foundations of Mindfulness (pp. 9-27). New York: Springer.  
Lomas, T., Etcoff, N., Van Gordon, W., & Shonin, E. (2017). The art of living mindfully: The 
health-enhancing potential of Zen aesthetic principles. Journal of Religion and Health, 
Advanced Online Edition, DOI: 10.1007/s10943-017-0446-5. 
Van Gordon, W., Shonin, E., & García-Campayo, J. (2017). The mandala of the present 
moment. Mindfulness, Advanced Online Edition, DOI: 10.1007/s12671-017-0779-x. 
Garcia-Campayo, J., Demarzo, M., Shonin, E., & Van Gordon, W. (2017). How do cultural 
factors influence the teaching and practice of mindfulness and compassion in Latin 
countries? Frontiers in Psychology, 8, 1-4, DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01161. 
Shonin, E., Van Gordon, W., Garcia-Campayo, J., & Griffiths, M. D. (2016). Can compassion 
cure health-related disorders? British Journal of General Practice, 67, 178-179. 
Shonin, E., & Van Gordon, W., & Griffiths, M. D. (2016). Mindfulness and wellbeing: 
Towards a unified operational approach. In: I. Ivtzan, & T. Lomas (Eds). Mindfulness in 
Positive Psychology: The Science of Meditation and Wellbeing (pp. 280-292). Oxford: 
Routledge. 
10 
 
 
Shonin, E., & Van Gordon, W. (2016). Experiencing the universal breath: A guided meditation. 
Mindfulness, 7, 1243-1245. 
Van Gordon, W., Shonin, E., & Griffiths, M. D. (2016). Are contemporary mindfulness-based 
interventions unethical? British Journal of General Practice, 66, 94-94. 
Shonin, E., & Van Gordon, W. (2016). The mechanisms of mindfulness in the treatment of 
mental health and addiction. International Journal of Mental Health and Addiction, 14, 
844-849.  
Shonin, E., & Van Gordon, W. (2016). Thupten Jingpa on compassion and mindfulness. 
Mindfulness, 7, 279-283. 
Griffiths, M. D., Shonin, E., & Van Gordon, W. (2016). Mindfulness as a treatment for 
gambling disorder. Journal of Gambling and Commercial Gaming Research, 1, 47-52. 
Shonin, E., Van Gordon, W., & Griffiths, M. D. (2015). Does mindfulness work? British 
Medical Journal, 351:h6919. DOI: 10.1136/bmj.h6919. 
Shonin, E., & Van Gordon, W. (2015). Managers’ experiences of Meditation Awareness 
Training. Mindfulness, 4, 899-909. 
Shonin, E., Van Gordon W., & Griffiths, M. D. (2015). Teaching ethics in mindfulness-based 
interventions. Mindfulness, 6, 1491-1493. 
Shonin, E., Van Gordon, W., & Singh, N. N. (Eds). (2015). Buddhist Foundations of 
Mindfulness. New York: Springer.  
Shonin, E., Van Gordon, W., & Singh, N. N. (2015). Mindfulness and Buddhist Practice. In: 
E. Shonin, W. Van Gordon, & N. N. Singh (Eds). Buddhist Foundations of Mindfulness 
(pp. 1-6). New York: Springer.  
Shonin, E., Van Gordon, W., Singh, N. N., & Griffiths, M. D. (2015). Mindfulness of Emptiness 
and the Emptiness of Mindfulness. In: E. Shonin, W. Van Gordon, & N. N. Singh (Eds). 
Buddhist Foundations of Mindfulness (pp. 159-178). New York: Springer. 
11 
 
 
Shonin, E., & Van Gordon, W. (2015). Mindfulness of ignorance. Mindfulness, 6, 1487-1490. 
Shonin, E., Van Gordon, W., Compare, A., Zangeneh, M., & Griffiths, M. D. (2015). Buddhist-
derived loving-kindness and compassion meditation for the treatment of psychopathology: 
A systematic review. Mindfulness, 6, 1161-1180. 
Shonin, E., & Van Gordon, W. (2015). Practical recommendations for teaching mindfulness 
effectively. Mindfulness, 6, 952-955. 
Shonin, E., Van Gordon W., & Griffiths, M. D. (2015). Are there risks associated with using 
mindfulness for the treatment of psychopathology? Clinical Practice, 11, 389-382. 
Shonin, E., & Van Gordon, W. (2015). The lineage of mindfulness. Mindfulness, 6, 141-145. 
Van Gordon, W., & Griffiths, M. D. (2015). For the mindful teaching of mindfulness. The 
Psychologist, 28, 514-515. 
Shonin, E., & Van Gordon W., & Griffiths, M. D. (Eds). (2015). Mindfulness and Buddhist-
derived Approaches in Mental Health and Addictions. Gewerbestrasse (Switzerland): 
Springer.  
Langer, A. I., Carmona-Torres, J. A., Van Gordon, W., & Shonin, E. (2015). Mindfulness for 
the treatment of psychosis: State of the art and future developments. In: E. Shonin, W. Van 
Gordon, & M. D. Griffiths (Eds). Mindfulness and Buddhist-derived Approaches in Mental 
Health and Addiction (pp. 211-244). Gewerbestrasse (Switzerland): Springer.  
Shonin, E., Van Gordon, W., & Griffiths, M. D. (2015). Mindfulness and Buddhist-derived 
treatment techniques in mental health and addiction. In: E. Shonin, W. Van Gordon, & M. 
D. Griffiths (Eds). Mindfulness and Buddhist-derived Approaches in Mental Health and 
Addiction (pp. 1-8). Gewerbestrasse (Switzerland): Springer. 
Van Gordon, W., Shonin, E., & Griffiths, M. D. (2015). The self and the non-self: Applications 
of Buddhist philosophy in psychotherapy. RaIIS-IT, 12, 10-11. 
12 
 
 
Shonin, E., Van Gordon W., & Griffiths, M. D. (2015). Mindfulness in psychology: A breath 
of fresh air? The Psychologist, 28, 28-31. 
Shonin, E., Van Gordon, W., & Griffiths, M. D. (2014). Do mindfulness-based therapies have 
a role in the treatment of psychosis? Australia and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, 
48, 124-127. 
Van Gordon, W., Shonin, E., Sumich, A., Sundin, E., & Griffiths, M. D. (2014). Meditation 
Awareness Training (MAT) for psychological wellbeing in a sub-clinical sample of 
university students: A controlled pilot study. Mindfulness, 5, 381-391. 
Shonin, E., Van Gordon, W., Dunn, T., Singh, N., & Griffiths, M. D. (2014). Meditation 
Awareness Training for work-related wellbeing and job performance: A randomized 
controlled trial. International Journal of Mental Health and Addiction, 12, 806-823. 
Shonin, E., Van Gordon W., & Griffiths, M. D. (2014). Practical tips for using mindfulness in 
general practice. British Journal of General Practice, 64, 368-369. 
Shonin, E., Van Gordon, W., & Griffiths, M. D. (2014). Mindfulness and the social media. 
Journal of Mass Communication and Journalism, 2014, 4: 5, DOI: 10.4172/2165-
7912.1000194. 
Compare, A., Zarbo, C., Shonin, E., Van Gordon, W., & Marconi, C.  (2014). Emotional 
regulation and depression: A potential mediator between heart and mind. Cardiovascular 
Psychiatry and Neurology, 2014, Article ID 324374, DOI 10.1155/2014/324374. 
Shonin, E., Van Gordon, W., & Griffiths, M. D. (2014). The treatment of workaholism with 
Meditation Awareness Training: A case study. Explore: The Journal of Science and 
Healing, 10, 193-195. 
Shonin, E. & Van Gordon, W. (2014). Using mindfulness and insight to transform loneliness. 
Mindfulness, 5, 771-773. 
13 
 
 
Shonin, E., Van Gordon W., & Griffiths, M. D. (2014). The emerging role of Buddhism in 
clinical psychology: Toward effective integration. Psychology of Religion and Spirituality, 
6, 123-137. 
Shonin, E. & Van Gordon, W. (2014). Mindfulness of death. Mindfulness, 5, 464-466. 
Shonin, E., Van Gordon, W., & Griffiths, M. D. (2014). Current trends in mindfulness and 
mental health. International Journal of Mental Health and Addiction, 12, 113-115. 
Shonin, E., Van Gordon, W., & Griffiths, M. D. (2014). Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) 
and Meditation Awareness Training (MAT) for the treatment of co-occurring 
schizophrenia with pathological gambling: A case study. International Journal of Mental 
Health and Addiction, 12, 181-196. 
Shonin, E., Van Gordon W., & Griffiths, M. D. (2014). Mindfulness as a treatment for 
behavioral addiction. Journal of Addiction Research and Therapy, 5, e122. DOI: 
10.4172/2155-6105.1000e122. 
Shonin, E., Van Gordon W., & Griffiths M. D. (2014). Meditation Awareness Training (MAT) 
for improved psychological wellbeing: A qualitative examination of participant 
experiences. Journal of Religion and Health, 53, 849-863. 
Van Gordon, W., Shonin, E., Skelton, K., & Griffiths, M. D. (2014). Working mindfully: Can 
mindfulness improve work-related wellbeing and work effectiveness? Counselling at 
Work (A Journal of the British Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy), Winter 
Issue, 14-19. 
Shonin, E., Van Gordon, W., & Griffiths, M. D. (2014). Changing paradigms: Buddhist insight 
in Western psychological treatments. PsyPAG, 92, 35-39. 
Shonin, E., & Van Gordon, W. (2014). Dream or reality? Philosophy Now, 104, 54. 
Shonin, E., Van Gordon W., & Griffiths, M. D. (2014). Practical tips for teaching mindfulness 
to school-aged children. Education and Health, 32, 30-33. 
14 
 
 
Shonin, E., Van Gordon, W., & Griffiths, M. D. (2014). Loving-kindness and compassion 
meditation in psychotherapy. Thresholds: Quarterly Journal of the Association for 
Pastoral and Spiritual Care and Counselling (A Journal of the British Association for 
Counselling and Psychotherapy), Spring Issue, 9-12. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
 
List of Tables 
Table 8.1 Baseline demographic characteristics for each allocation condition  149 
Table 8.2 Means and standard deviations of outcome variable scores for   153 
group and time 
Table 8.3  Fixed effects estimates with 95% CIs for all six outcome measures  154 
Table 8.4 Parameter estimates of linear models for minutes meditated   160 
and outcome measures 
Table 8.5 Parameter estimates of path b treating the potential mediator as a   163 
predictor of each outcome measure 
Table 8.6: Parameter estimates for mediation models      164 
Table 9.1 Participant demographic characteristics     177 
Table 9.2 Master and subordinate themes      182 
Table 11.1 Baseline demographic characteristics for each allocation condition  236 
Table 11.2 Means and standard deviations of outcome variable scores    239 
for control and intervention groups at all time periods 
Table 11.3 Fixed effects estimates with 95% CIs for all six outcome measures  241 
 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 5.1 Dream or reality?        70 
Figure 8.1 Flow of participants through recruitment and assessment phases  150 
Figure 8.2 Mixed effect model for DASS      155 
Figure 8.3 Outcome means across measurement intervals with two-tier 95% CIs 156 
Figure 8.4 Example of mediation model paths      162 
Figure 10.1  Change in outcome variable scores over time.     221 
Figure 11.1 Flow of participants through recruitment and assessment phases  237 
Figure 11.2 Mixed effect model for BWAS      242 
Figure 11.3 Outcome means across measurement intervals with two-tier 95% CIs 243 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 
 
 
List of Abbreviations 
APA: American Psychiatric Association 
AST: Authentic spiritual transmission 
CBT: Cognitive behavioural therapy 
CBTG: Cognitive behavioural theory for groups 
CONSORT: Consolidated Standards of Reporting Trials 
DLA: Deductive logical analysis 
DSM: Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders  
FG-MBI: First-generation mindfulness-based intervention 
FMS: Fibromyalgia syndrome 
GP: General practitioner 
IPA: Interpretative phenomenological analysis 
MAT: Meditation awareness training 
MBCT: Mindfulness-based cognitive therapy 
MBI: Mindfulness-based intervention 
MBSR: Mindfulness-based stress reduction 
MN: Majjhima Nikāya 
NICE: National Institute for Health and Care Excellence 
OAT: Ontological addiction theory 
RCT: Randomised controlled trial 
SG-MBI: Second-generation mindfulness-based intervention 
SN: Saṃyutta Nikāya 
ToE: Theory of everything 
 
 
17 
 
 
General Abstract 
Scientific and public interest into the health applications of mindfulness has increased 
substantially in recent decades. However, the rapidity at which mindfulness has been 
assimilated by Western research and applied settings has prompted concerns as to whether 
mindfulness-based interventions (MBIs) frame mindfulness in a manner that (i) resembles the 
traditional Buddhist conceptualisation of the technique, and (ii) is optimal in terms of treatment 
effectiveness. To address these concerns, there has recently been a growth of empirical 
investigation into what have been termed second-generation mindfulness-based interventions 
(SG-MBIs). SG-MBIs are distinct from first-generation mindfulness-based interventions (FG-
MBIs) because in addition to being overtly spiritual or psycho-spiritual in nature, they typically 
employ (i) a greater range of (normally secularised) meditative techniques, (ii) ethics as a key 
component of the taught program, and (iii) an instructor training program that normally 
requires several years of supervised mindfulness practice. The purpose of this doctoral thesis 
is to advance scientific understanding regarding the health-related applications, mechanisms of 
action, and limitations of SG-MBIs.  
Section A of the thesis (Chapters 2 to 7) provides the theoretical foundations to support 
the operationalisation of SG-MBIs in clinical and other applied settings. In addition to 
reviewing and critically appraising the relevant literature as well as outlining the conceptual 
underpinnings of SG-MBIs (Chapters 2-4), Section A introduces several alternative models of 
mental illness that integrate Buddhism’s emphasis on attachment to ego as a key determinant 
of suffering (Chapters 5 and 6). These models explicate the principles underlying the use of 
SG-MBIs for improving health and human functioning. In addition to direct treatment 
applications, an additional focus of the thesis is to explore the effectiveness of SG-MBIs for 
improving civic engagement and citizenship more generally. Consequently, Chapter 7 focusses 
on the integration of SG-MBIs into the work setting and delineates the challenges associated 
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with employing mindfulness for improving work-related wellbeing and work effectiveness. 
The theses continues with Section B (Chapters 8 to 11) that employs quantitative and 
qualitative study designs to assess the effectiveness, feasibility, and flexibility of an SG-MBI 
known as Meditation Awareness Training (MAT) for improving health and wellbeing in 
different patient groups. Chapter 8 reports findings from an active-controlled RCT that 
demonstrated MAT is an effective for treating fibromyalgia and for helping individuals with 
fibromyalgia re-engage with paid and unpaid work. A mediation analysis conducted as part of 
the same study also demonstrated that undermining attachment to ego asserted a role in 
symptom reduction. This outcome was supported by Chapter 9 which reports findings from a 
qualitative investigation that demonstrated that individuals with fibromyalgia experience MAT 
as an effective means of helping them change their relationship with pain by becoming less 
self-centred. A clinical case study (Chapter 10) provided an in-depth account of the assessment, 
case formulation, and treatment phases that were employed as part of the successful treatment 
of sex-addiction using MAT. A further outcome of this case study was that following 
completion of the MAT intervention, the study participant demonstrably strengthened their 
career trajectory. Finally, a non-randomised controlled trial (Chapter 11) demonstrated the 
feasibility and effectiveness of MAT for treating workaholism. Following the focus in Sections 
A and B on theory and research, respectively, Section C (Chapter 12) focusses on practice and 
synthesizes key findings from the aforementioned studies in order to explicate how they can 
improve the delivery and content of mindfulness-based approaches. 
In summary, findings indicate that SG-MBIs have treatment applications across a range 
of pathologies and for improving adaptive psychosocial functioning more generally. The thesis 
contributes to the growing evidence base supporting the clinical utility of SG-MBIs and 
suggests that they can complement FG-MBIs by increasing the choice of MBI that are available 
to prospective mindfulness practitioners. 
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Chapter 1. General Introduction 
Mindfulness derives from Buddhist practice and involves using an attentional referent, such as 
observing the breath, to focus awareness on the present moment (Shonin, Van Gordon, & 
Griffiths, 2015a). In 2015, nearly 700 scientific papers on mindfulness were published, which 
is more than triple the number of mindfulness papers published in 2010 (American Mindfulness 
Research Association, 2016). In terms of clinical applications, the most compelling evidence 
for mindfulness exists for its use in the treatment of depression and anxiety, where meta-
analytic studies typically report effect sizes in the moderate-strong to strong range (Hofmann, 
Sawyer, Witt, & Oh, 2010; Vøllestad, Nielson, & Nielson, 2012).  Consistent with these meta-
analytical findings, specific forms of mindfulness are advocated by the National Institute for 
Health and Care Excellence (NICE; 2010) and the American Psychiatric Association (APA; 
2009) for the treatment of recurrent depression in adults. Mindfulness is also included in the 
practice guidelines of the Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists 
(RANZCP; Hay et al., 2014) as a non-first-line treatment for binge eating disorder in adults. 
Furthermore, there exists evidence indicating that mindfulness may have a role in treating (for 
example) schizophrenia-spectrum disorders, eating disorders, addiction disorders (both 
chemical and non-chemical), sleep disorders, psoriasis, cancer, human immunodeficiency 
virus, irritable bowel syndrome, heart disease, hypertension, lung disease, diabetes mellitus, 
and chronic pain (Shonin et al., 2015a). 
Although there appear to be clinical applications for mindfulness, the rapidity at which 
it has been introduced into Western research and clinical settings has led some scholars to 
question whether (i) findings supporting the effectiveness of mindfulness may be over-
exaggerated, and (ii) the type of mindfulness being employed in applied psychological settings 
continues to bear any resemblance to the traditional Buddhist conceptualisation of the 
technique.  
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In terms of over estimating the effectiveness of mindfulness, it has been suggested that 
methodological issues – such as what has been termed the ‘popularity effect’ – may undermine 
the strength of the evidence base (Van Gordon, Shonin, & Griffiths, 2015a). The ‘popularity 
effect’ refers to the notion that rather than health improvements arising from practising 
mindfulness, the growing popularity of mindfulness amongst the general public means that 
outcomes could be influenced by participants’ belief that they are receiving a ‘fashionable’ 
and/or ‘proven’ psychotherapeutic technique. This is a difficult confounding factor to control 
for because it is almost impossible to blind patients from the fact they are receiving therapeutic 
mindfulness techniques (Shonin et al., 2015a). Other unanswered questions pertaining to the 
effectiveness of mindfulness are whether: (i) there is any validity in the Buddhist position that 
sustainable improvements to health and wellbeing typically require daily mindfulness practice 
over a period of many years (i.e., they do not arise after attending just eight weekly classes of 
a few hours duration), and (ii) it is the spiritual or psychological aspect of mindfulness that is 
principally responsible for therapeutic gains.  
There appears to be an empirical basis to some of these concerns because meta-analyses 
that feature much more stringent inclusion criteria (i.e., and only include the most 
methodologically robust studies such as randomised controlled trials (RCTs) with active 
control conditions) report effect sizes in the small-moderate range (d=0.3-0.38) for the 
treatment of depression or anxiety after completion of eight-weeks mindfulness training (with 
a reduction in effect size [d=0.22-0.23] at 3-6 months follow-up] (Goyal et al., 2014). More 
methodologically robust meta-analyses likewise report small-moderate effect sizes (d = 0.33) 
for the use of mindfulness in the treatment of chronic pain (Goyal et al., 2014). These more 
modest outcomes are comparable with results that would be expected from utilising 
antidepressants in a primary care population, but without the associated toxicity. 
To address some of the concerns and unanswered questions relating to mindfulness, a 
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second-generation of mindfulness-based interventions (SG-MBIs) have recently been 
formulated and subjected to empirical investigation. Compared to FG-MBIs such as 
Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT) and Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction 
(MBSR), SG-MBIs such as Meditation Awareness Training (MAT) are based on the 
assumption that mindfulness is a psycho-spiritual as opposed to a purely psychological 
technique. SG-MBIs generally follow a secular format and are suitable for use in applied 
psychological settings (Van Gordon, Shonin, & Griffiths, 2015b). However, they frame and 
teach mindfulness in a manner that is more congruent with the traditional Buddhist model. 
Although SG-MBIs represent a key new direction in mindfulness research and practice, 
research into their clinical applications is still at an early stage. Consequently, there is a need 
to establish (i) the specific user groups and illnesses for which SG-MBIs may constitute 
effective treatments, and (ii) the theoretical underpinnings of SG-MBIs, including how they 
differ from FG-MBIs and other meditation-based interventional approaches.  
 
Summary of Aims and Methods 
This doctoral thesis makes an original contribution to knowledge by advancing scientific 
understanding regarding the clinical applications of SG-MBIs. There are two specific sub-aims 
in this respect: (i) to provide robust theoretical foundations to support the operationalisation of 
SG-MBIs in clinical settings, and (ii) to empirically investigate the treatment applications of 
SG-MBIs. 
The second of the abovementioned aims was achieved by investigating the 
effectiveness, acceptability, and versatility of an SG-MBI known as MAT (Shonin, Van 
Gordon, & Griffiths, 2014a; Van Gordon, Shonin, Sumich, Sundin, & Griffiths, 2014a). The 
empirical component of the thesis expanded upon and developed the researcher’s earlier 
empirical investigations into the effectiveness of MAT for treating mental health issues in 
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clinical and non-clinical populations (e.g., Shonin et al., 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2014d; Shonin, 
& Van Gordon, 2015a; Van Gordon et al., 2014a). 
The fact that SG-MBIs constitute a new direction in non-pharmacological intervention 
research means that there essentially exists an open book in terms of identifying suitable study 
populations or patient groups. Consequently, for the purposes of this doctoral thesis, the choice 
of study population was governed by factors such as (i) findings from preliminary studies of 
MAT indicating that further research with the same patient group was warranted, (ii) the need 
to work with different patient groups to ensure a thorough assessment of the flexibility and 
versatility of MAT, (iii) the fact that research examining the effects MBIs (whether belonging 
to the first- or second-generation modality) is disproportionately weighted towards anxiety and 
mood-spectrum disorders within outpatient settings, and that there exist population groups 
(e.g., individuals suffering from behavioural addictions or psycho-somatic conditions such as 
fibromyalgia) that have been specifically highlighted as requiring additional empirical enquiry 
(Shonin et al., 2014e), and (iv) logistical considerations (e.g., ease of access to a given 
population). 
In order to conduct a rounded and rigorous evaluation of the potential benefits of MAT, 
a mixed-methods design was employed. Separate studies recruited adults in the community 
setting (i.e., to avoid the need to access hospital or general practitioner patient records) 
suffering from (i) fibromyalgia, (ii) sex addiction, and (iii) work addiction.  Several controlled 
trials (including an RCT) were conducted using MAT. CONSORT (Consolidated Standards of 
Reporting Trials) guidelines for non-pharmacological interventions were followed where 
appropriate (Boutron, Altman, Schulz, & Ravaud, 2008; Schulz, Altman, & Moher, 2010). A 
qualitative component (using interpretative phenomenological analysis; Smith, Flowers, & 
Larkin, 2009) was embedded in the RCT to facilitate a better understanding of the mechanisms 
by which patients derive benefit from SG-MBIs. A clinical case study was also conducted to 
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allow for a detailed evaluation of the treatment process at the assessment, case formulation, 
and intervention phases of clinician-patient engagement. The case study involved 
administering training in a version of MAT modified for one-to-one/small-group delivery.  
 
Chapter Summary 
Chapters of this thesis have been grouped into three distinct sections that can be broadly 
categorised as: (i) contributions to theory (Section A), (ii) contributions to research (Section 
B), and (iii) contributions to practice (Section C).  
 
Section A 
Section A provides the conceptual underpinnings to support the clinical operationalisation of 
SG-MBIs. The first chapter in Section A (i.e., Chapter 2) provides an overview of current 
directions in mindfulness practice and research, and outlines a number of integration and 
operational issues that the field of mindfulness is currently contending with. Chapter 3 provides 
a more in-depth assessment of some of the issues introduced in Chapter 2, and discusses how 
a better understanding of the Buddhist conceptualisation of mindfulness can help reconcile 
some of the actual and perceived incompatibility between Buddhist practice and contemporary 
secular mindfulness-based approaches. Based on the discussion and proposals provided in 
Chapter 3, Chapter 4 specifically elucidates the core components of SG-MBIs (including how 
they differ from FG-MBIs), and explains how SG-MBIs are well positioned to address some 
of the concerns relating to FG-MBIs. Chapter 5 introduces a key Buddhist principle – known 
as emptiness – that is deemed to assert a central therapeutic role in SG-MBIs such as MAT. 
The chapter explicates how an understanding of emptiness can not only challenge certain 
conventions of Western psychological thought, but is essential for researchers and clinicians 
choosing to work with Buddhist-derived approaches such as mindfulness. Chapter 7 introduces 
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a new psychological theory known as ontological addiction theory. OAT is an attempt to 
provide a model of mental illness that is compatible with both Buddhist and Western 
paradigms. Chapter 7 also delineates the key elements of the treatment model employed by 
SG-MBIs such as MAT.  
 
Section B 
Section B comprises the empirical component of the thesis. The first chapter in Section B (i.e., 
Chapter 8) is a multi-site RCT (trial no. NCT02800720) with active control condition that 
evaluates the effectiveness of MAT for treating fibromyalgia syndrome (study 1). The chapter 
integrates a second study (i.e., study 2) that employs mediation analysis to determine the 
mechanistic pathways utilised by MAT. Chapter 9 reports on the findings of a qualitative study 
arm (study 3) that was embedded within the abovementioned RCT. The qualitative study used 
IPA to explore patients’ experiences of participating in MAT.  Chapter 10 is a clinical case 
study of a male suffering from sex addiction that underwent a version of MAT modified for 
one-to-one delivery (study 4). The final chapter in Section B (i.e., Chapter 11) reports findings 
from the fifth study of this PhD that comprised a non-randomised controlled trial investigating 
the applications of MAT for treating workaholism. 
A sub-theme running throughout each of the five studies reported in Section B (i.e., in 
addition to the primary theme of assessing the applications of MAT for treating specific 
pathologies) is that secondary outcomes in some way assess changes in the patient’s ability to 
actively contribute to the welfare of society. In other words, a key objective of MAT is not only 
to induce clinically significant change across pre-defined diagnostic measures, but is to 
promote adaptive psychosocial functioning as well as civic engagement and citizenship more 
generally.  
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Section C 
Following the contributions to theory and research in Sections A and B, Section C comprises 
Chapter 12 that delineates a Buddhist perspective on suffering (as captured by a central 
Buddhist tenet known as the Four Noble Truths). More specifically, Chapter 12 employs 
deductive logical analysis in order to establish the validity and logical soundness of the Four 
Noble Truths, and then discusses their individual and collective implications for clinicians 
seeking to comprehend, practice, and use mindfulness in treatment settings. 
 
Conclusion 
This doctoral thesis makes an original contribution to knowledge by advancing scientific 
understanding regarding the applications of SG-MBIs in clinical settings. The thesis provides 
theoretical foundations to support the effective clinical operationalisation of SG-MBIs, and 
delineates the therapeutic principles that underpin an SG-MBI-based treatment model. 
Outcomes from the empirical component of the thesis attest to the effectiveness of MAT for 
treating a range of pathologies (and for improving adaptive psychosocial functioning more 
generally). Furthermore, findings from the thesis build upon previous studies indicating 
treatment applications for MAT and contribute to the growing evidence base supporting the 
clinical utility of SG-MBIs. 
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SECTION A 
 
CONTRIBUTION TO THEORY: 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS TO SUPPORT THE CLINICAL 
OPERATIONALISATION OF SG-MBIs 
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Chapter 2 
Mindfulness in Mental Health: A Critical Reflection 
 
 
 
This chapter (whether in full or in part) was adapted for publication and was subsequently 
published as: 
Van Gordon, W., Shonin, E., & Griffiths, M. D. (2015). Mindfulness in mental health: A 
critical reflection. Journal of Psychology, Neuropsychiatric Disorders and Brain Stimulation, 
1(1), 102. 
 
 
The final published version of this chapter is available at Elyns Group: 
http://www.elynsgroup.com/journal/j-psy-brain-stim/article/mindfulness-in-mental-health-a-
critical-reflection 
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Abstract 
Empirical and clinical evidence supporting the application of mindfulness in the treatment of 
psychopathology has increased significantly in the last decade. Given the significant growth of 
interest into the clinical applications of mindfulness, this chapter provides (i) a timely and 
evidence-based appraisal of current trends and issues in psychopathology-related mindfulness 
research, and (ii) a discussion of whether the empirical evidence for MBIs merit their growing 
popularity and utilisation amongst mental health stakeholders. 
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Mindfulness derives from Buddhist practice and is fundamentally concerned with the 
development of present moment awareness. It is arguably one of the largest growing areas of 
mental health research with the last decade witnessing a tenfold increase in the number of 
published scientific papers concerning the applications of mindfulness in mental health 
contexts (Shonin et al., 2014f). A growing appreciation of the potential benefits of mindfulness 
to mental health and psychological wellbeing is not only developing amongst mental health 
clinicians and researchers, but also amongst health professionals and service users more 
generally. For example, one study reported that over 70% of general practitioners (GPs) in the 
United Kingdom now believe that patients can derive health benefits by becoming more 
mindful of the present moment – a view shared by more than 80% of British adults in the same 
study (Mental Health Foundation, 2010).  
 Given the significant growth of interest into the clinical utility of mindfulness, this 
chapter provides (i) a timely and evidence-based appraisal of current trends and issues in 
psychopathology-related mindfulness research, and (ii) a discussion of whether the empirical 
evidence for MBIs actually merits their growing popularity and utilisation amongst mental 
health stakeholders. 
 
The Debate Surrounding Mindfulness Definition and Attributes 
Scientific papers concerning mindfulness invariably include a statement to the effect that: there 
is currently a lack of consensus in Western medicine as to exactly what defines the mindfulness 
construct (Shonin et al., 2014g). However, this alleged lack of consensus amongst mindfulness 
experts may overshadow the fact that there are a number of key areas of scientific accord 
amongst researchers, clinicians, health practitioners, and Buddhist scholars regarding the 
attributes of mindfulness. For example, it is generally accepted in both the contemporary 
mental health literature and traditional Buddhist literature that mindfulness involves (i) 
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focussing attention on the present moment in order to regulate ruminative and maladaptive 
thought patterns, (ii) mind-body synchronisation (i.e., engaging a full task and situational 
awareness as opposed to engaging in activities without being fully conscious of so doing), (iii) 
observing both sensory and cognitive-affective processes, (iv) increasing perceptual distance 
from psychological, physiological, and environmental stimuli such that these phenomena are 
observed and experienced ‘as they are’ without conceptually adding to or subtracting from 
them, (v) ongoing practice throughout daily activities and not just when formally seated in 
meditation, (vi) the use of an attentional referent such as observing the breath, (vii) avoiding 
any forced breathing or other attempts to modify (i.e., rather than accept) the present moment, 
and (viii) the deliberate engendering of an attention-set that supersedes any dispositional 
mindfulness capacity (Shonin et al., 2014g). 
Arguably the most popular delineation of mindfulness used in the mental health literature 
is the one introduced by Kabat-Zinn who defines mindfulness as ‘paying attention in a 
particular way: on purpose, in the present moment, and non-judgmentally’ (Kabat-Zinn, 1994). 
However, it has been suggested that the term ‘non-judgementally’ may be too ambiguous and 
does not assimilate the discerning faculty of mindfulness that prevents the mindfulness 
practitioner from becoming ethically and morally ‘indifferent’ to situations around them (Van 
Gordon, Shonin, Griffiths, & Singh, 2015c). 
A related area of debate concerning the various attributes of mindfulness is the extent to 
which mindfulness integrates meditative modes that are more concentrative in aspect, as 
opposed to modes more orientated towards insight generation (e.g., insight into Buddhist 
principles such as ‘impermanence’ and ‘emptiness’ that overlap with emerging evidence from 
quantum mechanics research concerning the absolute nature of reality) (O’Connell et al., 2010; 
Shonin et al., 2014g; Van Gordon, Shonin & Griffiths, 2016a). According to traditional 
Buddhist teachings, mindfulness is principally a means of regulating meditative concentration 
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in order to ensure that concentration remains at the optimum level for the extraction of 
meditative insight (Van Gordon et al., 2015c). Thus, based on the Buddhist model, mindfulness 
is neither concentrative meditation nor is it insight meditation – it is the attentional faculty that 
moderates extraneous thinking such that meditative concentration and/or insight can be 
cultivated (Van Gordon et al., 2015c). This represents a fundamental departure from 
interpretations of mindfulness in contemporary interventional approaches where mindfulness 
is often presented as a standalone form of meditation.  
A further key issue in the mindfulness definition debate is whether mindfulness is a 
psychological or spiritual faculty (Shonin et al., 2014h). At present, differing academic stances 
exist because in the traditional Buddhist setting, mindfulness is practiced within the context of 
spiritual development where ‘enlightenment’ is the ultimate goal (Shonin et al., 2014g). This 
is obviously different to clinical models of mindfulness where the primary focus is on relief 
from psychiatric and/or somatic illness. Accordingly, as part of efforts to reduce some of the 
disconnect between MBIs and traditional Buddhist approaches to mindfulness, the last few 
years have witnessed the formulation and empirical evaluation of SG-MBIs. Unlike FG-MBIs 
such as MBSR and MBCT, SG-MBIs – such as the eight-week secular intervention MAT – are 
overtly spiritual in aspect and teach mindfulness within a practice infrastructure that integrates 
what are traditionally deemed to be prerequisites for effective meditative development (Shonin 
& Van Gordon, 2015a). An example of a mindfulness definition that is advocated and utilised 
by certain second generation MBIs is that: Mindfulness is the process of engaging a full, direct, 
and active awareness of experienced phenomena that is (i) spiritual in aspect and (ii) 
maintained from one moment to the next (Van Gordon et al., 2015b, p.592). 
 
Practitioner Competency in Administering Mindfulness-Based Interventions 
There is growing awareness in the mental health literature of the need for mindfulness 
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clinicians and instructors to have in-depth personal experience of practicing mindfulness 
(Shonin et al., 2014g, 2014h). This is consistent with the traditional Buddhist model of 
mindfulness teaching where emphasis is placed more on the extent to which the teacher 
embodies mindfulness in their words and actions rather than their competency at providing 
instruction via conventional learning formats (e.g., manual-based teaching/lecturing, dialogue 
and psycho-education during clinician-patient sessions, etc.) (Van Gordon et al., 2015c). 
Recent qualitative research attests to this principle and demonstrates that participants assign 
importance to the mindfulness instructor’s ability to impart an experientially-informed and 
authentic transmission of MBI learning outcomes (Shonin & Van Gordon, 2015a). 
Although initiatives are underway with the intention of disseminating best-practice and 
assessment guidelines for MBI clinicans (Crane et al., 2012, 2013), they have been devised 
with a limited number of MBIs in mind (e.g., MBCT, MBSR). Furthermore, such initiatives 
are not necessarily sympathetic of the many subtleties that are traditionally deemed to underlie 
effective mindfulness practice and teaching. Given that there are reports of MBI instructors 
having as little as one year’s mindfulness practice and teaching experience following 
completion of a single eight-week training course (Mental Health Foundation, 2010), there is 
clearly work to be done in order to ensure that mindfulness instructors working in clinical 
settings conform to minimum standards and competency levels (Shonin et al., 2014g).  
 
Are There Risks Associated with Mindfulness? 
In the peer-reviewed mental health literature, reports of adverse effects following mindfulness 
practice are scarce. However, research specifically investigating whether there are health risks 
associated with participation in MBIs is significantly underdeveloped (Shonin et al., 2014f). 
Nevertheless, there are a small number of instances where mindfulness-encompassing (but not 
exclusively mindfulness-based) meditation modalities have precipitated non-salutary health 
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outcomes. For example, a recent literature review identified six separate clinical case reports 
of individuals (n = 12) presenting with psychotic episodes following participation in meditation 
programs that included some mindfulness exercises (e.g., breath awareness, body scanning, 
etc.) (Shonin et al., 2014i). Clearly, the very small participant numbers involved here 
significantly limits the generalisability of these findings, as does the fact that some of the 
participants had previously experienced psychotic episodes.  
In addition to psychotic episodes, other adverse effects of meditation reported in the 
empirical literature include painful kinaesthetic sensations, addiction to meditation, anti-social 
behaviour, impaired reality testing, dissociation, despair, and exhaustion (Perez-De-Albeniz & 
Holmes, 2000; Yorston, 2001). However, once again, the extent to which these findings have 
implications for MBIs is questionable because the design of these studies makes it difficult to 
apportion any negative (or positive) outcomes to mindfulness as opposed to other meditative 
modes (e.g., Transcendental Meditation, QiGong, etc.) (Shonin et al., 2014i). Similarly, factors 
completely unrelated to meditation may also have exerted a confounding effect (e.g., 
environmental stressors such as lack of food or social contact during meditation retreats). 
Although the reliability of evidence indicating possible risks of mindfulness is highly 
questionable, the matter certainly warrants further investigation because the traditional 
Buddhist scriptures and commentaries specifically caution against the incorrect teaching and 
practice of meditation and/or mindfulness (Shonin et al., 2014g). Such recommendations may 
not have been subject to rigorous empirical evaluation, but they have been subject to more than 
2,500 years of testing and positive experience by Buddhist adepts and practitioners (Shonin et 
al., 2014f). Examples of some of the risks traditionally associated with incorrect 
meditation/mindfulness teaching and practice include: (i) asociality and nihilistic outlook, (ii) 
developing an excessively-pious personality affectation (where mindfulness practitioners or 
teachers go to great lengths in order to appear to ‘be mindful’ [e.g., constant/inappropriate 
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smiling, talking/moving excessively slowly in the presence of others, etc.] without actually 
having any presence of mind), (iii) addiction to the tranquil states associated with meditative 
concentration, (iv) compassion burnout, and (v) psychological and/or somatic discomfort due 
to trapped ‘spiritual wind’ – a potential consequence of forced/incorrect meditative breathing 
(Shonin et al., 2014f, 2014i). 
 
Does the Evidence Match The Momentum? 
Empirical and clinical evidence supporting the application of MBIs in the treatment of 
psychopathology has increased significantly in the last decade. The most convincing evidence 
– based on meta-analytic studies – exists for the utilisation of mindfulness in the treatment of 
mood and anxiety disorders (Hofmann et al., 2010). As a consequence of these findings, both 
the APA (US) and NICE (UK) advocate the use of MBCT in the treatment of recurrent 
depression in adults (Van Gordon, Shonin, Zangeneh, & Griffiths, 2014b). There is also 
preliminary evidence that supports the use of MBIs in the treatment of a broad range of mental 
health issues including (but not limited to) schizophrenia-spectrum disorders, addiction 
disorders (both chemical and behavioural), bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, 
eating disorders, and anger dysregulation (Shonin et al., 2014g).  
However, despite these promising findings, when taken collectively, the evidence-base 
for MBIs is limited by various factors including (but by no means limited to) a paucity of long-
term follow-up studies coupled with poorly-designed control interventions (Van Gordon et al., 
2015a). Furthermore, it is difficult for MBI (and other non-pharmacological) intervention 
studies to implement blinding protocols to the same extent that might be employed in 
pharmacological efficacy trials. This is a particularly important consideration for mindfulness 
interventions because the current popularity of mindfulness amongst the general public may 
introduce a form of intervention or performance bias that inflates therapeutic outcomes over 
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short periods of time. 
The aforementioned performance bias issue warrants much more consideration that it 
currently receives in the empirical literature because in addition to what might be seen as 
‘impressive’ therapeutic gains over very short periods of time (e.g., after just 4-8 weekly two-
hour sessions), there are an increasing number of arguably surprising claims being made in the 
mindfulness clinical literature regarding the levels of meditative development being made by 
MBI participants. For example, it has recently been suggested that participants of eight-week 
group MBI interventions can demonstrate levels of insight and meditative development 
equivalent to that experienced by advanced Buddhist meditation practitioners (Grabovac, 
2014).  
Some accomplished Buddhist experts have expressed surprise at such claims because 
although in Buddhism’s 2,500-year history there are instances of ‘spiritually gifted’ individuals 
undergoing rapid meditative development, such individuals are rare and are normally regarded 
as saintly beings (Shonin et al., 2014g).  Indeed, even Buddhist practitioners that choose to 
dedicate their entire life to meditation (e.g., certain Buddhist monastics and yogis) typically 
have to train for decades (and under the direction of an accomplished meditation master) in 
order to arrive at what might be regarded as an ‘advanced’ level of meditative development 
(Shonin et al., 2014g). 
Consistent with the emerging empirical evidence as well as the general consensus of 
clinicians, researchers, and the general public, it is concluded that MBIs have the potential to 
play an important role in psychiatric treatment settings as well as in applied psychological 
settings more generally. However, due to the rapidity at which mindfulness has been taken out 
of its traditional Buddhist setting, and what is possibly evidence of media and/or scientific 
‘hype’ concerning the potency of mindfulness (Van Gordon et al., 2015a), it is recommended 
that future research seeks to (i) consolidate and replicate research findings, (ii) assess the 
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maintenance of outcomes over longer time periods, (iii) investigate potential adverse effects, 
(iv) fully control for potential performance bias in MBI intervention studies, (v) formulate 
comprehensive training and supervision curricula – that are informed by the traditional 
meditation literature – for secular MBI instructors, and (vi) investigate the Buddhist position 
that sustainable improvements to mental (and spiritual) health typically require consistent daily 
mindfulness practice over a period of many years (i.e., they do not arise after attending eight 
two-hour classes with some self-practice in between).  
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Chapter 3 
There is Only One Mindfulness: Why Science and Buddhism Need To Work Together 
 
This chapter (whether in full or in part) was adapted for publication and was subsequently 
published as: 
Van Gordon, W., Shonin, E., Griffiths, M. D., & Singh, N. N. (2015). There is only one 
mindfulness: Why science and Buddhism need to work together. Mindfulness, 6, 49-56. 
 
 
 
The final published version of this chapter is available at Springer:  
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12671-014-0379-y 
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Abstract 
This chapter discusses how a better understanding of the various Buddhist constructions of 
mindfulness may help to reconcile some of the actual and perceived incompatibility between 
Buddhist practice and contemporary secular mindfulness-based approaches. The chapter also 
critically examines the assumption that if secular mindfulness-based approaches represent a 
more “superficial” construction of mindfulness, then the “superior” approach embodied by 
present-day Buddhist teachers and traditions should be easily identifiable. More specifically, a 
means of conceptualising mindfulness is presented that attempts to communicate the versatility 
and underlying unity of the Buddha’s teachings, and the fact that the scriptural, empirical, and 
logical grounds for asserting that secular mindfulness-based approaches offer a less authentic 
practice mode than mainstream Buddhist modalities are not as robust as contemporary general 
opinion might suggest. 
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There exist differences in how Buddhism and contemporary mindfulness interventional 
approaches interpret and contextualise mindfulness (Dunne, 2011; Kang & Whittingham, 
2010; Monteiro, Musten, & Compson, 2015), but there are also differing interpretations of 
mindfulness within Buddhism. These apparent differences within Buddhism are arguably more 
noticeable when making comparisons across Buddhist vehicles (i.e., Theravada, Mahayana, 
Vajrayana), but to a lesser extent intra-vehicular differences can also be said to exist (i.e., 
differences between Buddhist traditions of the same vehicle). This chapter investigates the 
validity of some of these different Buddhist constructions of mindfulness, and then discusses 
how a better understanding of their scriptural and conceptual soundness (or lack thereof) may 
help to reconcile some of the actual and perceived incompatibility between Buddhist practice 
and contemporary secular mindfulness-based approaches.  
 The chapter also critically examines the assumption that if secular mindfulness-based 
approaches represent a more “superficial” construction of mindfulness, then the “superior” 
approach embodied by present-day Buddhist teachers and traditions should be easily 
identifiable. More specifically, a means of understanding mindfulness (and related Buddhist 
meditative principles) is presented that attempts to communicate the versatility and underlying 
unity of the Buddha’s teachings, and the fact that the scriptural, empirical, and logical grounds 
for asserting that secular mindfulness-based approaches offer a less authentic practice mode 
than mainstream Buddhist modalities are not as robust as contemporary general opinion might 
suggest. 
 
One Path 
Based on a comprehensive review and analysis of descriptions provided in both the academic 
and popular contemporary literature, terms typically employed to describe a Buddhist and/or 
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authentic construction of mindfulness can be categorised into five different types of meditation 
and/or awareness:  
i. Concentrative meditation – whether as synonymous with or a central component of 
mindfulness (e.g., sustained attention [Bishop et al., 2004], absorption [McGarvey, 
2010], focussed attention [Kabat-Zinn et al., 1998; Lutz, Slagter, Dunne, & Davidson, 
2008]). 
ii. Shamatha meditation (e.g., Mipham, 2002; Trungpa, 2004)  
iii. Insight/vipassana meditation (e.g., Bowen et al., 2006; Chiesa, 2010; Kabat-Zinn, 1982; 
Sills & Lown, 2008)  
iv. Mindfulness meditation – typically contextualised as a distinct form of meditation in and 
of itself but sometimes referred to utilizing terms such as present moment awareness or 
moment-by-moment awareness (e.g., Kabat-Zinn, 1982, 1990, 1994; Horowitz, 2010; 
Manocha, 2000). 
v. Open awareness (e.g., bare attention [Brown, Ryan, & Creswell, 2007; Kabat-Zinn, 
1982; Nyanaponika, 1962], choiceless awareness [Krishnamurti, 2009], unconstructed 
awareness [Kang & Whittingham, 2010], non-judgemental awareness, detached 
observation [Kabat-Zinn, 1982]). 
 
 Despite these various interpretations and descriptions of mindfulness by scholars, 
researchers, and Buddhist teachers, the present author argues that, in actual fact, the Buddha 
taught only one type of mindfulness. Indeed, there is little (if any) ambiguity in the original 
teachings expounded by the Buddha in terms of how mindfulness should be interpreted and 
practiced. According to the record of the Pāli Canon Sutta Pitaka, the Buddha’s first reference 
to mindfulness was during his Discourse that Sets the Wheel of Dharma in Motion 
(Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta, Saṃyutta Nikāya [SN], 56:11; Bodhi, 2000) that is believed 
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to represent the first teaching he gave (to the five ascetics) after attaining enlightenment. In this 
and subsequent discourses, mindfulness was introduced as the seventh aspect of the Noble 
Eightfold Path. The Noble Eightfold Path corresponds to the path referred to by the Buddha in 
the fourth of the Four Noble Truths – the path that leads to the cessation of suffering (Van 
Gordon, Shonin, Griffiths, & Singh, 2015d). 
 As noted by Monteiro et al (2015), all Buddhist traditions acknowledge the importance 
of the Noble Eightfold Path. The reason for this is simple; the Noble Eightfold Path is a 
fundamental teaching that is repeatedly referred to and featured in the Pāli and Chinese 
Buddhist Canons (and to a lesser extent the Tibetan Buddhist Canon). There are inevitably some 
differences in how texts within these respective Buddhist canons refer to and explicate the 
Noble Eightfold Path (the Ekottara Āgama of the Chinese Canon [Taishō Tripiṭaka 125] being 
an example of a notable outlier), but for the most part the basic meaning and principles of the 
Noble Eightfold Path remain the same in each of the established Buddhist canonical collections. 
Consequently, although some researchers, scholars, and Buddhist teachers might claim that 
there exist versions of the Noble Eightfold Path that capture more accurately the intended 
meaning of the Buddha, the authenticity of the Buddha’s Noble Eightfold Path teachings as 
recorded in, for example, the Sutta Pitaka of the Pāli Canon, cannot not disputed (i.e., 
disregarding any loss of accuracy arising due to the passage of time between the expounding 
and subsequent recording of the Buddha’s teachings). 
 Although the Noble Eightfold Path should be regarded as a single (albeit multi-faceted) 
path (Shonin et al., 2016), the fact that right mindfulness (Pāli: sammā-sati, Sanskrit: samyak-
smrti) was included in addition to and separate from right concentration (Pāli: sammā-samādhi, 
Sanskrit: samyak-samādhi) implies that the Buddha believed that mindfulness and meditative 
concentration were two distinct faculties. Indeed, had the Buddha believed or personally 
experienced that mindfulness and meditative concentration were the same construct, then it is 
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logical to assume that in place of the Noble Eightfold Path, he would have expounded the Noble 
Sevenfold Path (i.e., in which right mindfulness and right concentration were condensed into a 
single path element). Furthermore, perhaps of greatest bearing for the purposes of the present 
commentary, the placement by the Buddha of right mindfulness immediately prior to right 
concentration indicates that mindfulness is an important (arguably the most important) 
moderating agent in the cultivation and maintenance of right concentration.  
 Meditative concentration is the process of focussing attention on a given meditative object 
(e.g., the breath, a visualisation, the mind, or even the present moment more generally) with the 
primary intention of introducing focus and tranquillity (a wholesome mental factor known as 
samatha [Pāli, Sanskrit: shamatha]) into the mind (Shonin et al., 2016). Samatha, in turn, 
facilitates the deepening and stabilisation of samadhi, and the interplay and reciprocal feedback 
between samadhi and samatha (i.e., concentration and tranquillity) provides the optimum 
conditions for the subsequent cultivation of meditative insight (Shonin et al., 2014g). However, 
for various reasons and to varying degrees, the mind of the unaccomplished meditation 
practitioner has a tendency to be distracted from its object of placement (Chah, 2011; Dalai 
Lama & Berzin, 1997). One of these reasons is the fact that the tranquillity associated with 
meditative concentration can be so blissful and absorbing, it can trigger a loss of meditative 
concentration (Tsong-Kha-pa, 2004). Accordingly, mindfulness performs the primary function 
of surveying the concentrating mind so that attentional adjustments can be made as required in 
order to ensure that meditative concentration remains at its optimum level (i.e., neither too 
constricted nor too loose) (Shonin et al., 2016).  
 Thus, mindfulness regulates the breadth and intensity of meditative concentration, but 
mindfulness itself is not – and was never explicated by the Buddha as being – meditative 
concentration (i.e., samadhi). As already indicated, in addition to the Theravada Sutta Pitaka 
discourses referred to above, this same interpretation of mindfulness – as a faculty that regulates 
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meditative concentration – appears in the core texts of both the Mahayana and Vajrayana 
Buddhist vehicles. For example, in the Tibetan Buddhist (but principally Mahayana) text known 
as the Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment (Tibetan: lam rim chen mo), 
the 14th century Tibetan Buddhist Saint Tsong-kha-pa explicitly described mindfulness as being 
the function that prevents attention from wandering from the object of meditation. Likewise, in 
the principally Vajrayana text known as the Song of the Four Mindfulnesses (not to be confused 
with the Four Foundations of Mindfulness), the seventh Dalai Lama directs Buddhist followers 
to place their mind on four different objects of placement. These objects include: (i) admiration 
and respect (for the Buddha and/or teacher), (ii) compassion, (iii) the divine/subtle body (that 
the meditation practitioner possesses), and (iv) emptiness. He then instructs monastic and lay 
practitioners to practice mindfulness by “not letting your mind stray” from these four meditative 
objects and by “making your attention unforgetful” (Gelek, 2009, p. 3-5). Therefore, consistent 
with the Theravada position, Mahayana and Vajrayana Buddhist perspectives clearly depict 
mindfulness as a faculty that is separate from, but essential to the maintenance of, meditative 
concentration. 
 The exact same argumentation applies to claims – often with Mahayana (including Zen) 
and Vajrayana Buddhist connotations – that mindfulness can be likened to a state of “natural, 
uncontrived, spontaneously arisen awareness that is inseparable from every moment of 
experience” (Kang & Whittingham, 2010, p.169), bare attention (Brown, Ryan, & Creswell, 
2007); Nyanaponika, 1962), choiceless awareness (Krishnamurti, 2009) unconstructed 
awareness (Kang & Whittingham, 2010), or non-judgemental awareness/detached observation 
(Kabat-Zinn, 1982). Such descriptions of mindfulness do not accurately reflect the 
aforementioned fundamental teachings of the Buddha in, for example, the Noble Eightfold Path, 
and they assign levels of meaning and profundity to mindfulness that have no scriptural basis 
in any of the canonical Buddhist collections (Rosch, 2007). This is not to say that profound 
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states of mind are not described or attainable in Buddhist practice, but such states should not be 
confused with the concentration-regulating faculty of mindfulness. The exact same principle 
and counter-argument applies to assertions that mindfulness is insight/vipassana meditation, 
samatha meditation, or a form of meditation in and of itself (i.e., mindfulness meditation). At 
no point did the Buddha state or imply that the term mindfulness (i.e., sati or smrti) can be used 
interchangeably with these meditative states or modes. 
 In terms of referring to mindfulness as insight meditation or vipassana meditation, it 
might be argued that in the Ānāpānasati Sutta (Majjhima Nikāya [MN] 118; Ñanamoli & Bodhi, 
2009), the final tetrad of the sixteen mindfulness of breathing exercises are specifically 
concerned with the cultivation of insight. This statement is perfectly true because after having 
performed the first twelve Ānāpānasati Sutta exercises that specifically relate to cultivating 
awareness of bodily and psychological phenomena (i.e., whilst utilizing the breath as a 
meditative anchor), the Buddha then instructs the meditation practitioner to foster awareness of 
various insight elements and/or spiritual truths (e.g., impermanence, relinquishment of 
suffering, nirvana, etc.). However, the instructions provided by the Buddha in the final tetrad 
of the Ānāpānasati Sutta are not inconsistent with any of his previous or subsequent 
mindfulness teachings. In the Ānāpānasati Sutta, the subject of each of the sixteen exercises 
(e.g., breath, body, rapture, mental formations, mind, impermanence, etc.) are introduced as 
meditative objects, and mindfulness is the regulatory process of ensuring that concentration 
remains placed on the object in question (Shonin et al., 2014g). 
 Consistent with the traditional samatha-vipassana meditation model, and with the 
delineation of anapanasati (i.e., mindfulness of breathing) in the Vissuddhimagga (Nanamoli, 
1976), by meditatively concentrating on the various objects of the first twelve Ānāpānasati 
Sutta exercises, the necessary conditions are fulfilled for the cultivation of tranquil abiding (i.e., 
samatha). As noted above, tranquil abiding is one of the prerequisites for the cultivation of 
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vipassana (which translates from the Pāli as clear seeing or superior seeing; Shonin et al., 
2014g). There is debate amongst Buddhist scholars and teachers as to whether the shift in 
meditative mode from samatha to vipassana is something that happens naturally, or whether it 
requires purposeful effort on the part of the meditator. However, irrespective of which position 
is favoured (the latter position best reflecting the view and experience of the present author), 
the point is that in the Buddha’s original anapanasati teachings, mindfulness serves to ensure 
that concentration remains focussed on whichever samatha and/or vipassana experience is 
manifest in the mind. 
 
One Emptiness 
There appears to be a commonly held view that the notion of non-duality is primarily a 
Mahayana/Vajrayana construct that is incompatible with the Theravada Buddhist framework of 
viewing existence through the dualistic lens of samsara (i.e., suffering) and nirvana (i.e., 
liberation) (Monteiro et al., 2015). This relates closely to the popular belief that non-self (Pāli: 
anattā, Sanskrit: anātman) is primarily a Theravada construct that is distinct from the 
Mahayana/Vajrayana principle of emptiness (Pāli: suññatā, Sanskrit: śūnyatā). In essence, 
within Mahayana/Vajrayana Buddhism, non-duality is another means of referring to and 
explicating the concept of emptiness. If a subject-object divide is not imposed on an individual’s 
mode of perceiving, this means that a ‘subject self’ that exists separately from an ‘object other’ 
is no longer apprehended. Consequently, the experience of oneness, emptiness of self, and 
emptiness of other arises (Shonin et al., 2013a). In the opinion of the present author (and in 
much the same vein as the previous assertion that the Buddha taught only one type of 
mindfulness), there exists (and the Buddha taught) only one type of emptiness, that is identical 
to – and encompassing of – the experiential meaning of both the terms non-self and non-duality. 
 There are numerous lines of reasoning upon which this assertion is made. The first is that 
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emptiness is explicitly and frequently referred to and taught throughout the Theravada Pāli 
Canon. For example, in the Majjhima Nikāya, amongst various other direct and indirect 
references to emptiness, there appears both the Shorter Discourse on Emptiness (Cūḷasuññata 
Sutta, MN 121) and the Greater Discourse on Emptiness (Mahāsuññata Sutta, MN 971). 
Emptiness (also translated as voidness) is likewise directly referred to in core Theravada texts 
such as the Dhammapada (that appears in the Khuddaka Nikāya of the Sutta Pitaka): 
 
He whose cankers are destroyed … whose object is the void, the unconditioned freedom 
– his path cannot be traced, like that of birds in the air (Dhammapada, 7, 93; 
Buddharakkhita, 1986, p. 37). 
 
 Furthermore, the Mahavedalla Sutta (MN 43) appears to directly indicate that the Buddha 
deemed that emptiness/voidness and non-self were equivalent constructs: 
 
Here a bhikkhu, gone to the forest or to the root of a tree or to an empty hut, reflects thus: 
‘This is void of a self or of what belongs to a self’. This is called the deliverance of mind 
through voidness (Ñanamoli & Bodhi, 2009, p. 394). 
 
 Even without the direct references to and discourses on emptiness in the Theravada Pāli 
Canon, the primary reason for asserting that there are limited grounds for assigning emptiness 
and non-duality as non-Theravadan constructs rests on a matter of both scientific and logical 
fact. All phenomena, without exception, originate and exist only in dependence upon 
innumerable causes and conditions. Consequently, as phenomena do not exist independently, 
by default, they lack an intrinsically existing self (Shonin et al., 2013a). In other words, 
emptiness is a truth that pervades the strata of existence – it constitutes the underlying fabric of 
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reality. Not only can this assertion be validated via deductive logical analysis (Shonin & Van 
Gordon, 2013, 2014a), but according to Van Gordon et al. (2016a), there is also preliminary 
empirical evidence – mostly from the field of quantum mechanics – that attests to the truth and 
all-pervading presence of emptiness. 
 The Buddha is understood by all Buddhist traditions to have tapped into this liberating 
truth of emptiness and to have attempted – using various means – to guide others to do the 
same. However, irrespective of how it is referred to or interpreted, and as explicated in the 
Cūḷasuññata Sutta, the Buddha only ever taught that there exists one type of emptiness: 
 
Ananda, whatever recluses and Brahmins in the past entered upon and abided in pure, 
supreme, unsurpassed voidness, all entered upon and abided in the same pure, supreme 
voidness [repeats for recluses and Brahmins of the present and those of future, who will 
all enter upon and abide in this same, supreme unsurpassed voidness] (Ñanamoli & 
Bodhi, 2009, p. 970). 
 
 Despite the number of competing assertions that could be made about its properties, water 
will always behave in the same manner under identical conditions. Likewise, emptiness remains 
a single truth irrespective of the number of claims made by researchers, scholars, and Buddhist 
teachers about the different types of emptiness that are supposed to exist (and that are advocated 
by different Buddhist traditions). Indeed, if Theravada Buddhist practitioners realise the non-
self of themselves, then by logical default, they realise the non-self or emptiness of everything 
else (because without a self there is no other). According to Shonin and Van Gordon (2015b), 
there is an underlying truth of emptiness, and a spiritual practitioner (Buddhist or otherwise) 
either begins to realise this truth, or they remain experientially ignorant of it. In the present 
author’s opinion, it is when researchers, scholars, and Buddhist teachers remain experientially 
48 
 
 
ignorant to the truth of emptiness, they are likely to speculate and develop flawed theories about 
what emptiness is, how it should be practiced, and how it relates to other Buddhist teachings, 
such as mindfulness.  
 In the context of the present chapter, the purposes of highlighting the single, unchanging, 
and all-pervasive nature of emptiness is to further dispel the misconception that there are 
different types of mindfulness that vary according to how a particular Buddhist tradition 
constructs mindfulness, as well as how they construct and interpret other fundamental Buddhist 
teachings (e.g., emptiness). As referred to above, in order to meet the needs of spiritual 
practitioners from a broad range of backgrounds, the Buddha employed multiple methods of 
teaching. However, these various methods – some more direct than others – always pointed 
towards the existence of the same truth. In other words, there has only ever been one type of 
mindfulness, and there has (and will) only ever be one type of emptiness. Understanding the 
accurate and single nature of both mindfulness and emptiness is a prerequisite for effective 
spiritual growth, and the manner in which an individual practices and apprehends either one of 
these core Buddhist principles directly influences the extent to which they develop an accurate 
perception of the other (Shonin et al., 2015b). 
 
One Purpose 
There is currently debate as to whether it is appropriate for mindfulness to be utilised in military 
and business settings (Monteiro et al., 2015). Most of the opposing arguments are based on the 
belief that because mindfulness was originally taught as a means of fostering peace and 
spiritual awakening, it is ethically inappropriate to introduce mindfulness to the armed forces 
and/or commercial entities. However, as explicated below, there are also robust grounds for 
arguing that introducing mindfulness to military and business personnel is in keeping with 
traditional Buddhist values and ideals. 
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A core principle of Buddhist practice is generosity, and this includes generosity in the 
sharing of the Buddha’s teachings (Gampopa, 1998). Indeed, not only does restricting the 
integration of mindfulness to military and business settings run contrary to the popular view – 
mostly held by advocates of secular mindfulness-based approaches – that mindfulness practice 
requires a “non-judgemental” attitude, but according to Shonin and Van Gordon (2014b), it 
also denies individuals the right and opportunity to encounter and practice the spiritual 
teachings: 
 
The Buddhist teachings (known as the Dharma) – which include teachings on 
mindfulness – are universal in their application. It does not matter if a person is rich or 
poor, good or bad, famous or obscure, young or old, male or female, or if they purport 
not to have an interest in matters of a spiritual nature – the Dharma is available for 
everybody to benefit from. Indeed, it is not for anybody – not even the Buddha – to 
decide which people should be denied spiritual teachings and which people should 
receive them. Each person must make that choice on an individual basis and the only 
way they can make an informed decision about whether a particular form of spiritual 
practice is right for them, is if they have the opportunity to try it first. Therefore, 
introducing military personnel to the mindfulness teachings brings people working in 
military settings into contact with the Dharma and gives them the opportunity to make 
an informed decision as to whether mindfulness is a practice they would like to integrate 
into their lives (p.1). 
 
According to Buddhist thought, the Buddha’s teachings can be likened to an all-purpose 
medicine (Tsong-Kha-pa, 2004). The key principles of this view are that: (i) due to their purity 
and potency, the inevitable outcome for an individual that receives the Buddha’s teachings – 
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including those relating to mindfulness – is an increase in wisdom, compassion, and awareness, 
and (ii) in the event that such qualities do not manifest, it is because the teachings have been 
incorrectly taught and/or incorrectly practiced (Shonin & Van Gordon, 2014b). In essence, 
what is being alluded to is what the present author has previously referred to as an inbuilt 
natural protection mechanism of the Buddhist teachings:  
 
If a person comes into contact with the Dharma who is not ready to receive the teachings 
or who intends to use them for selfish or negative purposes, their wrong intention will 
prevent the teachings from taking root within their being. In fact, all that they will 
receive will be a theoretical and superficial account of the teachings – and even this 
won’t be properly understood (Shonin & Van Gordon, 2014b, p.1). 
 
In view of heightened inter- and intra-territorial tensions in the world, it seems that the 
majority of governments believe that an armed force is essential for acting as a deterrent to 
invasion, terrorist attack, and/or civil unrest. In such an uncertain and arguably hostile 
economic and political global climate, rather than refuse to introduce responsible military 
leaders to the principles of mindful awareness, the present author argues that a more rational 
solution is to deploy military personnel and leaders that are fully aware of the consequences of 
their thoughts, words, and actions, and who carry out their role with wisdom and compassion. 
The Buddha’s fundamental intent when deciding to expound the Buddha-dharma was 
to alleviate suffering, and he was unconditional in the manner in which he extended this 
invitation and opportunity to others (i.e., the Buddha only refused to teach an individual in 
circumstances where they had already abused his trust and kindness, and thus provided 
reasonable grounds for determining that it would be unprofitable to continue trying to teach 
them at that particular stage of their life) (Van Gordon et al., 2015d). When and where 
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mindfulness is correctly taught to individuals, empirical research demonstrates that not only 
are participants likely to experience improvements in psychological wellbeing and role 
competency, but – to admittedly differing degrees – they are also likely to engender a more 
compassionate outlook and to grow in spiritual insight (e.g., Shonin & Van Gordon, 2015a; 
Van Gordon et al., 2014b). However, when and where mindfulness is incorrectly taught – 
including where it is taught outside of a framework of ethical awareness – then the resultant 
construct can no longer be said to bear any resemblance to a traditional construction of 
mindfulness. In such circumstances, the entire issue of whether it is ethically and morally 
correct to introduce mindfulness into military and/or business settings becomes redundant 
(because what is being introduced and practiced is something other than mindfulness) (see 
Chapter 7 for a fuller discussion of this point).  
 
One Teacher 
Concerns that have been raised in the academic and populist literature concerning the 
competency of instructors of mindfulness-based interventions (Monteiro et al., 2015). Such 
concerns arise because in the traditional Buddhist setting, meditation teachers would typically 
undergo many years (and in many cases decades) of focussed daily training before being 
considered adequately experienced to begin teaching and guiding others in meditative and 
spiritual practice (Van Gordon et al., 2015a). In the present author’s view, these concerns are 
entirely justified because there are reports of individuals teaching mindfulness following 
completion of just a single eight-week program (Mental Health Foundation, 2010). However, 
there is also a danger of vilifying secular mindfulness-based approaches and pitching them (and 
their respective teachers) as “superficial” versus their “authentic” Buddhist counterparts. 
  Compared to teachers of secular mindfulness-based approaches, it is arguably much 
easier for teachers of mainstream Buddhism to claim an affiliation with an authentic Buddhist 
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lineage. However, the act of “belonging” to a lineage provides little if any assurance as to the 
spiritual realisation of a particular Buddhist teacher and/or their suitability to teach meditation. 
As the present author has previously argued, the single most important factor when attempting 
to gauge the suitability and competency of a meditation teacher is the extent to which they have 
amassed authentic spiritual and meditative realisation (Shonin & Van Gordon, 2015b). If a 
secular mindfulness teacher has given rise to authentic spiritual insight and instructs others from 
an experientially informed perspective, then according to Van Gordon et al. (2015a), they are 
capable (in both practical and moral terms) of teaching mindfulness. Conversely, if a teacher – 
including a teacher of mainstream Buddhism – has not given rise to such insight, then 
irrespective of the number of lineages, titles, or endorsements they hold, they should not be 
considered as authentic. 
 According to certain systems of Buddhist thought, the current epoch corresponds to a 
period of spiritual degeneration (Sanskrit: pashchimadharma, Japenese: mappō) and is 
characterised by the widespread demise of the spiritual teachings (Marra, 1988). Consequently, 
almost without exception, the core texts and commentaries of the Theravada, Mahayana, and 
Vajrayana Buddhist approaches – which in some cases are thousands of years old – repeatedly 
refer to the risk of spiritual practitioners and teachers becoming knowingly or unknowingly 
corrupt in their embodiment of the Buddha-dharma, and how in future periods (i.e., present 
times) instances of such corruption are likely to significantly increase.  
 Even as long as 1,200 years ago when the Buddhist (and spiritual) teachings were at a 
much earlier phase of decline (known as the Age of Semblance Dharma; Sanskrit: 
pratirupadharma, Japanese: zōbō), the Chinese Zen teacher Huang Po repeatedly made 
reference to the prevalence of corruption and deluded views held by Buddhist teachers and 
practitioners. He estimated that only five out of every ten thousand practitioners that were 
focussed on attaining enlightenment would be able to substantiate a claim to authentic spiritual 
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realisation (Huang Po, 1982). Twelve centuries later, when the Buddhist teachings are believed 
to be at a more advanced state of degeneration (Marra, 1998), it is logical to assume that Huang 
Po’s estimate would need to be significantly revised (e.g., five out of every hundred thousand, 
million, or even ten million diligent Buddhist practitioners attaining at least a moderate degree 
of lasting and authentic spiritual insight). However, given that Huang Po’s estimate referred 
only to those individuals that had set their intentions firmly on attaining enlightenment (e.g., 
monks, nuns, diligent lay practitioners, etc.), and given, in all likelihood, that the majority of 
individuals and teachers practising meditation at present time would not meet Huang Po’s 
criteria of being a focussed/diligent practitioner, the present author would envisage that the 
number of Buddhist teachers with authentic spiritual realisation is significantly less than most 
Buddhist and non-Buddhist spiritual practitioners may have been led to believe. 
 Therefore, although the underlying truths of existence that the Buddha attempted to 
introduce to others are incorruptible (Norbu & Clemente, 1999), claims by some researchers, 
scholars, and Buddhist teachers that Buddhism “is in the right” and secular mindfulness-based 
approaches are “in the wrong” are in certain instances likely to be examples of such individuals 
demonstrating the same piousness and superficiality that they aver is embodied by the recent 
secular mindfulness movement. The crux of the matter is that if a teacher of either Buddhism 
or a secular mindfulness-based approach is sincere in their meditation practice and has touched 
or tapped into emptiness (and thus made inroads into undermining their ego), then recipients of 
their teachings – whether in Buddhist or secular (e.g., clinical) contexts – are likely to derive 
lasting benefit from their participation (Shonin & Van Gordon, 2015b). A small body of 
empirical qualitative research supports this assertion and suggests that sincerity and experience 
on behalf of the mindfulness teacher are key determinants of successful intervention outcomes 
(e.g., Shonin et al., 2014d; Shonin & Van Gordon, 2015a; Van Gordon, Shonin, & Griffiths, 
2016b). 
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One Mindfulness Community 
Even when Shakyamuni Buddha was still alive, certain recipients of his wisdom felt the need 
to systematize, categorize, and conceptualise the various teachings that he imparted. Although 
the Buddha encouraged questioning and investigation of his teachings, he was clear right from 
the outset with his followers that the various truths he was attempting to convey could only be 
realised as a result of sustained effort and practise, and that over-conceptualisation of these 
truths was an unprofitable endeavour (e.g., (Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta, SN 56; Bodhi, 
2000). However, some 2,500 years after the Buddha’s death, it is clear that for the most part, 
his message of simplicity and the importance of arriving at an experiential (rather than 
theoretical) understanding of his teachings has not been heeded. Within contemporary society, 
there exist numerous different traditions of Buddhism, each with their own interpretation of the 
Buddha’s teachings, and each with their own view regarding the extent to which other Buddhist 
traditions deviate from the Buddha’s original and intended meaning. Arguably, the most 
obvious example of this division in the Buddhist teachings occurs when comparing the 
Theravada perspective with that of either the Mahayana or Vajrayana Buddhist vehicles. 
Obviously, the manner in which Buddhism evolves will vary according to the receptivity, 
culture, and existing beliefs of the population in which it finds itself (Dunne, 2011). 
Nevertheless, as repeatedly emphasised and demonstrated throughout this chapter, the Buddha 
was entirely consistent in his teachings, and any alleged differences in the meaning of his 
instructions ultimately arise as a result of conceptual elaborations that, in general, are often of 
limited scriptural or logical soundness.  
Reading and understanding the works of any genuinely accomplished Buddhist 
practitioner should lead an individual to the realisation that divisions in the Buddhist teachings 
are ultimately “man-made”. For example, the present author would argue that any experienced 
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Buddhist scholar would have difficulty in denying the strong Vajrayana undercurrent that runs 
throughout the works of the Theravada Buddhist teacher Rājvudhācāriya (see, for example, 
Rājvudhācāriya, 2010). Likewise, in the Theravada Pāli Canon, there are numerous examples 
of individuals (such as Añña Kondañña [Bodhi, 2000] and Upāli [Ñanamoli & Bodhi, 2009]) 
undergoing a sudden awakening (normally associated with Mahayana [particularly Zen] and 
Vajrayana Buddhism) upon hearing even the most fundamental of Buddhist teachings (e.g., the 
Four Noble Truths). 
 Although, in the present chapter, it has been argued that some of the terms utilised by 
researchers, scholars, and Buddhist teachers to refer to mindfulness (and other Buddhist 
principles) have been employed with limited scriptural or logical soundness, it needs to be 
remembered that in the context these definitions were offered, they may not necessarily 
represent erroneous explications. For example, if Trungpa’s (2004) aforementioned depiction 
of mindfulness as (rather than an integral part of) shamatha meditation brought recipients of 
his teachings to an accurate and/or experiential understanding of mindfulness (and/or 
shamatha), how can it be argued that contextualizing mindfulness in such a manner was 
inappropriate? In a similar vein, although (to a much greater extent) there are differences 
between how mindfulness is taught and practised in both Buddhist and secular mindfulness-
based approaches, if secular approaches offer an efficacious means of alleviating suffering – 
and the evidence suggests that they do (e.g., Hofmann et al.,  2010) – then the value of critically 
highlighting the means by which they deviate from a traditional or contemporary Buddhist 
contextualisation becomes somewhat questionable.  
The present author would argue that concerns regarding the extent to which 
contemporary mindfulness-based approaches are compatible with the traditional Buddhist 
model have been comprehensively raised, and are duly noted by both the scientific and 
Buddhist community. Consequently, in the spirit of both Buddhist and contemporary secular 
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mindfulness teaching ideals, perhaps an appropriate point has been reached for the scientific 
and Buddhist communities to work more closely together, and as a single mindfulness 
community seek to develop and empirically validate interventions and/or teaching modes that 
are effective according to both clinical and spiritual criteria. 
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Chapter 4 
Towards a Second-Generation of Mindfulness-Based Interventions 
 
 
This chapter (whether in full or in part) was adapted for publication and was subsequently 
published as: 
Van Gordon, W., Shonin, E., & Griffiths, M. (2015). Towards a second-generation of 
mindfulness-based interventions. Australia and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, 49, 591-
591. 
 
The final published version of this article will be available at Sage Publications: 
http://anp.sagepub.com/content/49/7/591.full.pdf 
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Abstract 
There are growing concerns over the rapidity at which mindfulness has been extracted from its 
traditional Buddhist setting and introduced into psychiatric treatment settings. These concerns 
centre on the alleged absence within FG-MBIs of the factors that, according to the 2,500-year-
old system of Buddhist meditative practice, are deemed to maximise the efficacy of 
mindfulness. To address these concerns, a number of SG-MBIs have recently been formulated 
and empirically investigated. This chapter explicates the key differences between FG-MBIs 
and SG-MBIs, briefly appraises key empirical findings and issues relating to SG-MBIs, and 
discusses the implications of the trend towards a second-generation of MBIsfor psychiatrists 
and service-users. 
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Emerging evidence suggests that MBIs have applications for treating diverse 
psychopathologies and disorders including addictive behaviours (e.g., pathological gambling, 
workaholism), PTSD, anger dysregulation, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, pain 
disorders (e.g., fibromyalgia), sexual dysfunction, and psychotic disorders (Shonin et al., 
2013b). However, commensurate with growing interest into the clinical (and non-clinical) 
applications of MBIs, there are growing concerns over the rapidity at which mindfulness has 
been extracted from its traditional Buddhist setting and introduced into psychiatric treatment 
domains (Van Gordon et al., 2014a). Specifically, these concerns centre on the alleged absence 
within FG-MBIs of the factors that, according to the 2,500-year-old system of Buddhist 
meditative practice, are deemed to maximise the efficacy of mindfulness. Simply put, some 
researchers, clinicians, and Buddhist scholars have suggested that mindfulness in MBIs has 
been altered from its traditional Buddhist construction to such an extent, that it is inaccurate 
and/or misleading to refer the resultant technique as ‘mindfulness’. 
 To address these concerns, a number of SG-MBIs have recently been formulated and 
empirically investigated. This chapter explicates the key differences between FG-MBIs and 
SG-MBIs, briefly appraises key empirical findings and issues relating to SG-MBIs, and 
discusses the implications of the trend towards a second-generation of MBIs for psychiatrists 
and service-users. 
 
Differences Between First- and Second-Generation MBIs 
FG-MBIs refer to interventions such as MBSR (developed in the 1970s) and MBCT (developed 
in 2002), as well as the various derivatives of these that came later (e.g., Mindfulness-Based 
Relapse Prevention, Mindfulness-Based Eating Awareness Training) (Shonin & Van Gordon, 
2015a). FG-MBIs have been influential in helping mindfulness gain acceptance within 
psychiatric settings, and in many respects they represent a novel approach to regulating 
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maladaptive cognitive and affective processes (Singh et al., 2014). For example, in addition to 
utilising present moment awareness, FG-MBIs advocate ‘letting-go’ of thoughts and feelings 
(whether adaptive or dysfunctional) rather than attempting to modify them as in specific 
cognitive-behavioural approaches.  
Arguably the most popular definition of mindfulness as conceptualised by FG-MBIs is 
that it: “[pays] attention in a particular way: on purpose, in the present moment, and non-
judgmentally” (Kabat-Zinn, 1994: p. 4). In essence, this definition implies that mindfulness is: 
(i) principally an attentional faculty, and (ii) an aptitude that is not necessarily mediated by 
other meditative processes. A further observation of note concerning the above definition is the 
inclusion of the term ‘non-judgementally’, which appears to suggest that mindfulness requires 
passivity and/or impartiality towards sensory and psychological stimuli.  
Although FG-MBIs and SG-MBIs both invariably follow an eight-week group-therapy 
format and are tailored for utilisation in Western clinical settings (e.g., they are generally 
secular in nature), the above-outlined FG-MBI delineation of mindfulness is fundamentally 
distinct from how SG-MBIs interpret and teach mindfulness. Rather than a passive or ‘non-
judgemental’ awareness, the SG-MBI model advocates an active and discriminative form of 
awareness (Shonin & Van Gordon, 2015a). Indeed, in addition to moment-by-moment 
observance, SG-MBIs teach that mindfulness requires active participation in the here and now. 
The ‘participating observer’ notion is intended to help mindfulness practitioners understand 
that it is possible (and indeed essential) to observe and ‘let-go’ of present moment experiences, 
whilst concurrently discerning how to respond in an adaptive manner. This helps to avoid the 
scenario where the patient’s or another individual’s wellbeing is at risk, yet due to being ‘non-
judgemental’ they avoid taking preventative action.  
As referred to in Chapter 2, one recently proposed SG-MBI conceptualisation of 
mindfulness defines it as the: “process of engaging a full, direct, and active awareness of 
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experienced phenomena that is: (i) spiritual in aspect, and (ii) maintained from one moment to 
the next” (Shonin & Van Gordon, 2015a). In addition to advocating either an ‘active’ or ‘non-
judgemental’ form of awareness, a further difference between FG-MBIs and SG-MBIs is the 
explicit use in the SG-MBI definition of the term ‘spiritual’. This term is included to help 
prevent participants becoming confused (or being inadvertently misled) as to the nature of the 
intervention they are receiving (in fact, FG-MBIs have been criticised for being ambiguous in 
this respect; Van Gordon & Griffiths, 2015; Van Gordon, Shonin, & Griffiths, 2016c). A 
further difference between the two approaches is that SG-MBIs invariably teach mindfulness 
in conjunction with other meditative practices and principles (e.g., ethical awareness, 
impermanence, emptiness/non-self, loving-kindness and compassion meditation, etc.) that are 
traditionally deemed to promote effective mindfulness practice (Shonin et al., 2014g). 
 
Issues and Key Empirical Findings 
Empirical evaluation of SG-MBIs – including via the use of RCTs – has demonstrated that SG-
MBIs can be effective treatments for depression, anxiety and stress, schizophrenia, 
pathological gambling, work addiction, work-related stress, nicotine dependence, anger 
dysregulation, and antisocial behaviour (Shonin & Van Gordon, 2015a; Singh et al., 2014). As 
with FG-MBIs, an increase in perceptual distance from cognitive and affective processes is 
generally accepted as being a primary mechanism of SG-MBIs. However, exploratory 
quantitative and qualitative studies of SG-MBIs – such as those investigating the eight-week 
MAT intervention – have yielded findings suggesting that SG-MBIs also utilise the following 
mechanistic pathways: (i) improved regulation of ego-centric thinking patterns leading to 
reductions in self-preoccupation, self-disparaging schemas, and asocial behaviour, and (ii) 
increased spirituality that exerts a protective influence over life-adversity and low self-purpose 
(Shonin & Van Gordon, 2015a). 
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Despite these promising findings, to date there have been no head-to-head comparison 
studies to ascertain whether the FG-MBI or SG-MBI approach is most effective for a given 
population. Consequently, SG-MBIs could be criticised for relying too heavily on expert 
opinion and best-practice guidelines (i.e., according to 2,500-year-old Buddhist meditational 
theory) in order to justify their necessity.  
 
Implications for Psychiatrists and Service Users 
The formulation and empirical assessment of SG-MBIs appears to reflect a current trend in 
mental health research and practice. However, there is clearly a need for further research in 
order to establish the full clinical applications and efficacy of SG-MBIs compared to FG-MBIs. 
Whilst there are a lack of studies directly comparing the two approaches, this does not 
necessarily undermine the value of SG-MBIs because, at the very least, they provide service-
users – including those interested in (or belonging to) Eastern contemplative traditions – with 
a non-pharmacological treatment that more closely follows a traditional (but secular) approach 
to mindfulness practice.  
Although the development of SG-MBIs has largely been prompted by criticisms of FG-
MBIs (e.g., taking a reductionist approach to teaching mindfulness), it is entirely feasible that 
the two approaches can co-exist or even complement each other. However, irrespective of 
whether future research and clinical utilisation of mindfulness focuses on one or both 
approaches, the growing popularity of MBIs in clinical settings combined with the 
interventional use of a greater range of meditative techniques (e.g., compassion meditation, 
loving-kindness meditation, etc.) is likely to have professional training implications for 
psychiatrists. Accordingly, it is recommended that psychiatrists acquire a working familiarity 
of meditational theory and the factors that it attributes to the onset of mental illness. 
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Chapter 5 
Buddhist emptiness theory: Implications for psychology 
 
This chapter (whether in full or in part) was adapted for publication and was subsequently 
published as: 
Van Gordon, W., Shonin, E., & Griffiths, M. D. (2016). Buddhist emptiness theory: 
Implications for psychology. Psychology of Religion and Spirituality. Advance Online 
Publication, DOI: 10.1037/rel0000079. 
 
 
The final published version of this article is available at American Psychological Association: 
http://psycnet.apa.org/index.cfm?fa=buy.optionToBuy&id=2016-13170-001  
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Abstract 
In recent decades, there has been growing assimilation of ancient Buddhist practices and 
principles into Western research and applied psychological settings. One Buddhist principle 
that is currently receiving an increasing amount of scientific interest is emptiness. Emptiness 
asserts that all phenomena – including the “self” – are empty of intrinsic existence. This chapter 
examines how logical enquiry and evidence from diverse psychological and scientific 
disciplines appear to be gradually adding credence to the notion of emptiness. The chapter 
explicates how, if emptiness theory continues to be validated and accepted by Western 
psychologists, it will become necessary to re-examine some established beliefs in relation to 
the workings of both the psychological and physical world. Examples of how emptiness might 
develop and/or complement psychological and wider scientific understanding in this respect 
include coming to the acceptance that: (i) what is currently understood to be waking reality is 
effectively a shared dream, (ii) the “self” does not inherently exist, (iii) the underlying cause of 
mental illness is an individual’s belief that they inherently exist, and (iv) maladaptive 
psychosocial functioning and the absence of mental illness are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive occurrences. It is concluded that there is a clear need for greater research into the 
validity and applications of emptiness. However, if supportive empirical findings relating to 
emptiness continue to emerge, it is possible that some of the next important scientific 
“discoveries” concerning mind and matter will emerge at the intersection of ancient Eastern 
contemplative practice, empirically-grounded Western psychological insights, and quantum 
mechanics. 
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There is growing interest among Western psychologists into the attributes, correlates, and 
applications of ancient Buddhist practices and principles. The most obvious example is the 
meditative practice of mindfulness that has received substantial scientific and public attention 
in recent decades. Indeed, initiatives have been implemented and research has been conducted 
that supports the utilisation of mindfulness in a wide range of applied psychological settings 
including: (i) clinical and health psychology for the treatment of psychological and somatic 
disorders (Van Gordon et al., 2015a), (ii) forensic psychology as a tool for reducing 
reoffending, modulating impulsivity, and regulating anger (Howells, Tennant, Day, & Elmer, 
2010), (iii) occupational psychology for improving work-related wellbeing, work productivity, 
and job performance (Dane, 2010), (iv) educational psychology for improving academic 
performance, knowledge acquisition, quality of learning environment, and cognitive 
functioning (Burke, 2010), and (v) sport psychology for achieving peak performance, 
situational awareness, and task focus (Gardner & Moore, 2012). 
Notable examples of other Buddhist practices that have attracted scientific and public 
interest include loving-kindness meditation, compassion meditation, and emptiness (Kelly, 
2008). Loving-kindness and compassion meditation are similar to mindfulness in the sense that 
they are both meditative techniques and involve an element of attentional focus (i.e., combined 
with a spiritual intention to relieve one’s own and/or others’ suffering; Galante, Galante, 
Bekkers, & Gallacher, 2014). However, emptiness – the subject of the present chapter – can be 
considered as distinct from these meditative modes because although emptiness can effectively 
be “practiced” during meditation, it is better considered as more of a founding and defining 
principle of Buddhism, and of the nature of self and reality more generally (Dalai Lama, 1995). 
As will be explicated in greater detail below, Buddhist emptiness theory implies that there is 
no logical or scientific plausibility to the principles upon which an individual constructs their 
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self-concept, and that the notion of inherent existence (whether pertaining to the individual or 
phenomena more generally) is fundamentally flawed (Tsong-Kha-pa, 2004). If it is accepted 
that emptiness accurately reflects the manner in which individuals and reality exist, then there 
are significant implications for both psychological and scientific thought. 
 The present chapter provides: (i) an explication of a traditional Buddhist construction 
of emptiness, (ii) an examination of how this differs from Western psychological conventions 
concerning the self and how individuals perceive and interact with their world, and (iii) an 
assessment of relevant empirical findings relating to Buddhist emptiness theory and their 
implications for contemporary psychological and scientific understanding of the human mind. 
 
Buddhist Emptiness Theory 
Emptiness (Pāli: suññatā, Sanskrit: śūnyatā) refers to the fundamental Buddhist teaching that 
phenomena – including the self – are devoid or “empty” of intrinsic existence (Nhat Hanh, 
1999). Emptiness does not explicitly occur as a theory in Buddhism. It is considered more as a 
truth of existence, or even as a state of being and way of life (Van Gordon et al., 2016a). 
However, for the purposes of the present chapter, it is fitting to refer to emptiness as a theory 
because: (i) Western Psychology does not currently accept the principles of emptiness and 
views it from an “outside” perspective, and (ii) it facilitates an objective investigation of the 
underlying assumptions of emptiness.  
Emptiness is considered by some to be one of the most poorly understood – and perhaps 
poorly elucidated – Buddhist teachings (Shonin et al., 2015b). For example, there is a common 
misconception that suññatā (emptiness) is a Mahayana Buddhist concept, whereas anattā (Pāli; 
non-self) is a Theravada Buddhist concept (Mahayana and Theravada refer to different 
Buddhist schools; for a discussion of the differences between the major schools of Buddhism, 
see Shonin et al., 2014g). However, within the Theravada Pāli Canon, there exits (for example) 
the Greater Discourse on Emptiness (MN 122) and the Lesser Discourse on Emptiness (MN 
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121) – known as the Mahāsuññata Sutta and the Culasuññata Sutta, respectively.1 Although 
there is a greater emphasis on emptiness in Mahayana vis-à-vis Theravada Buddhism, 
emptiness still substantially features in the Theravada discourses. Some scholars draw 
distinctions between “Theravada non-self” and “Mahayana emptiness” by asserting that 
emptiness encompasses the notion of non-self but extends beyond the “self” to include all 
phenomena. However, in essence, non-self and emptiness are the same thing. If there is no self, 
by default, there is no other. Thus, logic dictates that non-self implies that all phenomena are 
empty (Van Gordon et al., 2016a).  
Despite these terminological issues, emptiness is a reasonably common sense notion that 
can be validated using simple logical deduction. There are numerous Buddhist metaphysical 
standpoints from which emptiness can be examined and interpreted, each with their own 
strengths and limitations. This chapter primarily focuses on the Mahayana Buddhist outlook 
because as referred to above, emptiness is more extensively referred to in Mahayana doctrine. 
Arguably, the three most widely propagated Mahayana dialogues on emptiness are viewing it 
through the lens of: (i) interconnectedness, (ii) the Mādhyamaka view of a middle-way between 
extremes, and (iii) the Yogācāra supposition that all phenomena are dreamlike and of the nature 
of mind. 
Interconnectedness is perhaps the most elementary of these three ontological standpoints. 
It refers to the notion that phenomena are intricately interconnected and that they arise in 
dependence upon each other (Nhat Hanh, 1999). For example, a flower manifests in dependence 
upon the water and air in the atmosphere, heat of the sun, seed from which it grew, nutrients in 
the soil, insects and animals that died and decomposed in order to produce those nutrients, etc. 
Consequently, the flower does not exist in isolation of all other phenomena and it is empty of 
an independent and inherently existing self. Although investigating emptiness via the concept 
                                                          
1 A search for the term emptiness in modern translations of the Theravada scriptures may prove ineffective 
because suññatā has often been translated (e.g., by Ñanamoli & Bodhi, 2009) as ‘voidness’. 
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of interconnectedness can help foster a basic understanding of emptiness, this system of thought 
is not without its limitations. The most obvious limitation being that by asserting phenomena 
are connected to each other, the premise that they are empty of inherent existence is 
automatically negated (because phenomena cannot be connected to each other if they do not 
inherently exist) (Shonin et al., 2015b). Consistent with this line of reasoning, another 
translation of the Sanskrit word śūnyatā is boundlessness, which is based on the assumption 
that it is impossible to draw absolute boundaries between one phenomenon and another. 
The second of the aforementioned methods of interpreting emptiness is based on the work 
of the Indian Māhāyana Buddhist philosopher and saint Nāgārjuna (2nd c. AD), who founded the 
Mādhyamaka (meaning “middle-way”) school of Buddhist thought. Nāgārjuna asserted that any 
given object cannot be said to exist: (i) in isolation from its parts, (ii) as each part individually, 
or (iii) as the sum of its parts (because as a collective, the component parts do not cease to be 
component parts but are nonetheless assigned a label that by convention denotes an entirely new 
phenomenon) (Garfield, 1995). Nāgārjuna advocated a “conceptual” middle way between the 
extremes of inherent existence and nihilism. The term “conceptual” is employed because at no 
point did Nāgārjuna explicitly posit that a middle way actually exists. In other words, the notion 
of a middle way was introduced more for didactic purposes because if it is shown and/or accepted 
that the two poles of a continuum are untenable, then it is also untenable that there is a middle-
way that exists between them (Shonin et al., 2014g).  
Nāgārjuna’s rejection of nihilism is as equally significant as his rejection of inherent 
existence, and was intended to dispel the erroneous view that emptiness and non-existence are 
interchangeable terms. Although all phenomena manifest in reliance upon causes and 
conditions and are thus devoid of an inherent self, this does not negate the fact that phenomena 
appear and can be perceived by an onlooker. It is for this reason that the Heart Sutra (Sanskrit: 
Prajna Paramita Hrdaya Sutra) – a fundamental Māhāyana Buddhist teaching on emptiness – 
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asserts that “form does not differ from emptiness, emptiness does not differ from form” (Soeng, 
1995, p.1). The purpose of this statement is to explicate the Buddhist view that: (i) form (i.e., 
appearances and all perceived phenomena) are of the nature of emptiness, and (ii) emptiness is 
not a mystical state of mind or an alternative non-worldly dimension, but constitutes the very 
nature and fabric of the reality in which we currently find ourselves (i.e., the present moment) 
(Soeng, 1995).  
The notion of phenomena being empty yet still perceptible to the human mind is explored 
further by the Yogācāra school of Māhāyana Buddhism (i.e., the third metaphysical standpoint 
referred to above). In essence, the Yogācāra school of thought asserts that waking state reality 
occurs in much the same manner as a dream and that it unfolds entirely within the expanse of 
the mind. It is generally acknowledged that the Yogācāra Buddhist standpoint accepts that 
phenomena perceived by the mind are empty of intrinsic existence, but there is debate as to 
whether: (i) the Yogācāra school also accepts that the mind itself is empty of intrinsic existence, 
and (ii) the Mādhyamaka approach reflects a superior metaphysical position (Williams, 2008). 
However, in the present author’s opinion – and consistent with the view of the 8th Century 
Indian Buddhist philosopher Śāntarakṣita – the assertion that the Yogācāra view posits an 
inherently-existing mind is based on a poor understanding of the Yogācāra approach.  
At first glance, the Yogācāra view that waking-state reality comprises the same 
underlying fabric and nature of a dream may appear to be an absurd notion that contradicts 
accepted psychological and scientific conventions. However, as shown below (see Figure 5.1) 
in text extracted and adapted from a Buddhist interpretation of emptiness entitled Dream or 
Reality (Shonin & Van Gordon, 2014a), a more in-depth examination of the Yogācāra position 
demonstrates that there are actually no logical grounds upon which to distinguish between the 
ultimate nature of how phenomena exist in a dream, and how they exist in waking-state reality.  
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Figure 5.1. Dream or Reality (extracted & adapted from Shonin & Van Gordon, 2014a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Emptiness of Self and Current Psychological Thought 
 
Professor: Are we awake or are we dreaming? 
Student: We are awake, of course. 
Professor: How can you be certain? 
Student: That is easy. In a dream, everything is illusory and the product of the mind. However in waking 
reality things are real and exist. 
Professor: So according to you we are currently awake and therefore my fountain pen really exists. 
Student: That is correct. The pen writes when I press it against the paper. It is real. 
Professor: So your criteria for reality is based on the function that an object performs? 
Student: Of course. 
Professor: Take away all of the components of the pen, so that you are left with only the nib. Does the 
nib still write? 
Student: Yes, it still works because there is a small amount of ink remaining. 
Professor: But the nib isn’t the pen? 
Student: Good point. It appears my original premise was wrong. Although it performs the function of 
the pen, the nib is just a single pen component, and not all the parts that comprise the pen. One thing 
cannot be another thing. 
Professor: So is the pen real? 
Student: Well, having just taken the pen apart and seen that all of its components are present, I would 
still conclude that the pen is real. I still think we are awake. 
Professor: So you are saying that the pen exists as the sum of its component parts? 
Student: Yes, that is correct. 
Professor: I see. But you have already said that something cannot be two things at the once. Yet now 
you seem to be saying that when the nib, cartridge, lid, and other pen components are put together, 
they stop being those components and become a new single entity? 
Student: No, that is illogical. The component parts still exist in the pen, but the word “pen” is employed 
to designate the collection of individual components that together form that object. 
Professor: So you are saying that “pen” is just a label? 
Student: Well I guess so. 
Professor: But if “pen” is just a label then the pen does not inherently exist. So are you now saying that 
we are currently dreaming? 
Student: I am confused now. Irrespective of whether we are awake or dreaming, although things 
certainly appear to exist, there is no logical basis upon which to make that claim. A dream occurs 
within the expanse of the mind, and in a dream, there is the impression of coming and going, yet 
nothing really moves. Whilst dreaming, there is also near and far, but there is actually no distance. In 
a dream, although things appear, they are illusory and cannot be said to truly exist. However, 
composite objects perceived by the waking mind are also devoid of intrinsic existence. Are you 
saying that waking reality also unfolds within the expanse of the mind? 
Professor: You will have to work that out for yourself. 
Student: We still have not determined whether we are currently dreaming or awake. 
Professor: Does it really matter? Can’t you just relax and enjoy each moment of whichever reality you 
are currently in? 
Student: Yes, I think I can. 
71 
 
 
There are various interpretations of what delineates the self in psychology. Some of these 
favour a more fixed self that resides at the centre of its world (e.g., Harré, 1998), whilst other 
elucidations – particularly from the field of social psychology – are constructed more around 
the notion of a dynamic and relational self (e.g., Markus, Mullally, & Kitayama, 1997; Smith 
& Mackie, 2007). However, irrespective of which psychological system of conceptualizing the 
self is preferred, the existence of a definite “self” or “I” entity is invariably explicitly or 
implicitly inferred in Western psychology. An obvious example is Rogers’ (1959) humanistic 
approach in which dimensions of self-worth, self-image, and ideal-self are collectively 
understood to comprise an individual’s self-concept (i.e., the set of established beliefs and 
perceptions an individual harbours about themselves). Compared to Freud’s (1923) earlier 
contributions based on the id, ego, and superego, the humanistic approach advocated by 
Roger’s and others is generally accepted to have greater utility in contemporary psychological 
settings (Kahn, 1998). Nevertheless, both Freudian and Rogerian systems of thought are 
constructed around the explicit acceptance of a discrete “self” entity. 
The existence of a definite self is likewise explicit within Winnicott’s (1965) true self 
(based on the individual’s sense of “simply being”) and false self (based on the individual’s 
sense of doing and on societal expectation) schema. Unsurprisingly, this identification with an 
inherently existing self continues throughout the various developments of Winnicott’s work 
(e.g., Kohut, 1966, 1971; Lowen, 2004; Orbach, 2009; Symington, 2003). For example, 
Kohut’s (1966, 1971) self-psychology model is constructed around the idea of the grandiose-
exhibitionistic self (i.e., the ideal person) and the idealised parental imago (i.e., the ideal 
parent). An intrinsically existing self is also proposed in Lewis’ (1990) model of self in which 
two distinct dimensions of selfhood are posited: (i) the existential self that has a sense of being 
distinct from others, and (ii) the categorical self that understands that although it is a separate 
entity, it also exists within, and makes part of, the world. 
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Phenomenological psychology is also based on the assumption of a discrete self-entity 
that experiences and interacts with its world: “The perception of the world is nothing but an 
expansion of my field of presence, it does not transcend the essential structures of this field, 
and the body always remains an agent in and never becomes an object of this field. The world 
is an open and indefinite unity in which I am situated” (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 318). It could 
be argued that the practice of bracketing within phenomenology enables the notion of self and 
the factors that condition its interpretation of the world to be transcended (Creswell, 2007). This 
is true to a certain degree but bracketing does not deny the existence of a self, it simply limits 
the influence of an analyst’s selfhood in terms of how data relating to the “lifeworld” of another 
individual is interpreted. 
It is beyond the scope of the present chapter to outline and/or appraise each of the various 
models of self within psychology, and the examples above are included merely to establish that 
an intrinsically existing self is explicit within many of the founding systems of current 
psychological thought. However, there are also psychological models that subscribe to a more 
abstract and/or holistic notion of self. Jungian theory is an obvious example in which the Self 
archetype denotes the unification of both the conscious and unconscious mind (Van Gordon, et 
al., 2016a). According to Jung (1981), the Self signifies the whole of the being and it cannot be 
limited or fixed to a given location in time or space. A more abstract conceptualisation of self 
is likewise presented in Hayes’ (2002) work on Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT), 
in which a transcendent self is favoured over a conceptualised self (i.e., an individual’s 
conception [and attachment to that conception] of who they think they are).  
Jungian and ACT interpretations offer a more abstract and holistic notion of self, and are 
arguably positioned one step closer to the Buddhist depiction of the “emptiness of self”. 
Nevertheless, given that both of these systems imply that the processes of knowing and 
perception are locus-orientated, an inherently existing self is still implicitly assumed. Thus, 
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throughout the various psychological interpretations of self in the study of human personality, 
social relationships, cognitive and behavioural processes, phenomenology, and 
psychopathology, there is an explicit or implicit acceptance of an inherently existing “I” (Chan, 
2008).  
 
Use of the Term “Emptiness” in Psychology 
In terms of Western psychology’s specific usage and understanding of the term “emptiness”, 
there are very few instances where the term has been assimilated by the psychological literature. 
Furthermore, when references to emptiness are made, they mostly occur within the clinical 
literature. Within clinical psychology, emptiness tends to be associated with feelings of 
hopelessness, loneliness, and isolation (Klonsky, 2008). However, an interpretation of 
emptiness that perhaps sits closer to the Buddhist model has been identified in schizophrenia 
research. For example, according to Clark (1996), “Schizoid patients often appear bland or 
faintly repellent to other people and equally often describe themselves as empty and without a 
self. One aspect of this emptiness is defensive in nature. It is born of the desire to protect the 
self. Unfortunately, however, defensive emptying serves to weaken the very thing the individual 
is trying to protect” (p. 153).  
In the majority of cases, the feelings of emptiness experienced by some individuals with 
schizophrenia-spectrum disorders are likely to be maladaptive. However, if it is accepted that 
emptiness does in fact represent the ultimate truth of existence, then perhaps aspects of these 
delusions may not be as irrational as current clinical consensus might suggest. Based on this 
premise, a recent clinical case study involving an individual with co-occurring schizophrenia 
and pathological gambling successfully utilised emptiness training (in conjunction with 
meditation and cognitive behavioural therapy techniques) and emphasis was placed on helping 
the individual accrue the necessary insight and resources to understand and accept the notion 
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of an empty self (i.e., rather than reject it or allow it to become a cause of internal conflict; 
Shonin et al., 2014b). As demonstrated by this case study example, there are clearly a number 
of important implications for psychology if emptiness theory is accepted as valid.  
 
Empirical Investigation of Emptiness 
Based upon the assumption that the self and reality are empty of intrinsic existence, the entire 
canonical collection of Buddhist teachings and the commentaries upon them are in some way 
orientated towards undermining the belief in the intrinsic existence of phenomena. However, 
despite the fact that Buddhism does not subscribe to the belief in concrete self-entities, it accepts 
that most people do (Dalai Lama, 1995). Consequently, the Buddhist discourses can be broadly 
divided into: (i) teachings intended to be interpreted and practiced on the relative level (i.e., 
where reality is constructed in dualistic terms and where a subject exists only because there is 
an object), and (ii) those teachings that are concerned more with the absolute aspect of existence 
(i.e., the true or ultimate mode in which reality exists, which transcends the concept of duality) 
(Tsong-Kha-Pa, 2004). The first category of teachings are generally utilised to guide 
individuals through the preparatory stages of Buddhist practice such that they can subsequently 
apprehend the essential meaning of teachings concerning the absolute level. 
 Thus, a point of note concerning Buddhism is that it does not realistically expect 
individuals to come to a sudden and full intuitive understanding of emptiness (although there 
are rare reports of this happening; Sogyal Rinpoche, 1998). Indeed, according to Buddhist 
thought, giving rise to a full realisation of emptiness invariably takes an entire lifetime (or many 
lifetimes) of dedicated day-to-day spiritual and contemplative practice (Dalai Lama & Berzin, 
1997). Consequently, the principles of emptiness are often taught at the very start of the 
meditative journey, so that they can be gradually internalised as the individual accrues spiritual 
and life experience. 
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 Recent empirical findings suggest that introducing individuals to emptiness in this 
gradual manner can enhance different aspects of psychosocial functioning. For instance, a 
cross-sectional study investigating the Buddhist principle of non-attachment found that non-
attachment to self and experiences predicted greater levels of acceptance, non-reactivity, 
mindfulness, self-compassion, subjective wellbeing, and eudemonic wellbeing (Sahdra, 
Shaver, & Brown, 2010). In the same study, non-attachment was negatively associated with 
fatalistic outlook, avoidance of intimacy, dissociation, and alexithymia (i.e., an impaired ability 
to identify or describe feelings). A more recent cross-sectional study showed that non-
attachment to self and experience predicted prosocial behaviour in adolescents (Sahdra, 
Ciarrochi, Parker, Marshall, & Heaven, 2015). 
An intervention study involving a six-week group therapy that taught selflessness and 
other related Buddhist principles demonstrated that individuals with co-occurring diabetes and 
depression that received the therapeutic intervention reported significant reductions in anxiety 
over treatment-as-usual controls (Rungreangkulkij, Wongtakee, & Thongyot, 2011). More 
recently, a number of studies have investigated the utility of a secular (but Buddhist-based) 
eight-week intervention known as MAT. A key pedagogic feature of MAT is the importance it 
assigns to training participants in the concept and practice of emptiness (as well as other 
Buddhist meditative and spiritual techniques). Findings – including from clinical case studies 
as well as randomised and non-randomised controlled trials – have shown that MAT can 
improve: (i) work-related stress, (ii) stress, anxiety, and depression, (iii) workaholism, (iv) co-
occurring schizophrenia and pathological gambling, and (v) job satisfaction, organisational 
citizenship, and job performance (Shonin et al., 2014b, 2014c, 2014d; Van Gordon et al., 
2016b; 2016d; 2017). Qualitative studies also demonstrate that MAT participants associate 
understanding and practicing emptiness with improvements in psychological and spiritual 
wellbeing, as well with the undermining of maladaptive ego-attachment constructs (Shonin & 
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Van Gordon, 2015a). 
A closely related principle to emptiness is the Buddhist concept of impermanence that 
comprises the following three dimensions: (i) the self (and indeed all phenomena) will 
ultimately die and cease to be, (ii) phenomena (including the self) are constantly changing and 
do not remain in stasis for even the smallest scientifically meaningful moment of time (i.e., one 
Planck time [5.39 x 10-43 seconds]), and (iii) the transiency of phenomena (i.e., the fact that 
they are constantly changing) means that they – and anything resembling a self that intrinsically 
exists within them – can never be located in time and space (Tsong-Kha-pa, 2004). A number 
of trauma and grief treatment modalities have begun to integrate impermanence awareness 
training (often in conjunction with mindfulness training) as a means of helping individuals 
come to terms with the fact that: (i) life is uncertain and sudden loss of life and/or traumatic 
events can (and do) happen, and (ii) the only thing certain about life is that it will end in death 
(Cacciatore, & Flint, 2012; Cacciatore, Thieleman, Osborn, & Orlowski, 2014a; Cacciatore, 
Thieleman, Killian, & Tavasolli,, 2014b; Kumar, 2005; Wada & Park, 2009). An increased 
acceptance of the impermanent nature of existence may help to facilitate the earlier-onset of the 
recovery and restorative phases of the grieving process (Wada & Park, 2009). 
 Examples of other empirical evidence indicating applications for emptiness in applied 
psychological settings are provided – albeit in a less direct manner – from studies of Buddhist 
compassion and loving-kindness meditation techniques. Compassion meditation is described 
in the psychological literature as the meditative development of affective empathy as part of 
the visceral sharing of others’ suffering (Shamay-Tsoory, 2011). Loving-kindness meditation 
is distinct from compassion meditation and involves the meditative cultivation of a feeling of 
love for all beings (Lee et al., 2012). Both compassion and loving-kindness meditative 
techniques can be described as being “other” as opposed to “self” focussed. From the Buddhist 
perspective, undertaking spiritual and meditative practice with the intention of alleviating the 
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suffering of others represents a “win-win” scenario because it not only helps other beings both 
materially and spiritually, but it also helps the meditation practitioner assume a humble 
demeanour that is essential for dismantling attachment to the belief in an inherently existing 
self (Shonin et al., 2014g). Studies of compassion and loving-kindness meditation have 
demonstrated a broad range of salutary health outcomes including improvements in (but not 
limited to): (i) schizophrenia symptomatology (Johnson et al., 2011), (ii) positive and negative 
affect (May, Weyker, Spengel, Finkler, & Hendrix, 2014), (iii) depression, anxiety, and stress 
(Van Gordon et al., 2014a), (iv) anger regulation (Carson et al., 2005), (v) personal resources 
(Fredrickson, Cohn, Coffey, Pek, & Finkel, 2008), (vi) the accuracy and encoding of social-
relevant stimuli (Mascaro, Rilling, Negi, & Raison, 2013), and (vii) affective processing 
(Desbordes et al., 2012). 
 
Mechanisms of Action 
According to Buddhist thought, psychological suffering stems from an erroneous belief in an 
inherently existing self. This maladaptive core belief has been termed ontological addiction (Van 
Gordon et al., 2016f) which has been formulated as a new category of addiction (i.e., in addition 
to more traditional chemical addiction and behavioural addiction). Ontological addiction is 
defined as “the unwillingness to relinquish an erroneous and deep-rooted belief in an inherently 
existing ‘self’ or ‘I’ as well as the ‘impaired functionality’ that arises from such a belief” (Shonin 
et al., 2013a, p.64). Buddhism teaches that maladaptive mental states manifest as a result of the 
imputed self: (i) yearning for objects and/or experiences that it considers will enhance its 
circumstances and survival prospects, and (ii) harbouring aversion towards objects and/or 
experiences it considers will negatively influence its circumstances and/or threaten its sense of 
self (Gampopa, 1998). This process of constant craving is known in Buddhism as attachment and 
is defined as “the over-allocation of cognitive and emotional resources towards a particular 
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object, construct, or idea to the extent that the object is assigned an attractive quality that is 
unrealistic and that exceeds its intrinsic worth” (Shonin et al., 2014g, p.126). Buddhism asserts 
that attachment leads to an exacerbation of ontological addiction and that practicing emptiness is 
the most effective means of deconstructing the erroneous belief in the inherent existence of the 
self (Van Gordon et al., 2016a). 
In terms of attempting to explicate how the gradual internalisation of emptiness 
facilitates recovery from ontological addiction, the following mechanistic pathways have been 
proposed: (i) emptiness promotes therapeutic transformation due to the client and therapist 
relaxing their attachment to selfhood and connecting in an open and uninhibited manner 
(Segall, 2003; Sills & Lown, 2008), (ii) non-attachment to self and experience fosters 
increased implicit and explicit affection towards others which helps to improve prosocial 
behaviour (Sahdra et al., 2015), (iii) emptiness leads to an increase of spiritual awareness that 
exerts a protective influence over life-stressors as well as feelings of loneliness, isolation, and 
low sense of purpose (Shonin & Van Gordon, 2015a), (iv) reduced preoccupation with self 
facilitates a greater acceptance of death and this, in turn, reduces death- and/or grieving-
related anxiety and trauma-response (Cacciatore et al., 2014a, 2014b; Kumar, 2005), (v) by 
gradually undermining deep-rooted core beliefs concerning selfhood, emptiness mediates the 
effect of psychotherapeutic techniques that work at the surface level of behaviour and 
cognition (Chan, 2008), (vi) reducing the amount of self allocated to life and work tasks 
fosters strategic perspective, clarity of thought, decision-making competency, and problem-
solving skills (Shonin & Van Gordon, 2015a), (vii) emptiness reduces the intrinsic value that 
individuals with addiction disorders assign to the object of their addiction (Griffiths, Shonin, 
& Van Gordon, 2015), and (viii) emptiness ameliorates self-obsession which helps to reduce 
thought rumination and negative thinking patterns (Trungpa, 2003). 
Implications of Emptiness for Psychology 
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Outcomes from several of the aforementioned empirical investigations of emptiness (e.g., 
improvements in prosocial behaviour and organisational citizenship) appear to suggest that 
individuals with a better understanding of emptiness construct a more permeable boundary 
between self and society. Consistent with the view by some psychologists that rigid divides 
between self and other are contraindicative to optimal human functioning (e.g., Sampson, 1999), 
emptiness may have implications in social psychology for advancing understanding of the 
correlates and determinants of healthy societies. As noted earlier, an inherently existing self is 
implicit within the study of social psychology. Indeed, an individual’s belief that it exists and has 
a role in society is deemed to be important for both self and societal enhancement (Smith & 
Mackie, 2007). However, a common misconception concerning emptiness theory is that it does 
not prevent individuals from assuming an identity or role within society. Emptiness recognizes 
and allows for the uniqueness of every individual (and all phenomena), and it also recognizes 
that such individuals are key components of a much larger whole (Nhat Hanh, 1999). In other 
words, emptiness of self and the absence of self-identity are two very different notions. 
Emptiness allows for the complete expression of individuality but acknowledges that such 
individuality can only manifest out of a larger society of which the individual forms an 
inseparable part.2 
If the principle of emptiness is accepted, then there are also implications for the field of 
neuropsychology. More specifically, in recent decades there have been attempts to identify the 
neurological seat of the self and/or consciousness (Koch, 2004). To a certain degree, these efforts 
have been successful because associations have been identified between certain self-related 
cognitive processes and the activation of specific areas in the brain. Two examples of relevance 
to the present chapter are the: (i) association between self-referential memories and increased 
activation of the medial prefrontal cortex (Kelley et al., 2002), and (ii) regulation of self-
                                                          
2 At the absolute level, this larger society is likewise absent of inherent existence. 
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recognition (normally of facial images) by the left cerebral hemisphere (Heatherton, Macrae, & 
Kelley, 2004; Turk et al., 2002). However, despite the fact that neuroimaging studies provide 
useful data in terms of brain areas that correspond to self-referential processes, the activation of 
such brain areas does not equate to the location of consciousness or the nucleus of an inherently 
existing self. Rather, neuron activation in these brain areas simply demonstrates that most 
individuals have a pronounced sense of self. From the perspective of emptiness theory, empirical 
attempts to identify the location of self or consciousness would be considered a somewhat futile 
endeavour because at the absolute level, consciousness and self exist as all things, and they abide 
just as much within the brain as they do outside of it.  
As previously suggested (see section on the Empirical Investigation of Emptiness), 
emptiness may have utility within mental health treatment settings, and for promoting adaptive 
psychosocial functioning more generally. However, in terms of its potential impact upon the 
treatment and understanding of mental health issues, perhaps the most significant implication of 
emptiness theory is the fact that if the clinical literature continues to accept, assimilate, and utilise 
such Buddhist principles, then it will also need to re-evaluate its assumptions in terms of what 
actually constitutes mental illness. The reason for this is because individuals currently deemed 
to be “mentally healthy” (by Western medical conventions) would not be considered as such 
according to emptiness theory. Indeed, the Buddhist teachings on emptiness assert that any 
individual that does not perceive the absolute (i.e., empty) nature of reality is effectively deluded 
(Gampopa, 1998). 
 The condition of perceiving the world in this deluded manner has recently been referred 
to as an inverted hallucination, and it involves the non-perceiving of that which is (Shonin et al., 
2014g). This is distinct from the more regular form of hallucination that involves the perceiving 
of that which is not. Therefore, rather than a continuum with categories of mentally healthy and 
mentally ill at each end, a model of mental illness in accord with the theoretical assumptions of 
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emptiness would necessitate a continuum with categories of deluded or mentally ill at one end, 
and extremely deluded or extremely mentally ill at the other. Implicit within such a model would 
be the understanding that all un-enlightened beings exhibit symptoms of mental illness, but these 
symptoms are more accentuated in some individuals compared to others. 
Given the fact that extant psychiatric diagnostic systems accept that symptoms of mental 
illness can be present at the sub-diagnostic level (Davey, 2008), it could be argued that the 
aforementioned description of an emptiness-compatible model of mental illness does not present 
a significant departure from current psychological thought. However, as previously elucidated, 
rather than assessing the severity of mental illness according to its impact upon functionality, an 
emptiness-compatible model would assess illness severity according to the intensity of ego- or 
self-attachment. Not only does this constitute a departure from current diagnostic procedures, but 
it would be conceivable (according to emptiness theory) that an individual could – by Western 
psychological conventions – be classified as mentally healthy and found to be functioning in an 
adaptive manner, yet at the same time be substantially attached to their selfhood. 
Given that emptiness involves a number of subtle existential and ontological concepts and 
given that research into the properties, correlates, and applications of emptiness is still at an early 
stage, it is difficult to make reliable or definitive inferences regarding the degree of disconnect 
between emptiness theory and current psychological understanding of mental health. Based on 
findings from some of the aforementioned empirical studies indicating strong positive 
correlations between emptiness and adaptive psychosocial functioning, it may be that the two 
conceptual approaches are more compatible than might be expected. Nevertheless, there are some 
fundamental differences in terms of how Western psychology and emptiness theory understand 
mental illness, and this should be borne in mind as part of any attempt to integrate emptiness 
principles into Western mental health diagnostic and treatment systems. 
A Theory of Everything 
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In addition to implications specific to psychology, there are also implications of emptiness for 
the wider scientific understanding of mind and matter. In recent decades, there have been 
numerous attempts within physics to formulate a theoretical framework – known as a theory of 
everything (ToE) – that explains and links together all physical aspects of the universe 
(Hawking, 2006). An explication of leading ToE theories is beyond the scope of this chapter, 
as is a detailed evaluation of evidence from the field of quantum mechanics that appears to 
support the validity of emptiness. However, suffice to say, there is growing consensus amongst 
quantum theorists that at the sub-atomic level, there can never be absolute certainty that a 
particle exists at a given position in time or space (O’Connell et al., 2010). In fact, it has been 
demonstrated in an experimental setting that a minute metal blade of semi-conductor material 
can be made to simultaneously vibrate in two different energy states (O’Connell et al., 2010). 
These experimental findings are the kinetic equivalent of matter being in two different places 
at the same time. They demonstrate that at the sub-atomic level, particles (and any property of 
self that they might possess) can never be absolutely located in time and space (i.e., they exist 
nowhere and everywhere at the same time).  
The present author argues that emptiness theory is a type of ToE because it provides a 
unifying theory regarding the nature and workings of reality. Consistent with the 
aforementioned experimental findings, emptiness implies that phenomena never come to rest 
in a fixed place, are made of “transience”, and do not exist in absolute terms. Therefore, within 
emptiness, phenomena are deemed to be of the same nature and they are all assigned an 
equivalent level of importance (Norbu & Clemente, 1999). Phenomena arise from emptiness, 
are empty of inherent existence for the duration of their manifestation, and dissolve back into 
emptiness (Nhat Hanh, 1999). Thus, according to emptiness theory, reality exists as a 
singularity that transcends the “man-made” concepts of space and time. This is very similar to 
the singularity that is believed to have been present immediately before matter was created 
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following the Big Bang (Penrose, 2006). The only difference between emptiness theory and 
current scientific thought is that the latter draws a distinction between the absolute energy state 
of the reality that existed before and after the Big Bang. However, in emptiness, no such 
distinction can be drawn because the pre-Big Bang singularity was already “pregnant” with 
reality as we know it today. At the absolute level, current reality is simply a face or expression 
of that “primordial” singularity and nothing has been created that has different absolute physical 
or metaphysical properties than that which created it. 
Emptiness theory posits that no distinction can be made between the inherent existential 
properties of tangible phenomena such as a house, tree, or planet, and intangible phenomena 
such as a thought, feeling, or dream (Norbu & Clemente, 1999). Consequently, emptiness 
implies that matter is composed of “mind particles” and that these mind particles are only 
perceived as “real” because the mind that perceives them is deluded. Consider the example of 
a person becoming frightened or excited during a dream – the mind has a deep-rooted 
propensity to apprehend as “existing” that which ultimately has no substance. Emptiness theory 
asserts that when a mind stops being attached to phenomena (including itself), it lets go of the 
idea of existing as a discrete self-entity and expands to its full capacity (Khyentse, 2007). The 
notion of a mind expanding to its full capacity is perhaps best explained by the analogy of a 
wave and the ocean. Although a wave appears to arise as a discrete phenomenon, at no time is 
it separate from the ocean. A deluded mind might be compared to a wave that only sees itself 
as a wave, whilst a mind expanded to its full capacity might be compared to a wave that has 
realised that it is an expression of the entire ocean.  
There is also evidence from within psychology that appears to support the assertion within 
emptiness theory that the universe (or multiverse) is “mind made”. The (now scientifically more 
accepted) phenomenon of near death experiences suggest that the mind continues (for a limited 
or unlimited period) to create and then live in a reality beyond clinical death (Belanti, Perera, 
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& Jagadheesan, 2008). To a certain degree, this appears to be consistent with the notion in 
emptiness theory that the deluded mind eternally migrates from one self-created reality to 
another. Some examples of these mind-created realties include: (i) waking-state reality, (ii) 
dream reality, and (iii) the reality that exists between death and re-entering into waking-state 
reality (Tsong-Kha-Pa, 2004). Some of these realities are understood to be created and lived in 
primarily by a single mind (e.g., dream state), whilst other realities – such as waking-state 
reality – are understood to be co-created. Examples of other mind realities posited by emptiness 
theory are perhaps less familiar to current psychological thought and include the existence of 
entirely different world systems (Dalai Lama, 2004). However, even the notion that there exist 
different realities and world systems is not completely foreign to modern science because M-
theory (and related mathematical models from quantum mechanics) asserts that reality actually 
has multiple (i.e., more than ten) dimensions to it (Hawking, 2010; Schwarz, 1999). Although 
emptiness theory asserts that the number of conceivable realities is infinite, recent mathematical 
and theoretical models from quantum mechanics appear to be closing some of the ground 
between modern scientific and ancient Eastern perspectives. 
A further body of evidence from within psychology that adds credibility to emptiness 
theory as a valid ToE comes from neuropsychology and the basic principles of saltatory 
conduction through the nervous system. Upon stimulation, sense receptors are understood to 
send electrochemical impulses via the peripheral nervous system to the central nervous system 
(CNS) (Vogel, 2009). The CNS receives these electrochemical messages and transforms them 
into coherent information that can be acted upon. However, without exception, an individuals’ 
sense of movement, touch, taste, pain, pleasure, sight, sound, and so forth is based upon a 
mental impression formulated by the CNS. In other words, the CNS transforms electrochemical 
information into a ‘working’ three-dimensional image or movie. However, consistent with the 
principles of emptiness, although there is the impression of living in and moving through a 
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physical world, in truth, there is never any movement and life is experienced solely as the 
mental projection of the CNS. 
 
Conclusion 
The principle of emptiness arises from the 2,500-year-old Buddhist system of spiritual practice 
and refers to the belief that all phenomena are empty of intrinsic existence. Current scientific 
and psychological interest into the properties, correlates, and applications of emptiness has 
probably grown out of increasing public and scientific interest into the Buddhist meditative 
practice of mindfulness. Cultivating an advanced level of competency in mindfulness – the 
practice of becoming aware of the present moment - requires a concrete understanding of the 
true and absolute (i.e., empty) mode in which the present moment exists (Nhat Hanh, 1999). 
Logical enquiry and evidence from a wide range of scientific disciplines appears to be 
gradually adding credence to the notion that phenomena are empty of intrinsic existence. If 
emptiness theory continues to be validated and accepted by Western psychology, it will become 
necessary to re-examine some established beliefs in relation to the workings of both the 
psychological and physical world. Examples of how emptiness might develop and/or 
complement psychological and wider scientific understanding in this respect would include 
coming to the acceptance that: (i) what is currently understood to be waking reality is effectively 
a shared dream, (ii) phenomena are in a constant state of transience, are “dream like” and/or 
“mind-made” in nature, and do not occupy a fixed place in time and space, (iii) physical space 
and all that it occupies is of the same composition of the mind, (iv) the self does not inherently 
exist, (v) the underlying cause of mental illness is the belief in inherent self-existence, and (vi) 
maladaptive psychosocial functioning and the absence of mental illness are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive occurrences. 
Further empirical evaluation into the validity and applications of emptiness is clearly 
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needed. However, perhaps one of the biggest challenges in terms of assimilating emptiness into 
Western research and applied psychological settings is the fact that as soon as emptiness is 
adopted as an object of empirical research or contemplative practice, there occurs a betrayal of 
the essential meaning of emptiness. According to emptiness theory, even emptiness is devoid 
of intrinsic existence (Tsong-Kha-Pa, 2004). Consequently, during the empirical study or 
practice of emptiness, there is a risk of emptiness being reified and erroneously apprehended as 
a metaphysical phenomenon that can be realised, analysed, and categorised. Indeed, any 
investigation of emptiness can only be undertaken according to the norms and laws of 
empiricism that are not necessarily compatible with the profound nature of emptiness that exists 
outside the confines of conceptuality (Puhakka, 2015).  
In spite of this, if supportive empirical findings relating to emptiness continue to emerge, 
it is possible that some of the next important scientific “discoveries” concerning mind and 
matter will emerge at the intersection of ancient Eastern contemplative practice, empirically-
grounded Western psychological insights, and quantum mechanics.  
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Chapter 6 
Ontological addiction: Classification, aetiology, and treatment 
 
This chapter (whether in full or in part) was adapted for publication and was subsequently 
published as: 
Van Gordon, W., Shonin, E., & Griffiths, M. D. (2016). Ontological addiction: Classification, 
etiology, and treatment. Mindfulness, 7, 660-671. 
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Abstract 
Despite the fact that there is increasing integration of Buddhist principles and practices into 
Western mental health and applied psychological disciplines, there appears to be limited 
understanding in Western psychology of the assumptions that underlie a Buddhist model of 
mental illness. The concept of ontological addiction was introduced and formulated in order to 
narrow some of the disconnect between Buddhist and Western models of mental illness, and to 
foster effective assimilation of Buddhist practices and principles into mental health research 
and practice. Ontological addiction refers to the maladaptive condition whereby an individual 
is addicted to the belief that they inherently exist. The purposes of the present chapter are to: 
(i) classify ontological addiction in terms of its definition, symptoms, prevalence, and 
functional consequences, (ii) examine the aetiology of the condition, and (iii) appraise both the 
traditional Buddhist and contemporary empirical literature in order to outline effective 
treatment strategies. An assessment of the extent to which ontological addiction meets the 
clinical criteria for addiction suggests that ontological addiction is a chronic and valid – albeit 
functionally distinct (i.e., when compared to chemical and behavioural addictions) – form of 
addiction. However, despite the protracted and pervasive nature of the condition, recent 
empirical findings add support to ancient Buddhist teachings and suggest that addiction to 
selfhood can be overcome by a treatment process involving phases of: (i) becoming aware of 
the imputed self, (ii) deconstructing the imputed self, and (iii) reconstructing a dynamic and 
non-dual self.  
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The biopsychosocial model of mental illness asserts that biological, psychological, and social 
factors each play a role in the onset of mental illness (Engel, 1978). It was formulated as an 
alternative to the medical model, that from the late 1970s onwards, was increasingly regarded 
by the scientific community as a form of biomedical reductionism (Ghaemi, 2009).  However, 
despite the more inclusive approach of the biopsychosocial model, it is not necessarily 
compatible with emerging thought and empirical findings regarding the aetiology and treatment 
of psychopathology. More specifically, there is growing assimilation in the clinical literature 
of ancient Buddhist principles concerning the determinants of mental illness, as well as 
interventional techniques constructed upon these principles (Kelly, 2015). Consequently, a 
somewhat paradoxical trend appears to be emerging where mental illnesses that are 
increasingly conceptualised and diagnosed according to a Western biopsychosocial framework, 
are being treated (or recommended for treatment) utilizing Buddhist-derived interventions that 
reject the assumption that mental illness can be solely attributed to a combination of biological, 
psychological, and social influences.  
Consistent with the principles of evidence-based medicine and a ‘what works’ approach 
to treating mental illness, it could be argued that utilizing interventions constructed upon 
assumptions that are incongruous with a Western understanding of psychopathology does not 
present a problem in and of itself. However, although this is true up to a point, a problem begins 
to emerge when: (i) many researchers and clinicians are seemingly unaware that the 
assumptions underlying the techniques they are researching and/or administering run tangential 
to mainstream Western scientific and medical opinion concerning the determinants of 
psychopathology, and (ii) there is limited understanding in the clinical and scientific literature 
of the mechanisms posited by 2500-year-old Buddhist meditational theory that underlie 
therapeutic change (Shonin, Van Gordon, & Griffiths, 2014g). 
In an attempt to foster effective assimilation of Buddhist practices and principles into 
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mental health research and practice, and in an attempt to narrow some of the disconnect 
between Buddhist and Western models of mental illness, the concept of ontological addiction 
was recently introduced and formulated by Shonin et al., (2013a). Consistent with traditional 
Buddhist thought concerning the origins and nature of psychopathology (and suffering more 
generally), ontological addiction refers to the maladaptive condition whereby an individual is 
addicted to the belief that they inherently exist (i.e., as an independent and autonomous entity). 
The purpose of this chapter is to build upon earlier theoretical and empirical works by 
undertaking an in-depth assessment of the various attributes of ontological addiction. By so 
doing, the present author hopes to elucidate a Buddhist construction of mental illness that is 
more palatable to a Western medical and scientific audience. The chapter begins by classifying 
ontological addiction in terms of its definition, symptoms, prevalence, and functional 
consequences, and continues by examining the etiology of the condition. The final part of the 
chapter appraises both the traditional Buddhist and current empirical literature in order to 
propose effective treatment strategies. 
 
Classification 
Definition 
Ontological addiction has been defined as “the unwillingness to relinquish an erroneous and 
deep-rooted belief in an inherently existing ‘self’ or ‘I’ as well as the impaired functionality 
that arises from such a belief” (Shonin et al., 2013, p.64). The intended meaning of each of the 
key terms employed in this definition are explained below in more detail. 
Given that such explanations will make use of the term ‘the Buddhist teachings’, an 
explanatory note is perhaps warranted. The assertion by some scholars that there are many 
‘Buddhisms’ is acceptable because the external form that Buddhism assumes varies according 
to culture, time, and geographic region. However, the present author would argue that all 
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authentic Buddhist lineages teach methods that ultimately lead to the same result. Furthermore, 
most of these methods are intended to foster insight into core Buddhist principles such as 
suffering, impermanence, and non-self. Suffering is suffering whether you approach it from a 
Theravada, Mahayana, or Vajrayana perspective (see Shonin et al. [2014g] for an overview of 
major Buddhist schools, and the differences between them). The same applies to impermanence 
and non-self. Thus, the different Buddhist ‘vehicles’ (a translation of the Sanskrit word yana) 
and their respective traditions essentially work with the same underlying principles, which they 
reconstitute and teach in different ways. The most profound Vajrayana practices are implicit 
within the simplest of Buddhist teachings, such as the discourse on the four noble truths (Van 
Gordon et al., 2015d). Therefore, within Buddhism, there are different interpretations of how 
to effectively practice spiritual development, but in essence, they represent variations on the 
same theme. 
 
Deep-rooted belief 
The words deep-rooted belief are intended to emphasize the persistent and consuming nature 
of the belief in an inherently existing self. In many respects, this term is similar to the notion 
of core beliefs in cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT). Core beliefs are deep-seated beliefs 
that often go unrecognised but significantly influence the way individuals interpret and react 
with people and the world around them (Wells, 1997). However, over and above their meaning 
within CBT contexts, the words deep-rooted belief are employed in the definition of 
ontological addiction in order to depict a much more persistent and primitive form of core 
belief. According to Buddhist theory, in the period following death the innermost aspect of a 
person’s mind or consciousness is reborn within another physical (or non-physical) form 
(Sogyal, 1998). Buddhism asserts that the particular rebirth an individual is attracted to is 
governed by whichever cognitive and behavioural response patterns become dominant during 
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their lifetime (and during previous lifetimes). The Buddhist teachings explain that embedded 
patterns of thinking and behaviour leave an ‘imprint’ on the mind-stream and that following 
death, these tend to propel the innermost aspect of consciousness towards (or away from) a 
particular rebirth (Sogyal, 1998). A detailed explication of Buddhist transmigration theory is 
beyond the scope of this chapter but the salient point is that according to Buddhist philosophy, 
beings are born with a latent tendency to clutch at a ‘self’ and to believe that they inherently 
exist (Dalai Lama & Berzin, 1997). 
 
Inherently existing ‘self’ or ‘I’ 
Models of ‘the self’ in Western psychology range from those that posit a ‘concrete self’, to 
those that assume a more fluid self-schema (Van Gordon et al., 2016a). An example of the 
former would be Rogers’ (1959) humanistic formation in which dimensions of self-worth, self-
image, and ideal-self are collectively understood to comprise an individual’s self-concept. 
Examples of the latter would be certain social psychological constructions in which a more 
relational self is proposed (Smith & Mackie, 2007), and Jungian theory (Jung, 1981) where it 
is asserted that the self cannot be confined to a given location in time or space. While some 
postmodern and poststructuralist philosophical and psychological perspectives have begun to 
question the validity of the self-concept (e.g., Gergen, 2009), it remains the case that most 
established models of self in Western psychology are locus-orientated, and thus implicitly or 
explicitly accept that there is a ‘self’ or an ‘I’ that intrinsically exists (Chan, 2008; Shonin et 
al., 2015b; Van Gordon et al., 2016a).  
Despite the tendency of most people to derive reassurance from the belief that they exist 
as a definite ‘I’ entity, the existence of such an entity is logically and scientifically implausible. 
Without exception, phenomena – including human beings – do not manifest as discrete 
standalone entities but manifest only in reliance upon numerous (or innumerable) causes and 
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conditions (Dalai Lama, 2001). For example, the human body relies for its existence on the air 
that it breathes, animals and plants that it eats, rain that it drinks, and so forth. If a single one of 
these conditions is not present, the human body ceases to manifest (Nhat Hanh, 1992). The fact 
that phenomena are fundamentally interconnected (i.e., boundless) means that they are of the 
nature of ‘non-self’ (i.e., they do not possess a self that exists independently). However, for the 
same reasons that it can asserted that animate and inanimate objects are empty of an intrinsically 
existing self, it can also be asserted that they are ‘full’ of everything that exists. Therefore, the 
one implies the whole, and the whole implies the one.  
It could be construed that there is a contradiction between the statement in the foregoing 
section that there is an innermost aspect of consciousness that survives death, and the assertion 
that sentient beings are of the nature of ‘non-self’. However, these assertions are compatible 
because the innermost aspect of consciousness is also of the nature of non-self (Shonin & Van 
Gordon, 2014c). Consequently, the notion of an inherently existing ‘self’ or ‘I’ is referred to as 
erroneous in the above definition of ontological addiction because a self that exists 
independently and of its own accord is untenable (for a detailed explication of the notions of 
‘non-self’ and ‘emptiness’, see Shonin et al., [2015b]). 
 
Unwillingness to relinquish and impaired functionality 
The terms unwillingness to relinquish and impaired functionality refer to the ‘addictive’ 
properties of ontological addiction, and the fact that it is a maladaptive condition. According 
to Griffiths’ (2005) component model of addiction, for a condition to be considered as an 
addiction, the following six components must be present: (i) salience, (ii) mood modification, 
(iii) tolerance, (iv) withdrawal, (v) conflict, and (iv) relapse. The following draws upon both 
the traditional Buddhist and contemporary psychological (theoretical and empirical) literature 
in order to examine the extent to which ontological addiction meets the conventional criterial 
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for classification as an addiction:  
 
1. Salience occurs when the activity becomes the single most important undertaking in the 
person’s life and dominates their thinking, feelings, and behaviour (Griffiths, 2005). 
Conventional chemical and behavioural forms of addiction involve the ingestion of a 
psychoactive substance (e.g., alcohol, nicotine, cocaine, etc.) and/or engagement in an 
activity (e.g., gambling, internet use, sex). The substance or activity in question 
becomes a (or the) focal point in the individual’s life, and they invariably have some 
awareness of their involvement with the activity or substance in question (Griffiths, 
2005).  
A key difference between ontological addiction and conventional forms of 
addiction is that in the case of the former, the individual is not necessarily aware that 
they are in some way ‘involved’ with the object of their addiction (i.e., they are not 
consciously engaged in the act of believing that they inherently exist). However, this 
does not detract from the fact that their belief in a discrete ‘I’ entity dominates their 
thoughts, feelings, and behaviours. According to Buddhist psychology, attachment or 
addiction to self governs each and every choice made by an individual afflicted with 
ontological addiction (Chan, 2008). In other words, the belief in an inherently existing 
self is understood to become so important to the individual that they are unable to 
associate with it as being separate from themselves (i.e., it has become a characteristic 
that defines their being rather than an activity that they routinely engage in). Thus, the 
criterion of salience is certainly met by ontological addiction, but it takes on a slightly 
different aspect compared to the meaning of this term in conventional addiction 
contexts. 
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2. Mood modification refers to the subjective experiences that people report as a 
consequence of engaging in the addictive activity, and can be seen as a coping strategy 
(i.e., experiencing an arousing ‘buzz’ or a ‘high’ or paradoxically, a tranquilizing 
feeling of ‘escape’ or ‘numbing’) (Griffiths, 2005). According to Buddhist psychology 
and what is known as the chain of dependent origination (Nanamoli & Bodhi, 2009), 
the underlying cause of all feelings (positive or negative) is ignorance as to the manner 
in which the self exists. Because most individuals have a deep-rooted belief in an 
intrinsically existing ‘self’, they crave objects, situations, and experiences that they 
deem will advance the interests of the self. Acquiring such objects, situations, or 
experiences brings temporary happiness, such as feelings of comfort, relief, elation, 
pleasure, joy, or pride. However, the process of desiring and acquiring ‘favourable’ 
circumstances reifies the individual’s belief in a self, and an addiction feedback loop 
arises (see section on Aetiology for a fuller description of addiction feedback loops in 
the context of the ontological addiction condition). 
The strategy of the individual suffering from ontological addiction is flawed 
because demand (i.e., desire) for favourable conditions always outweighs supply. 
Indeed, when an individual acquires a certain level of psychological and/or material 
comfort, Buddhism asserts that their expectations raise accordingly (Shonin et al., 
2014g). Therefore, ontological addiction gives rise to ‘trait’ experiences of mood 
modification (e.g., elation, satisfaction) that arise out of a ‘state’ experience of suffering 
which is born from constantly craving such trait experiences.    
3. Tolerance is the process whereby increasing amounts of the activity are required to 
achieve the former mood modifying effects (Griffiths, 2005). Compared to the other 
components of Griffiths’ model of addiction, the rationale for including tolerance as a 
feature of ontological addiction requires greater explanation. From the Buddhist 
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perspective and as discussed above, people are born with a propensity to become 
addicted to themselves. Depending upon which cognitive-behavioural response 
patterns become dominant during their life, Buddhism asserts that they either augment 
or weaken their belief in selfhood (Gampopa, 1998). However, during this current time 
period, it is understood (within Buddhism) that most individuals are inclined towards 
compounding their belief in selfhood. In Buddhist terms, this is the same as asserting 
that although most individuals are aware of a spiritual aspect to their being, they 
invariably choose not to nourish or develop it.  
One explanation for the tendency of people to repel themselves from authentic 
spiritual practice (which does not necessarily equate to religious practice) is that they 
do not wish to confront and/or make efforts towards dismantling the ‘selfhood’ that 
they have worked so hard to construct (Trungpa, 2002). Consequently, according to this 
line of Buddhist thought, individuals effectively ‘run’ from themselves and require ever 
increasing levels of immersion in emotions, discursive thinking patterns, and worldly 
pursuits in order to sustain and further augment the deluded belief that they inherently 
exist. From this perspective, it can be argued that tolerance is a component feature of 
ontological addiction. 
4. Withdrawal symptoms are the unpleasant feeling states and/or physical effects (e.g., 
moodiness, irritability, etc.) that occur when the person is unable to engage in the 
addictive activity (Griffiths, 2005). As noted above, in the current era (known in 
Buddhism as pashchimadharma [Sanskrit] or mappō [Japanese]), people might go 
through the motions of engaging in spiritual practice, but according to Buddhist theory, 
the majority of people are repelled by the idea of wholeheartedly committing 
themselves to spiritual development (Marra, 1988). Consequently, Buddhism asserts 
that individuals invariably repel – sometimes with extreme anger or venom – attempts 
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to ease them off their addiction to a ‘me’, a ‘mine’, and an ‘I’. One well-known historic 
example of this might be the crucifixion of Jesus Christ. Through selfless acts of 
kindness and what were deemed to be miracles, Christ is reported to have provided 
people with undeniable ‘evidence’ that the ‘Kingdom of God’ was a place or state they 
could access after transcending selfish thoughts and behaviours. However, having been 
shown, beyond reasonable doubt, that it was possible (i.e., via engaging in authentic 
spiritual practice) to completely transcend selfishness and thus experience ‘God’, 
historical records (e.g., the Gospel according to St. Luke, Chapter 23) report that the 
‘people’ became angry and killed (i.e., crucified) Christ. Thus, if Buddhism is correct 
in asserting that individuals are generally repelled by the idea of transcending selfhood, 
then it can be argued that withdrawal symptoms are a component of ontological 
addiction. 
5. Conflict refers to the conflicts between the person and those around them (interpersonal 
conflict), conflicts with other activities (e.g., work, social life, hobbies, and interests) 
or from within the individual (e.g., intra-psychic conflict and/or subjective feelings 
of loss of control) that are concerned with spending too much time engaging in the 
addictive activity (Griffiths, 2005). As highlighted in more detail below (see Aetiology 
section), Buddhism attributes all forms of intrapersonal and intra-psychic conflict to an 
individual’s belief in, and addiction to, selfhood (Gampopa, 1998). Even attempts to 
avoid intra-psychic conflict by engaging in experiential avoidance (defined by Hayes 
et al. [2006] as unwillingness to remain in contact with particular private experiences) 
would be considered in Buddhism to be an expression of ontological addiction because 
if the individual was not afflicted by a belief in selfhood, they would not be inclined to 
reject experiences or sensations that they deem are constituents of the ‘self’. 
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Recent empirical findings support the Buddhist position regarding the underlying 
source of conflict and indicate that non-attachment to self and experience plays an 
important role in the regulation of maladaptive and distressing psychological states. 
Based on participant responses to the (Buddhist-compatible) Non-Attachment Scale 
(Sahdra et al., 2010), non-attachment to self and experience has been shown to predict: 
(i) greater levels of acceptance, non-reactivity, mindfulness, self-compassion, 
subjective wellbeing, pro-social behaviour, and eudemonic wellbeing, and (ii) lower 
levels of fatalistic outlook, intimacy avoidance, dissociation, and alexithymia (i.e., an 
impaired capacity to identify or describe feelings) (Sahdra et al., 2010; Sahdra et al., 
2015). Based on these empirical findings and the Buddhist construction of suffering 
more generally, it appears that conflict is a core feature of ontological addiction. 
6. Relapse is the tendency for repeated reversions to earlier patterns of excessive 
engagement in the activity to recur, and for even the most extreme patterns typical of 
the height of excessive engagement in the addictive activity to be quickly restored after 
periods of control (Griffiths, 2005). According to some Buddhist teachers, it is not 
uncommon for individuals to undertake spiritual practice and begin making inroads into 
weakening their addiction to self but to subsequently lose enthusiasm and allow ego-
driven cognitive-behavioural processes to re-establish themselves (Shonin & Van 
Gordon, 2015b). From this point of view, it appears that relapse is a component feature 
of ontological addiction. 
 
Symptoms 
If it is accepted that a ‘psychopathology’ reflects an aberration from a statistical norm of 
suffering or functionality, then it is questionable whether ontological addiction can be defined 
as such. However, if the term ‘psychopathology’ is understood to mean a condition that 
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severely and chronically impairs functionality, then ontological addiction can be considered an 
‘illness’. Either way, the merits of developing and validating a diagnostic test for ontological 
addiction need to be carefully considered because if the assumptions elucidated throughout this 
chapter are correct, then it can be expected that a substantial proportion of the world’s 
population would satisfy the diagnostic criteria. This is not to say that a clinical cut-off and 
severity ratings could not be established because, consistent with Buddhist thought, it is 
reasonable to assume that there would be variation amongst individuals in the intensity of their 
belief in an inherently existing self. Nevertheless, the primary purpose for elucidating below 
the primary symptoms of ontological addiction – that have been sourced from a synthesis of 
the canonical Buddhist literature – is to help foster understanding of the Buddhist model of 
mental illness rather than provide a definitive set of diagnostic criteria per se: 
 
1. Presence of a DSM-5 mental disorder (e.g., anxiety, depression, personality disorders, 
trauma and stressor-related disorders, obsessive-compulsive disorders, dissociative 
disorders, etc.) excluding neurodevelopmental disorders and other disorders that are 
principally biological in nature (e.g., neurocognitive disorders, specific sexual 
dysfunctions, etc.). 
2. Blindly focussed on advancing wealth, material possessions, or status (including at the 
expense of others’ wellbeing). 
3. General disregard for the fact that death is a certainty and that its’ timing is uncertain 
(i.e., a lack of death awareness). 
4. Embroiled in schemes, plans, and/or quarrels with limited capacity to step back and 
approach such activities with clarity and perspective. 
5. Easily offended and responds with anger/irritation on occasions when the ego or 
selfhood is challenged or questioned. 
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6. Gloats and responds with pride when praised or on occasions when the ego or selfhood 
is reinforced. 
7. Dislike or hatred of individuals and scenarios that are deemed to threaten the interests 
of the self. 
8. Strong attachment towards individuals and scenarios that are deemed to advance the 
interests of the self. 
9. Superiority or inferiority complex. 
10. Limited interest in matters of a spiritual nature or in undertaking spiritual practice. 
11. Blind belief in a set of religious dogma including the belief in a ruling or divine entity 
that is in some way responsible for life occurrences. 
12. Belief that there intrinsically exists a: (i) self or other, (ii) this or that, (iii) here or there, 
(iv) past, (v) future, or (vi) present moment. From the Buddhist perspective, being 
‘without intrinsic existence’ is a property that applies to all things, including the present 
moment. In other words, ‘non-self’ and ‘emptiness’ (which in essence are the same 
thing) are not selective. Due to the fact that time never stands still, logic dictates that 
there is never a point when a present moment crystallizes into existence. For a fuller 
explication of why the present moment doesn’t intrinsically exist, see Shonin & Van 
Gordon (2013). 
 
Prevalence 
Given the very recent formulation of the ontological addiction concept, no studies have been 
published that specifically estimate the prevalence of the condition. However, there exist 
prevalence estimates for some of the abovementioned symptoms of ontological addiction and 
thus, it is possible to indirectly approximate a minimum level of global prevalence for the 
condition. Notable examples are: (i) global prevalence estimates for the existence of mental 
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illness (symptom 1 above) which are in the range of 20-33% (National Institute of Mental 
Health, 2012; WHO International Consortium in Psychiatric Epidemiology, 2000), and (ii) 
prevalence estimates for a belief in God (symptom 11 above) which for the US, are in the order 
of 78-92% of the population (Gallup, 2013; Maugans & Wadland, 1991; Harris Poll, 2009).  
Clearly, the reliability of such figures is questionable because (for example) there are 
criteria whereby a belief in an external God would not necessarily equate to the occurrence of 
ontological addiction. For instance, the word ‘God’ means different things to different people 
and whilst, from the Buddhist perspective, a belief in a divine and/or ruling being requires that 
there is a ‘self’ that likewise believes it exists, the belief that ‘God’ corresponds more to a 
principle, pervasive and unifying energy, or state that awaits those that can transcend selfhood 
reflects a much less dualistic (i.e., self-other) interpretation. Nevertheless, given the broad 
range of symptoms that relate to ontological addiction – of which some (e.g., anger, hatred, 
pride, desire for wealth, etc.) might be deemed to be core traits of human behaviour – global 
prevalence rates for at least a mild-to-moderate level of ontological addiction could be expected 
to exceed 99%. 
 
Development and Course 
As discussed above, ontological addiction is considered to be latent at birth. However, 
symptoms first begin to manifest as an individual develops a sense of selfhood during 
childhood. Consequently, and in practice, there is a progressive onset with symptoms first 
manifesting during childhood and gradually progressing into adulthood. For most individuals, 
the course is persistent and stable, unless treatment is initiated (Tsong-kha-pa, 2004). 
  
Risk and Prognostic Factors 
Risk and prognostic factors for ontological addiction are principally environmental (i.e., rather 
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than genetic or physiological). A lack of exposure to, or uptake of, spiritual values and 
principles is likely to increase severity and/or result in earlier onset. Exposure to conditions 
that foster desire for wealth, pleasure, and reputation can likewise increase severity (Gampopa, 
1998).  
 
Functional Consequences 
The unyielding belief in a ‘me’, ‘mine’, and ‘I’ results in interpersonal and inter-psychic 
conflict as discussed above. However, perhaps more importantly, ontological addiction 
effectively causes the mind to limit and ‘turn in’ on itself. Due to being absorbed in selfhood, 
perspective and clarity of thought diminishes and the belief in inherent existence acts a filter 
that impedes the ability to directly perceive and remain aware of the present moment (Norbu 
& Clemente, 1997). Self-addiction drives cyclic existence (i.e., the unending cycle of birth, 
death, and rebirth) and fosters ignorance as to the ultimate and deeply interconnected nature of 
phenomena (Dalai Lama, 2001). 
 
Aetiology 
Earlier in the chapter, reference was made to the lack of compatibility between the Buddhist 
and biopsychosocial models of mental illness. Buddhism does not deny that biological, 
psychological, and social factors play a role in the onset of mental illness, but it considers them 
to be secondary determinants. From the Buddhist perspective, a primary limitation of the 
biopsychosocial model is that it places minimal emphasis on the role of spiritual factors. This 
conceptualisation also appears to be carried over to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013), where discussion 
specifically relating to problems that are spiritual or religious in nature is limited to a total of 
four lines of text. 
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In the DSM-5, religious or spiritual problems are categorised as Problems Related to 
Other Psychosocial, Personal, and Environmental Circumstances within the section on Other 
Conditions that May Be a Focus of Clinical Attention. In respect of religious or spiritual 
problems (DSM-5 code V62.89), the DSM-5 gives examples of: (i) distressing experiences that 
involve loss or questioning of faith, (ii) problems associated with conversion to a new faith, 
and (iii) questioning of spiritual values that may not necessarily be related to an organised 
church or religious institution (American Psychological Association, 2013). Thus, the DSM-5 
considers problems that are spiritual or religious in nature to be features that can accompany, 
but are distinct from, mental illness (Yang & Lukoff, 2006). Rejecting the possibility of 
spiritual issues manifesting as mental illness arguably reduces the clinical significance of such 
issues. This is consistent with what the present author would argue is a relative lack of emphasis 
placed by clinical psychology on the role that spiritual factors play in the aetiology of 
diagnosable mental illnesses.  
In comparison, Buddhism adopts a different perspective and asserts that spiritual factors: 
(i) are the foremost determinants of mental illness, and (ii) can be variants of mental illness in 
and of themselves (e.g., ontological addiction) (Shonin et al., 2013a). From the Buddhist 
perspective, the term ‘spiritual’ could be interpreted as meaning ‘that which helps to transcend 
selfhood’. Consequently, character traits such as generosity, patience, compassion, loving 
kindness, and death awareness are highly regarded in Buddhism because to differing extents, 
their cultivation requires the individual to be ‘other’ centred as opposed to ‘self’ centred 
(Khyentse, 2007). Consistent with this mode of thought, actions and behaviours that are self-
centred are generally looked upon unfavourably in Buddhism because they are understood to 
reify an individual’s belief in inherent existence (Dalai Lama, 2001). Transcending selfhood in 
the context of it being a spiritual pursuit should not be confused with losing one’s self-identity 
as part of a group. From the Buddhist perspective, individuals generally join groups or causes 
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because the ego-self wants to belong to, or believe in, something (Shonin et al., 2014g). In 
other words, for most people, joining causes and groups actually reifies their sense of a ‘me’, 
‘mine’ or ‘I’ (e.g. ‘I belong to this’, ‘I believe in that’, ‘my view’, ‘my rights’, etc.). 
Due to being ignorant of their absolute nature and as previously discussed, Buddhism 
explicates that individuals are attached to circumstances that they deem will promote their 
selfhood and interests (Chah, 2011; see Chapter 5 for a definition of the Buddhist 
conceptualisation of attachment). Buddhism teaches that because sentient beings believe that 
they inherently exist, they view the world in dualistic terms and allocate unrealistic levels of 
value to (what they deem to be) desirable external objects and situations (Shonin et al., 2014g). 
However, because the ‘self’ is an imputed (i.e., made up) construct, Buddhism asserts 
that no amount of exposure to desirable objects and circumstances will result in lasting 
happiness (Gampopa, 1999). In other words, having finally gained possession of the 
commodity, person, or position that was previously the object of desire, Buddhism teaches that 
dissatisfaction will once again manifest in the mind, and that new commodities and situations 
will avail themselves as the object of the self’s attachment (Chah, 2011). Furthermore, because 
sentient beings and the conditions in which they find themselves are constantly changing (i.e., 
they are impermanent), favourable circumstances can, at best, be enjoyed for only a limited 
period of time. Therefore, a component attribute of ontological addiction is the incessant desire 
to have something else, be somebody else, and/or be somewhere else. 
Thus, Buddhism asserts that desirous and self-centred thoughts and behaviours are both 
product and cause of ontological addiction (Shonin et al., 2014g). The belief in an inherently 
existing self is understood to augment each time an individual views the world in self-other 
(i.e., dualistic) terms, and this augmented belief, in turn, increases the intensity and frequency 
of self-centred thoughts and behaviours. In many respects, this process is similar to current 
clinical understanding regarding the acquisition of addictive behaviour and the development of 
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addiction feedback loops. According to conventional addiction theory, particular behaviours 
induce positive or negative affective states, as well as memories that correspond to the mood-
modification associated with these behaviours (Baker, Piper, McCarthy, Majeskie, & Fiore, 
2004). Stimuli subsequently trigger these memories that result in cravings to either re-
experience (i.e., if it was positive), or avoid (i.e., if it was negative), the affective response. The 
cravings prompt behaviours that are subsequently rewarded or punished by the resulting 
modification of mood, thus encoding additional associative memories and fuelling an addiction 
feedback loop (Houlihan & Brewer, 2015).  
According to the Buddhist model, the process of acting selfishly and thus amplifying the 
belief in selfhood results in a negative feedback loop (Dalai Lama, 2001). As referred to 
previously, the intensification of selfish beliefs and behavioural patterns is understood in 
Buddhism to culminate in spiritual undernourishment. Without the protective influence of 
suitably developed spiritual competencies (e.g., compassion, loving-kindness, generosity, 
metacognitive insight, etc.), high levels of self-absorption eventually render individuals 
susceptible to mental illness including (but not limited to) episodes of anxiety, depression, 
trauma, and psychosis (Shonin et al., 2014f). In summary, from the Buddhist perspective, 
suffering (including ontological addiction and derivative forms of mental illness) is the 
consequence of the mind: (i) viewing and interacting with the world through the lens of 
selfhood, and (ii) attempting to force reality to function in a manner that is scientifically and 
logically implausible.  
 
Treatment 
Assessment of an individual’s suitability to receive treatment, and determining the duration 
and specific content of individual treatment phases, should be undertaken by a highly 
experienced meditator who, consistent which Buddhist guidelines, has cultivated a serene and 
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disciplined mind (Van Gordon et al., 2015c; a detailed appraisal of the qualities of a suitable 
‘ontological addiction therapist’ is beyond the scope of this chapter). However, for the purposes 
of outlining a generic course of treatment for ontological addiction, the following phases of 
treatment are recommended: (i) becoming aware of the imputed self, (ii) deconstructing the 
imputed self, and (iii) reconstructing a dynamic and non-dual self.  
 
Phase One: Becoming Aware of the Imputed Self 
The treatment of ontological addiction is concerned with uprooting an individual’s deep-rooted 
belief that they inherently exist. However, before the process of deconstructing the self can 
begin in earnest, it is first necessary for the individual to become aware of: (i) the fact that they 
have constructed a self, and (ii) the various attributes of the imputed self. Consequently, the 
first phase of treatment focuses on enhancing self-awareness and on helping individuals come 
to terms with the fact that there are actually no credible grounds upon which it can be said that 
they intrinsically exist as a discrete ‘I’ entity. For most individuals and consistent with 
qualitative research findings, the implausibility of selfhood is likely to be a difficult notion to 
digest (Shonin & Van Gordon, 2015a; Van Gordon, Shonin, & Griffiths, 2016b). Therefore, an 
element of psycho-education – focussing on the logic and principles of non-self and emptiness 
– is normally administered at the onset of treatment. 
Another principal aspect of the first treatment phase is gaining proficiency in meditative 
awareness. Meditative techniques introduced during this phase of treatment tend to be more 
concentration-based (i.e., as opposed to insight-based). Concentrative meditation (Pāli: 
samatha) is understood to facilitate an individual’s development of self-awareness, including 
awareness of the movements of both body and mind (Dalai Lama & Berzin, 1997; Singh et al., 
2013). Mindfulness plays an important role here and serves the purpose of regulating 
concentration and ensuring that it remains meditative in aspect (Van Gordon et al., 2015c). A 
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primary goal of the first phase of treatment is for the individual to develop the ability to sustain 
a degree of meditative awareness outside of formal seated meditation sessions (i.e., as they go 
about their daily activates). A detailed explication of the principles of concentrative meditation 
and mindfulness is beyond the scope of this chapter but some important considerations are as 
follows: 
 
1. The focus should be on introducing meditative awareness into daily life, and seated 
meditation sessions of excessive duration should be discouraged. 
2. The individual’s breathing can be used as an attentional referent (i.e., to anchor 
concentration in the present moment) (Singh et al., 2007). 
3. Whilst maintaining awareness of breathing, meditative attention should be directed, in 
successive order, towards the body, feelings, and mental processes (e.g., thoughts, 
perceptions, self-centred beliefs and cognitive-behavioural responses, attachments, 
etc.). 
4. The primary objective is to observe phenomena (e.g., sights, sounds, feelings, thoughts, 
etc.) as they enter the attentional sphere. Phenomena should be permitted to endure as 
objects of awareness until such time as they naturally exit the attentional sphere. 
5. Over exertion (including forced breathing) should be discouraged. 
6. The overall objective of concentrative meditation is to introduce tranquillity into the 
body, and ‘breathing space’ into the mind. Feelings of meditative tranquillity should be 
encouraged but dependency on them should be discouraged. If meditative tranquillity 
arises, it should be treated as an observable phenomenon and – as with all other 
psychosomatic experiences – adopted as an object of meditative awareness. 
 
 Although the primary purpose for utilizing concentrative meditation is to induce 
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psychological and somatic calming, findings from fMRI studies suggest that the process of 
simply observing and placing concentration upon observable sensory, psychological, and 
environmental phenomena begins to undermine the intensity of self-addiction. More 
specifically, activation of the default mode network (DMN) is correlated with the state of ‘mind 
wandering’ (i.e., discursive thinking) and self-referential processing (Buckner, Andrews-
Hanna, & Schacter, 2008; Whitfield-Gabrieli & Ford, 2012). Mindfulness practice has been 
shown to reduce activation of the DMN, including in the posterior cingulate cortex (a primary 
DMN node) (Houlihan & Brewer, 2015). Given that posterior cingulate cortex activation is 
positively correlated with severity of nicotine- and alcohol-related addictive cravings (Claus, 
Ewing, Filbey, Sabbineni, & Hutchison, 2011), there is tentative evidence suggesting that 
concentrative meditation may help to regulate the activation of brain areas associated with self-
addiction and derivative self-referential processes (Houlihan & Brewer, 2015).  
 
Phase Two: Deconstructing the Imputed Self 
Phase One of the treatment process helps to foster familiarity with the various attributes of the 
imputed self and to create the appropriate conditions for uprooting maladaptive ego-centred 
core beliefs. This procedure of uprooting or ‘deconstructing’ the imputed self is the focus of 
Phase Two, and it unfolds via the use of both indirect and direct psycho-spiritual techniques. 
 
Indirect techniques 
During Phase Two of the treatment, the individual is taught to cultivate and practice a range of 
spiritual competencies including compassion, generosity, patience, loving-kindness, and death 
awareness. The intention behind training in such aptitudes is to indirectly undermine ego-
centricity, and thus complement the action of meditative techniques that are intended to directly 
target addiction to selfhood (see Direct techniques sub-section below). 
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These spiritual aptitudes, that can be easily practised outside of formal seated meditation, 
have in recent years been subject to differing degrees of empirical enquiry, and are each 
understood to play an important role in fostering psychological wellbeing and/or treating 
psychopathology. For example, compassion and loving kindness-meditation have been shown 
to increase activity in brain areas associated with the regulation of neural emotional circuitry 
(e.g., anterior insula, post-central gyrus, inferior parietal lobule, amygdala, and right temporal-
parietal junction) (Keysers, 2011; Lutz, Brefczynski-Lewis, Johnstone, & Davidson, 2008). 
Increased regulation of neural emotional circuitry helps to modulate descending brain-to-spinal 
cord noxious neural inputs (Melzack, 1991), and may explain why some individuals experience 
reductions in pain intensity and pain tolerance during and following engagement in compassion 
and loving-kindness meditation (Shonin et al., 2015c). Loving-kindness and compassion 
meditation have also been shown to increase implicit and explicit affection towards known and 
unknown others, and to thus improve social-connectedness and prosocial behaviour 
(Hutcherson, Seppala, & Gross; 2008; Leiberg, Olga, & Tania, 2011). In turn, greater social-
connectedness exerts a protective influence over life-stressors as well as feelings of loneliness, 
isolation, and low sense of purpose (Shonin et al., 2015c).  
 
Direct techniques 
Breath awareness and the meditative tranquillity referred to in the above explication of Phase 
One of the treatment has been shown to slow down autonomic and psychological arousal (Van 
Gordon et al., 2015a). This, in turn, allows thoughts, feelings and sensory processes to be 
recognised and meditatively investigated on an individual basis. This meditative investigation 
of phenomena is a key component of Phase Two of the treatment, and the technique taught to 
individuals in order to directly investigate ‘selfhood’ is known as vipassanā (Pāli) or insight 
meditation. The type of vipassanā meditation being referred to here is fundamentally different 
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from the general use (or misuse) of this term in the psychological literature. For example, 
vipassanā, which actually translates as ‘superior seeing’, is often incorrectly referred to in the 
scientific (and popular Buddhist literature) as having the same meaning as the term mindfulness 
(Van Gordon et al., 2015c). 
In the manner that vipassanā meditation is taught and conceptualised in the treatment of 
ontological addiction (and in the traditional Buddhist literature), the practice involves capturing 
and refining the attentional focus cultivated during mindfulness and concentrative meditation 
practice in order to direct it in a very deliberate and specific manner (Gampopa, 1999). 
Consequently, insight meditation is best practised following a prior period of concentrative 
meditation (Tsong-Kha-Pa, 2004). The reason for this is because the tranquilisation of body 
and mind that occurs during concentrative meditation helps to introduce focus and perceptive 
clarity into the mind (Chah, 2011). During vipassanā meditation, this attentional focus is then 
directed in order to try to identify the causes, intrinsic properties, and absolute nature of a given 
phenomenon. More specifically, the technique involves attempting to locate the ‘selfness’ of 
the object of meditation and of the meditator more generally. When vipassanā meditation is 
practised correctly, the individual begins to realise that it is impossible to identify an 
intrinsically existing self within either themselves or an external object (Van Gordon et al., 
2016b). Consequently, the deep-rooted core beliefs that sustain ontological addiction begin to 
be undermined. 
 
Phase Three: Reconstructing a Dynamic and Non-Dual Self 
Although Buddhism considers that the notion of an intrinsically existing self is implausible 
(Dalai Lama & Berzin, 1997), the objective during the process of treating ontological addiction 
is not to eliminate any form of identification with a self. In other words, there is a difference 
between ‘non-self’ and ‘not caring for self’. Non-self is a tool used to undermine attachment 
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to self. However, non-self is a concept used to describe an experience or state of realisation, 
but it can never fully embody that state or experience. The notion of non-self is a construct of 
subject-object (i.e., self-other) conceptualisation. As such, it is an expression (albeit at a low 
level of intensity) of ontological addiction, and it must ultimately be relinquished. When the 
concepts of self and non-self are abandoned, an individual can abide as ‘true self’. True self 
encompasses both the individual and the whole. A person who has realised true self cares for 
the individual because they care for the whole, and vice versa. Thus, it is important to clarify 
that the ‘deconstruction of the self’ is not related to a deep dissociative experience (e.g., 
depersonalisation/derealisation disorder), which would likely incur harmful consequences.  
For individuals to function in an adaptive manner, they must be aware that society 
considers them to be a distinct entity, and that certain roles and conforming behaviours are 
expected of them. However, the self that the individual reconstructs during Phase Three of the 
treatment is one that, having realised it is empty of intrinsic existence, is comfortable with 
assuming a self-identity for the purposes of effectively functioning in the world. In comparison 
with the self that was present at the onset of treatment, this ‘newly constructed self’ is a much 
more fluid and dynamic entity. 
As demonstrated by the experiences of an individual that received the MAT intervention 
(a Buddhist-derived intervention that adheres to the phasic treatment model outlined here), the 
newly constructed ‘self’ regards itself as a deeply interconnected entity that is inseparable from 
the conditions, people, and phenomena around it:  
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Everything makes more sense. You start to see the bigger picture and you start to see just 
how petty people at work can be – at work it’s all about the self, the whole self, and 
nothing but the self. But when you take the self out of the equation … you kind of find 
yourself in the company’s shoes, your own shoes, and the customer’s shoes all at once 
(Shonin & Van Gordon, 2015a, p.905) 
 
This increased connectivity to, and awareness of, prevailing psychological and 
environmental conditions gives rise to what in research settings has been termed the 
phenomena feedback effect (PFE) (Shonin & Van Gordon, 2015a). PFE refers to the ability to 
reciprocally transact and communicate with the unfolding events of the present moment, and 
is reported to give rise to an increased ability to anticipate how a particular situation might 
unfold. According to Shonin and Van Gordon (2015a), PFE is the outcome of individuals 
knowing that they, and the situations in which they find themselves, are inseparable and 
continuously changing. Perceiving the self and phenomena as transient and unfixed entities is 
understood to allow individuals to work with, and stay abreast of, the present moment. 
Individuals report that the dynamic and non-dual self that is cultivated during this phase 
of treatment has greater perceptive clarity (Shonin & Van Gordon, 2015a). In not being 
attached to the idea that they intrinsically exist, individuals can minimize the amount of ‘I’ that 
they allocated to work and life engagements. Consequently, they are better able to ‘see the big 
picture’, and are less likely to be preoccupied with their own agenda and entitlements (Shonin 
& Van Gordon, 2015a). Furthermore, by reducing ego-centric beliefs and behaviours, there no 
longer exists a substantial ‘self’ that can be (for example) offended, let down, cheated, or 
traumatised. In other words, there is no longer a fixed locus upon which maladaptive cognitive-
affective states can assemble, and the newly constructed and dynamic ‘self’ thus liberates itself 
from the various functional impairments associated with ontological addiction. 
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Conclusions 
Despite the fact that there is increasing integration of Buddhist principles and practices into 
Western mental health and applied psychological disciplines, there appears to be limited 
understanding in Western psychology of the assumptions that underlie a Buddhist model of 
mental illness. The ontological addiction formulation is a means of addressing this problem, 
and explicates a Buddhist model of psychopathology that is sympathetic to Western 
conventions concerning the classification, aetiology, and treatment of mental illness.  
An assessment of the extent to which ontological addiction meets the clinical criteria for 
addiction (utilizing Griffiths’ [2005] components model of addiction) suggests that ontological 
addiction is a valid – albeit operationally and functionally distinct (i.e., when compared to 
chemical and behavioural addictions) – form of addiction. Consistent with 2,500-year-old 
Buddhist teachings, recent empirical findings suggest that addiction to the belief in an 
inherently existing self is associated with maladaptive psychosocial functioning (e.g., Sahdra 
et al., 2010). More specifically, there is rationale to suggest that ego-centric beliefs and 
behavioural-response patterns cause the mind to ‘contract’ and limit an individual’s psycho-
spiritual development.  
In terms of aetiology, ontological addiction is understood to be self-sustaining (i.e., self-
centred thoughts and behaviours reify an individual’s belief in selfhood and this, in turn, fosters 
further ego-centric responses). However, despite the chronic and pervasive nature of the 
condition, the addiction to selfhood can be overcome by a phasic treatment process that 
involves (in sequential order): (i) becoming aware of the imputed self, (ii) deconstructing the 
self, and (iii) reconstructing a dynamic and non-dual self. The first of these three phases makes 
use of concentrative meditation techniques in order to enhance awareness of the various 
attributes of selfhood. In conjunction with the tranquillity associated with concentrative 
meditation, this increased awareness of self is a prerequisite to employing insight meditation 
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techniques (utilised in Phase Two of the treatment) in order to undermine attachment to the 
belief in an intrinsically existing ‘I’ entity (Van Gordon et al., 2015b). Phase Three of the 
treatment is concerned with cultivating a dynamic and non-dual self that is deemed (and has 
been empirically shown) to be better able to communicate with, and adapt to, the changing 
conditions of the present moment (Shonin et al., 2014d).  
Clearly, additional theoretical and empirical endeavours are required in order to assess 
the utility of ontological addiction and its’ validly as: (i) a comprehensive model of mental 
illness and, (ii) a diagnosable form of psychopathology in and of itself. Likewise, therapeutic 
(and spiritual) discernment is clearly required in order to assess the suitability of a particular 
individual to receive, and progress through, the various (generic) treatment phases outlined in 
this chapter. Nevertheless, it is the view of the present author that the ontological addiction 
formulation constitutes an accurate portrayal of a Buddhist conceptualisation of mental illness 
that is palatable to a Western clinical and scientific audience. Perhaps more importantly, 
ontological addiction appears to challenge a number of established Western medical and 
scientific assumptions concerning the determinants of mental illness and the notion of selfhood 
more generally. Consequently, further theoretical and empirical investigation is warranted. 
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Chapter 7 
Corporate use of mindfulness and authentic spiritual transmission: 
Competing or compatible ideals? 
 
This chapter (whether in full or in part) was adapted for publication and was subsequently 
published as: 
Van Gordon, W., Shonin, E., Lomas, T., & Griffiths, M. D. (2016). Corporate use of 
mindfulness and authentic spiritual transmission: Competing or compatible ideals? 
Mindfulness and Compassion, 1, 75-83. 
 
 
The final published version of this article is available at Elsevier: 
http://www.journals.elsevier.com/mindfulness-and-compassion/recent-articles 
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Abstract 
There is consensus amongst both the scientific and Buddhist community that mindfulness – 
when correctly taught and practised – leads to a range of beneficial outcomes. However, there 
has been little evaluation of what happens when mindfulness is incorrectly taught, or is 
practised with a selfish rather than selfless intention. Nowhere is the importance of this issue 
more pertinent than the recent and growing assimilation of mindfulness for employees by large 
corporations. The current chapter introduces the principle of ‘authentic spiritual transmission’ 
and examines how it can inform the integration of mindfulness into the corporate workplace. 
Three questions are explored: (i) what spiritual infrastructure is required to operationalise 
mindfulness that is effective in the corporate setting? (ii) to what extent can ‘inner change’ 
induced by mindfulness substitute the need for corporations to foster healthy ‘external’ 
working conditions? and (iii) is mindfulness corruptible or does it have a natural defence 
mechanism? This chapter addresses these questions by synthesizing relevant Buddhist 
discourses, evaluating recent theoretical and empirical findings concerning the use of 
mindfulness in corporate settings, and examining how SG-MBIs can inform this topical area 
of scholarly debate. 
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American corporations spend an average of $13,000 per employee per year on direct and 
indirect healthcare costs (Klatt, Wise, & Fish, 2015). Approximately 20% of American 
employees take time off work due to a stress-related illness in a given twelve-month period, 
and 63% would welcome support and advice from their employer on how to improve their 
health and wellbeing (Crawford, 2014). In countries such as the United Kingdom, work-related 
stress results in a loss of 10 million working days each year (Health and Safety Executive, 
2015). Moreover, since 2009, the number of sick days lost to stress, depression, and anxiety in 
the United Kingdom has increased by 24%, while the number lost to serious mental illness has 
doubled (Davies, 2014). Consequently, it is unsurprising that there is growing interest amongst 
large corporations into techniques such as mindfulness that are reported to directly improve 
employee wellbeing, and indirectly improve productivity and profitability (Dane, 2010).  
Corporations such as General Mills, Target, Apple, Google, Carlsberg, Sony 
Corporation, Ikea, Nike, Procter & Gamble, AOL, Goldman Sachs, Transport for London, and 
Monsanto are reported to have implemented employee mindfulness programs, and according 
to one media report, over 25% of American companies have done likewise (Huffington, 2013). 
However, given that amongst traditional contemplative communities mindfulness is employed 
as a means of fostering spiritual growth (Purser, 2015), concerns have arisen regarding the use 
of mindfulness in the corporate setting. More specifically, some researchers, Buddhist teachers, 
and business leaders have asserted that introducing mindfulness into the corporate workplace 
could be harmful to (i) the Buddhist teachings (i.e., due to them being misappropriated and 
misapplied), (ii) society (i.e., due to employees using mindfulness to advance their career 
and/or wealth in ways that are ethically unwholesome), and (iii) employees (i.e., due to greater 
demands being placed upon them by corporations adopting the Buddhist rhetoric that stress is 
a ‘mind-made’ phenomenon that can be transmuted by practicing mindfulness (Macaro & 
Baggini, 2015; Purser, 2015; Purser & Ng, 2015). 
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At the core of Buddhist thought is the notion that stress – and indeed all forms of 
suffering – are ‘mind-made’ constructs that can be overcome by eliminating erroneous views 
concerning the ultimate manner in which the ‘self’ and reality exist (Dalai Lama, 1995; Van 
Gordon et al., 2016a). Although there are differing Buddhist perspectives, ultimately, all 
traditional schools of Buddhist practice subscribe to the view that by dedicating one’s life to 
spiritual practice, it is possible to start cultivating a mind that is unconditionally happy (i.e., 
irrespective of external conditions) (Chah, 2011; Dalai Lama, 1995; Huang Po, 1982; Nhat 
Hanh, 1999). The term ‘dedicating one’s life’ is key here because although Buddhism asserts 
that it is possible to permanently transmute suffering, it likewise asserts that this can only 
happen pursuant to the spiritual practitioner completely abandoning themselves to the 
Buddhadharma (in the sense used here, the Sanskrit term Buddhadharma means ‘the truth’ or 
‘true teachings’) (Khyentse, 2006).  
Some corporate mindfulness stakeholders appear to maintain that there are minimal 
risks associated with introducing mindfulness into the corporate setting (Huffington, 2013). 
The Trojan Horse metaphor is often employed in this respect in order to highlight the view that 
mindfulness will ‘work from within’ and gradually cause corporations to become more socially 
responsible and less profit-focussed. There are also reports that some corporate mindfulness 
advocates have gone one step further by drawing direct comparisons between their work and 
the historical Buddha providing teachings to kings and wealthy merchants (Purser, 2015). 
However, as noted by Purser, such claims appear to be made with limited consideration of the 
context in which the Buddha offered his teachings to interested parties: 
 
While the Buddha taught the dharma to leaders and the merchant class, what he taught 
was not a mindfulness-based intervention so they could simply feel better about 
themselves, nor did he simply provide them a meditative technique for improving their 
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concentration so that they could obtain even more wealth and riches, rather, the Buddha 
advocated a wiser form of ethical leadership that counteracted the mental poisons of 
greed, ill will and delusion (2015, p.37). 
 
Thus, when aspects of Buddhist practice are taken out of context and applied in settings 
that are primarily concerned with monetary – as opposed to spiritual – gain, claims that 
mindfulness can eliminate stress or induce an ‘enlightened workplace’ become contentious. 
Given these issues and concerns, the present chapter introduces the principle of ‘authentic 
spiritual transmission’ (AST) and examines how it can inform the integration of mindfulness 
for employees into large corporations. More specifically, three questions are explored: (i) what 
spiritual infrastructure is required to operationalise mindfulness that is effective in the 
corporate setting? (ii) to what extent can ‘inner change’ induced by mindfulness substitute the 
need for corporations to foster healthy ‘external’ working conditions? and (iii) is mindfulness 
corruptible or does it have a natural defence mechanism? The present chapter addresses these 
questions by synthesizing relevant Buddhist discourses, evaluating recent theoretical and 
empirical findings concerning the use of mindfulness in corporate settings, and examining how 
SG-MBIs can inform this topical area of scholarly debate. 
 
Authentic Spiritual Transmission 
There are numerous perspectives on what is implied by the term ‘spiritual’, but for the purposes 
of this chapter, ‘spiritual’ is understood to constitute ‘that which helps to transcend selfhood’. 
This delineation of spiritual is consistent with the Buddhist position that selfishness and craving 
for a ‘me’, ‘mine’, or ‘I’ is the cause of suffering, and that removing belief in selfhood is the 
cause of liberation (Van Gordon et al., 2015d). 
According to Shonin and Van Gordon (2015b), an authentic spiritual practitioner or 
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teacher is an individual that has transcended the ego and cultivated a high level of spiritual 
awakening. Such an individual could be firmly on the path to enlightenment, or a fully 
enlightened Buddha (Shonin & Van Gordon, 2015b). An authentic spiritual teacher emanates 
spiritual awareness and is not necessarily a Buddhist scholar (Nhat Hanh, 1999). AST takes 
place when an authentic spiritual teacher (known as the ‘right teacher’) imparts spiritual insight 
and awakening onto a suitably disposed student (known as the ‘right student’) (Shonin & Van 
Gordon, 2015b). There are various perspectives within Buddhism on what makes a student a 
suitable vessel for AST, but in general the student should be (i) willing to devote their life to 
spiritual practice, (ii) innately possessing spiritual acumen (possibly accumulated over 
successive lifetimes of spiritual practice), (iii) persevering and courageous, (iv) dissatisfied 
with cyclic existence (cyclic existence refers to the Buddhist notion that until they liberate 
themselves, sentient beings continue to migrate through a cycle of birth, life, death, and rebirth; 
Dalai Lama, 1995), and (v) eager to foster qualities of humility, faith, compassion, patience, 
joy, and generosity (Tsong-Kha-Pa, 2004). 
In the Canki sutta, the Buddha advises that the principal mark of an authentic spiritual 
teacher is that their behaviour is not influenced by greed, hatred, or delusion (Bodhi, 2009). As 
suggested by the following words recorded in the Sandaka sutta (and attributed to the Buddha’s 
disciple Ananda), the Buddha placed limited emphasis on other factors, including whether the 
teacher is a recipient of a traditional spiritual teaching lineage: 
 
Again, Sandaka, here some teacher is a traditionalist, one who regards oral tradition as 
truth, he teaches a Dharma by oral tradition, by legends handed down, by the authority 
of the collections. But when a teacher is a traditionalist, one who regards oral tradition 
as truth, some is well transmitted and some badly transmitted, some is true and some is 
otherwise (Bodhi, 2009, p.624). 
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Consistent with these accounts of the Buddha’s teachings, Shonin and Van Gordon 
(2015b) argue that there are no ‘worldly qualifications’ that an individual can attain in order to 
be conferred the status of an authentic spiritual teacher:  
 
If a person has genuine spiritual realisation, they are authorised to transmit the spiritual 
teachings. All titles, held-lineages, endorsements, acclamations, life accomplishments, 
life mistakes, and years spent in training are irrelevant…If a person is without genuine 
spiritual realisation, they have no such authority. All titles, held-lineages, endorsements, 
acclamations, life accomplishments, life mistakes, and years spent in training are 
irrelevant…Ultimately, true authorisation to transmit the spiritual teachings comes from 
awakening to the timeless truth of emptiness. It seems that some form of spiritual guide 
is required to effectuate this awakening (p.143). 
 
The primary methods by which AST can be acquired, developed, and maintained are via: 
(i) oral instruction (Tsong Kha-pa, 2004), (ii) the written word (Gampopa, 1998), (iii) mind-
to-mind transmission from a teacher present in physical form (Nyoshul & Surya Das, 1995), 
and (iv) mind-to-mind transmission from a teacher not present in physical form (Urgyen, 2000). 
It should be understood that the ultimate purpose of AST (i.e., that occurs when the ‘right 
teacher’ encounters the ‘right student’) is to bring the student into contact with the ‘teacher 
within’ (Shonin & Van Gordon, 2015b). Accessing and awakening the teacher within 
constitutes AST in its purest form and this notion has been alluded to by Nyoshul and Surya 
Das (1995) as follows:  
 
If you meet a teacher who represents the lineage and tradition of Dzogchen, this is also a 
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partial idea; it is good fortune, but it is still a limited notion…Authentic sacred vision, 
the pure perception often mentioned in the tantric path, implies that we can and should 
see everything as perfectly pure and inherently good; that is, beyond good and bad, 
perfectly complete just as it is (p.115). 
 
The most essential point appears to be that without the intervention of a spiritually 
realised teacher, and without the student being a receptive vessel, AST does not occur and the 
student remains unable to fully access or awaken the inner teacher (Urgyen, 2000). This 
principle (i.e., the importance of a spiritually realised teacher) applies to the teaching and 
learning of all aspects of Buddhist practice, including mindfulness.  
 
What Spiritual Infrastructure is Required to Operationalise Mindfulness that is Effective 
in the Corporate Setting? 
Various change management strategies have been implemented to maximize the chances of 
mindfulness being successfully integrated into the employee’s workplace (Klatt et al., 2015). 
Such approaches typically seek to secure management and employee buy-in, deliver tailored 
interventions, and capture data (i.e., to feedback to senior management) on how such 
interventions improve various aspects of work-related wellbeing and/or work effectiveness 
(Klatt et al., 2015). For example, the multinational food company General Mills is reported to 
have delivered mindfulness training to over 400 employees, where over 80% reported taking 
time each day to optimize their personal productivity following mindfulness training compared 
to 23% pre-intervention (Gelles, 2012). The same company found that 80% of senior 
executives that participated in mindfulness training reported improvements in decision-making 
competency (Gelles, 2012). 
These internal findings are consistent with reports in the academic literature where 
123 
 
 
mindfulness has been shown to lead to significant improvements in employee mental health 
outcomes, including anxiety (Dobie, Tucker, Ferrari, & Rodgers, 2016), depression (Mealer et 
al., 2014), stress (Monocha et al., 2011), burnout (Krasner et al., 2009), sleep quality (Frank, 
Reibel, Broderick, Cantrell, & Metz, 2015), and dispositional mindfulness (Malarkey et al., 
2013). Mindfulness has also been shown to improve employee physical health outcomes such 
as diet (Aikens et al., 2014), response to flu immunisation (as measured via changes in antibody 
titers; Davidson et al., 2003), and salivary α-amylase levels (Duchemin, Steinberg, Marks, 
Vanover, & Klatt, 2015). Furthermore, mindfulness in the workplace has been linked to job 
performance in various ways, including (i) client-centred empathic care in health-care 
professionals (e.g., Krasner et al., 2009), (ii) positive organisational behaviour (Aikens et al., 
2014), (iii) organisational innovativeness and performance (Ho, 2011), and (iv) work-related 
self-efficacy (Jennings, Frank, Snowberg, Coccia, & Greenberg, 2013; Poulin, Mackenzie, 
Soloway, & Karayolas, 2008).  
Although these findings are promising, the fact of the matter is that what is being 
implemented by corporations (and researchers) is not necessarily mindfulness. According to 
all systems of Buddhist thought that recognize mindfulness as a key feature of meditative 
development, mindfulness is deemed to be a spiritual practice (Shonin et al., 2014g). It is 
introduced as the seventh aspect of a fundamental teaching known as the Noble Eightfold Path 
(Bodhi, 1994). Whilst the Noble Eightfold Path (obviously) consists of eight different elements, 
these elements do not function as standalone entities. In other words, it is not the case that an 
individual begins with the first aspect of the Noble Eightfold Path – known as ‘right view’ – 
and only moves onto the second (known as ‘right intention’) after concluding their training in 
‘right view’. Indeed, although the Noble Eightfold Path has eight different aspects, it is a single 
path and a single practice (Van Gordon et al., 2015d). This means that in the absence of ‘right 
view’, ‘right intention’, ‘right speech’, ‘right action’, ‘right livelihood’, ‘right effort’, and ‘right 
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concentration’, there cannot be ‘right mindfulness’.  
The present author argues that contemporary mindfulness (hereinafter referred to as 
“mindfulness”), as it is operationalised in MBIs such as MBSR, MBCT, and Corporate-Based 
Mindfulness Training, does not always meet the traditional Buddhist criteria for authentic 
mindfulness (McWilliams, 2011; Purser, 2015; Rosch, 2007; Shonin et al., 2014g). The main 
reason for this is because contemporary “mindfulness” is invariably taught in the absence of 
each of the seven aforementioned Noble Eightfold Path elements, and it is generally not taught 
with the primary intention of fostering spiritual growth. A further reason why contemporary 
“mindfulness” techniques cannot necessarily be considered authentic from the Buddhist 
perspective, is the fact that most contemporary “mindfulness” instructors have not met Shonin 
and Van Gordon’s (2015b) aforementioned criteria of being a realised spiritual teacher. 
Although the situation is gradually improving, the experience of some instructors of 
“mindfulness” is limited to attendance at just one eight-week course followed by one year of 
self-practice (Mental Health Foundation, 2010). 
It would be inaccurate to assert that contemporary MBIs are ineffective, because (as 
indicated above) empirical data suggests otherwise. However, to date, all that such data 
demonstrate is that certain MBIs are effective for initiating change across predefined outcomes, 
and over relatively short periods of time (e.g., 3-24 months). Although this change is often 
reported as substantial, robustly conducted meta-analysis demonstrate that the effectiveness of 
MBIs is equivalent to what can be expected from using anti-depressants in a primary care 
population (i.e., small to moderate effect sizes; Goyal et al., 2014). In fact, with the exception 
of treating depression and anxiety in clinical populations, there is insufficient high quality 
evidence at present to support the wide-scale utilisation of mindfulness for effecting lasting 
psychological and/or behavioural change – including in the workplace setting (Shonin et al., 
2015a).  
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The present author argues that most “mindfulness” approaches teach an ‘attention-
based psychological technique’ that has demonstrable real-world applications. However, this 
technique should not be confused with authentic Buddhist mindfulness. For the reasons 
outlined above, mindfulness only becomes authentic (i.e., in the Buddhist sense) when it 
becomes spiritual, and it only becomes spiritual when taught by an authentic spiritual teacher. 
Therefore, in essence, if an organisation wishes to successfully introduce its employees to 
authentic mindfulness, the only indispensable infrastructure required is that of an authentic 
spiritual teacher. All other considerations (e.g., type of mindfulness intervention, program 
length, protected time for employees to practice mindfulness, space designation, amount of 
instructor-participant contact time, and range of meditation techniques employed) are of lesser 
importance. 
 
To What Extent Can ‘Inner Change’ Induced by Mindfulness Substitute the Need for 
Organisations to Foster Healthy ‘External’ Working Conditions? 
Santideva, an 8th Century Indian Buddhist saint and philosopher, asserted that rather than cover 
the entire outdoors with leather, it is more practical to adorn the feet with a leather sole 
(Santideva, 1997). As outlined above, central to Buddhist thought is the notion that any form 
of suffering can be transformed by spiritual training, and that this ultimately liberates the mind 
(Dalai Lama, 1995). The present author believes that the position of Santideva and other 
Buddhist adepts (including the Buddha) is robust, and that it is possible to foster meditative 
awareness to such an extent, that egoistic clinging (and therefore suffering) is abandoned. 
Under such circumstances, there is no longer a reification of ‘self’ through which suffering can 
manifest (Huang Po, 1982). This is not to say that an enlightened being does not experience 
(for example) pain when they trap their finger in a door, but they experience such pain ‘as it is’ 
(Urgyen, 2000) – without attachment and without relating to it as something that belongs to a 
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‘me’, ‘mine’, or ‘I’ (for a detailed explanation of the Buddhist concepts of attachment, 
emptiness, and non-self, see Shonin et al., 2014g). 
Based on empirical findings, it appears that after only 8-12 weeks of training, 
employees that participate in MBIs can increase resilience to psychological distress caused by 
suboptimal working conditions (Klatt et al., 2015). However, the notion of mindfulness 
equipping employees with the necessary psychological and spiritual resources to transcend the 
self – and thus become impervious to toxic work conditions – is unrealistic. The primary 
reasons for this are that (i) as noted above, the “mindfulness” that is typically taught by 
organisations is not necessarily authentic or sufficiently potent according to the Buddhist 
conceptualisation, and (ii) even where mindfulness is correctly taught and practiced, it 
generally takes many years (if not decades) of diligent day-to-day practice to attain high levels 
of spiritual insight (i.e., whereby mental quietude is profound, unconditional, and self-
sustaining) (Shonin et al., 2014g). 
In recent years, a new generation of MBI (i.e., SG-MBIs) have been formulated and 
empirically investigated. Compared to FG-MBIs, SG-MBIs – such as MAT – operationalise 
mindfulness in a manner deemed to be more congruent with the traditional Buddhist model 
(Van Gordon et al., 2015b). As discussed in Chapter 4, FG-MBIs generally subscribe to Kabat-
Zinn’s (1994) definition that mindfulness involves “paying attention in a particular way: on 
purpose, in the present moment, and non-judgmentally” (1994, p.4). Conversely, according to 
the SG-MBI delineation, mindfulness is deemed to be “the process of engaging a full, direct, 
and active awareness of experienced phenomena that is (i) spiritual in aspect, and (ii) 
maintained from one moment to the next” (Van Gordon et al., 2015b, p.592).  
The term ‘direct awareness’ in the SG-MBI formulation contradicts the use of the term 
‘non-judgemental’ in the FG-MBI definition. According to Van Gordon et al. (2015b), rather 
than teaching participants to be ‘non-judgemental’, SG-MBIs encourage them to be (amongst 
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other things) (i) ethically discriminative (i.e., responsible world citizens that are aware of both 
the short-term and long-term consequences of their actions), and (ii) spiritually empowered to 
relate to mindfulness as a ‘way of life’, rather than a therapeutic technique that is employed 
under certain conditions but not others. 
Studies of MAT (from RCTs and clinical case studies) have shown that 8-10 weeks of 
training can help effectuate statistically and/or clinically significant improvements in employee 
levels of (i) job performance (as rated by employee’s line managers), (ii) work-related stress, 
(iii) job satisfaction, (iv) attitudes towards work, and (v) workaholism (Shonin & Van Gordon, 
2015a; Shonin et al., 2014c; 2014d; Van Gordon et al., 2016d; 2017). Qualitative studies have 
likewise indicated that MAT can improve participant’s ability to transfer the locus of control 
for stress from external conditions to internal metacognitive and attentional resources (Shonin 
& Van Gordon, 2015b; Shonin et al., 2014a; Van Gordon et al., 2016b). Studies of other SG-
MBIs – such as Mindfulness-Based Positive Behaviour Support – have shown that SG-MBIs 
can improve caregiver levels of stress, turnover, and work-related injury, as well as reduce their 
use of physical restraints (Singh, Lancioni, Karazsia, & Myers, 2016; Singh et al., 2015; Singh, 
Lancioni, Winton, Singh, Adkins, & Singh, 2009).  
Findings from SG-MBI qualitative studies are often accompanied by participants 
reporting increases in spiritual awareness that are arguably more profound than comparative 
qualitative studies of FG-MBIs (Van Gordon et al., 2016b). Outcomes from SG-MBI research 
are promising and – at least from the Buddhist perceptive – the greater focus of SG-MBIs on 
AST could mean that they equip participants with greater psycho-spiritual coping resources 
relative to FG-MBIs. However, to date, no head-to-head studies have been conducted that allow 
reliable inferences to be drawn as to the relative effectiveness of FG-MBIs and SG-MBIs for 
different population groups. Furthermore, the manner in which SG-MBIs are being integrated 
into research and applied settings appears to be more in-keeping with providing prospective 
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mindfulness practitioners with a greater choice of MBI rather than seeking to compete with 
FG-MBIs.  
Thus, notwithstanding the fact that SG-MBIs are intended to be more spiritual in nature, 
as the situation currently stands it appears (i.e., based on available empirical findings) that 
mindfulness – whether delivered according to the FG-MBI or SG-MBI model – can be used by 
corporations to make improvements to work-related wellbeing and/or work effectiveness 
among employees. However, corporations should be realistic about what outcomes can be 
induced by both FG-MBIs and SG-MBIs and should consider them as just one element of the 
overall workplace infrastructure that can help to optimize productive working conditions.  
Mindful working and mindful managing are arguably key aspects of a healthy work 
environment, but over-reliance on mindfulness could directly or indirectly exert pressures on 
employees to endure work stresses that might otherwise be eliminated by (for example) making 
changes to human resource management systems (e.g., flexible work schemes, innovative 
appraisal and reward systems, etc.). The view of the present author is that in the majority of 
instances, corporations that have chosen to make mindfulness available to employees are well 
intended (i.e., they are seeking a win-win situation), and in so far as mindfulness training has 
encouraged a rhetoric of ‘stress is in the mind’, it should not be discounted that this may have 
occurred due to poor teaching and/or project implementation on the part of third-party 
mindfulness consultants (or a small number of so-called mindfulness experts in cases where 
corporations have instructed their own employees to deliver the training). 
 
Is Mindfulness Corruptible or Does it have a Natural Defence Mechanism? 
Where an employee is taught mindfulness correctly, they are also being directly or indirectly 
instructed in practices intended to cultivate ethical awareness (i.e., ‘right speech’, ‘right action’, 
‘right livelihood’), a compassionate and spiritual outlook (i.e., ‘right intention’, ‘right effort’), 
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and wisdom (i.e., ‘right view’) (Nhat Hanh, 1999). Consequently, correct and authentically 
taught mindfulness means that employees will also be learning how to become wiser and more 
responsible world citizens (Shonin & Van Gordon, 2014b). Under such conditions, there is a 
‘win’ for the employee, employer, Buddhism, and society more generally. 
As noted earlier, where mindfulness is taught outside of a system of ethical and spiritual 
values, it is not ‘true’ mindfulness that is being taught, but rather an ‘attention-based 
psychological technique’. Since what is being propagated in such situations is not authentic 
mindfulness, there is arguably limited value in being concerned with the consequences of 
employees or corporations misappropriating the mindfulness teachings. In other words, it is 
difficult to justify raising a grievance that a corporation is misusing mindfulness, if in fact what 
is being implemented is not mindfulness (Shonin & Van Gordon, 2014b).  
Exposure to “mindfulness” could foster an interest in more profound forms of 
spirituality (Lomas, Cartwright, Edginton, & Ridge, 2014), but it could also quash spiritual 
inquisitiveness while it is still at an embryonic stage (Farias & Wikholm, 2015). Indeed, it is 
the present author’s view that the majority of individuals enticed by “mindfulness” to explore 
spiritual practice have the ‘wrong intention’ and are motivated, or partially motivated, by desire 
to (for example) accrue wealth, follow a fashion, discover friends and relationship partners, or 
advance their career. However, despite this unfortunate scenario, Shonin and Van Gordon 
(2014b) have asserted that it is precisely this ‘wrong intention’ that triggers a natural defence 
mechanism of the spiritual teachings: 
 
If a person comes into contact with the Dharma who is not ready to receive the 
teachings, or who intends to use them for selfish or negative purposes, their wrong 
intention will prevent the teachings from taking root within their being. In fact, all that 
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they will receive will be a theoretical and superficial account of the teachings – and 
even this won’t be properly understood (p. 1).  
 
Furthermore, as implied by the following words of the Buddha (who refers to himself 
below as the Tathāgata), where an individual has a ‘wrong intention’, it is generally the case 
than an authentic spiritual teacher will refuse to teach them:  
  
Some misguided men here formulate a question, come to the Tathāgata, and ask it. In 
that case, Sunakkhatta, though the Tathagata has thought: ‘I should teach them the 
Dhamma,’ he changes his mind (Bodhi, 2009, pp. 861-862). 
 
As referred to in Chapter 3, specific Buddhist systems of thought divide history into 
phases that correspond to the ‘health’ of the spiritual teachings during that particular period of 
time (Van Gordon et al., 2015c). For example, ‘the age of true law’ (Sanskrit: 
saddharma, Japanese: shōbō) corresponds to the period when the historical Buddha lived and 
taught some 2,500-years-ago, and when the spiritual teachings were deemed to be flourishing 
(Endo, 1999). This was followed by the ‘age of semblance dharma’ (Sanskrit: pratirupadharma, 
Japanese: zōbō), a period where authentic spiritual teachings were deemed difficult to happen 
upon. The current period of time (i.e., approximately the last 500-1,000 years) is known as the 
‘age of degeneration of the dharma’ (Sanskrit: pashchimadharma, Japenese: mappō) and 
corresponds to a period of widespread demise in spiritual teachings.  
However, although, according to the Buddhist view we are currently in a period of 
spiritual degeneration, the present author would argue that ultimately, the Buddhadharma – 
and indeed any true spiritual teaching such as authentic mindfulness – is indestructible. 
Santideva (1997) asserted that authentic spiritual teachings are expressions of an ultimate truth 
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of reality. Although individuals may foster deluded views regarding how to attain this ultimate 
truth (i.e., enlightenment), the ultimate truth itself does not degenerate. Likewise, because 
authentic spiritual teachings are direct expressions of a pervasive and enduring ultimate truth 
of existence, they too remain incorruptible (Norbu & Clemente, 1999). 
Thus, whether due to authentic spiritual teachers refusing to teach it, or due to it not 
revealing itself to individuals with impure intention, ‘spiritual truth’ – of which authentic 
mindfulness is an aspect – remains protected from corruption (Norbu & Clemente, 1999). The 
minds of human beings may move through phases of being less receptive to authentic 
mindfulness (and other spiritual) teachings, but the essence of mindfulness does not wax nor 
wane. Therefore, it is the present author’s view that corporations can (inadvertently) misguide 
employees by teaching “mindfulness”, but it is both employee and employer that are subjected 
to a corrupted version of the teachings rather than mindfulness being corrupted per se.  
 
Discussion 
The Buddhist teachings, that include teachings on mindfulness, are asserted to be universal in 
their application (Dalai Lama, 2000). It is inconsistent with the ethos of Buddhism, and that of 
spiritual practice more generally, to make spiritual teachings available to some people, but deny 
them to others (Shonin & Van Gordon, 2014b). Therefore, there are strong grounds for arguing 
that individuals working for large corporations should be permitted the opportunity to make an 
informed decision as to whether a particular form of spiritual practice is right for them. This 
can only happen if they have the opportunity to try it first. Consequently, the present author 
support the integration of authentic mindfulness into the corporate workplace.  
However, there is clearly a need for greater awareness amongst corporations as to what 
(i) constitutes authentic mindfulness practice, (ii) outcomes can be realistically expected from 
training employees in mindfulness techniques (i.e., steady improvements in work-related 
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wellbeing and/or work effectiveness rather than the sudden emergence of an ‘enlightened 
workplace’), (iii) methodological factors limit the findings from mindfulness research (i.e., in 
order to counteract some of the scientific and media hype that organisations may have 
encountered regarding mindfulness efficacy), and (iv) health and commercial risks can arise 
due to a lack of authenticity (i.e., spiritual aptitude) on the part of the mindfulness teacher. 
This latter point is arguably of crucial importance because very few studies have 
specifically sought to assess whether mindfulness can incur adverse effects, and the outcomes 
of some of these studies have given rise for concern. For example, one recent study that 
appeared to employ what the present author would deem to constitute “mindfulness” (i.e., 
rather than authentic mindfulness) demonstrated that a mindful breathing exercise led to 
increased false memory susceptibility (Wilson, Mickes, Stolarz-Fantino, Evrard, & Fantino, 
2015). There also exist reports of mindfulness fostering ‘depersonalisation’ (Booth, 2014) and 
negative self-perceptions (Lomas et al., 2015).  
Although there are few (if any) studies investigating whether mindfulness practiced 
according to the traditional Buddhist model can lead to negative consequences, the traditional 
model of mindfulness has been ‘tried and tested’ for over 2,500 years. Consequently, and while 
acknowledging that minor modifications, such as language secularisation, are likely to be 
necessary when using mindfulness in corporate (and other applied) settings, any major 
deviation from the traditional approach should be undertaken with caution.  
In terms of the current state of affairs, it is probably accurate to conclude that AST and 
corporate mindfulness constitute competing rather than compatible ideals. Nevertheless, the 
present author believes that there is scope for introducing authentic (and secular) mindfulness 
into the corporate workplace in a manner that serves the spiritual, health, and financial interests 
of both employers and employees. However, the effective implementation of such an initiative 
would require fundamental changes in the way corporations view both spiritual and 
133 
 
 
commercial advancement, as well as the close collaboration of spiritual leaders – that possess 
at least a moderate degree of genuine meditative realisation – with spiritually receptive business 
leaders. In the meantime, corporations may wish to carefully investigate the ‘spiritual 
authenticity’ of their chosen mindfulness provider (whether an employee or external 
consultant) to ensure that they (i) are not permitting individuals that do not understand the 
delicate intricacies of AST to teach mindfulness to their workforce, and (ii) are not paying for 
an occupational intervention that, when the hype surrounding “mindfulness” eventually 
subsides, will leave them spiritually and financially short-changed.  
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SECTION B 
CONTRIBUTION TO RESEARCH: 
EVALUATING THE TREATMENT APPLICATIONS OF SG-MBIs 
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Chapter 8 
Meditation Awareness Training for the treatment of fibromyalgia: 
A randomised controlled trial 
 
This chapter (whether in full or in part) was adapted for publication and was subsequently 
published as: 
Van Gordon, W., Shonin, E., Dunn, T., Garcia-Campayo, J., & Griffiths, M. D. (2017). 
Meditation Awareness Training for the treatment of fibromyalgia: A randomised controlled 
trial. British Journal of Health Psychology, Advance Online Publication, 22, 186-206. 
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Abstract 
Fibromyalgia syndrome (FMS) is a chronic pain disorder that affects approximately 3% of 
adults.  While some FMS patients appear to respond favourably to pharmacological treatments, 
many experience limited symptom reduction as well as adverse effects. The need for more 
efficacious FMS treatments – including those without the side-effects of pharmacotherapy – 
has prompted a growth of scientific investigation into the applications of mindfulness for 
treating FMS. The purpose of this study was to conduct the first RCT to evaluate the 
effectiveness of an SG-MBI for treating FMS. Adults with FMS received an eight-week SG-
MBI known as MAT (n = 74) or an active control intervention known as Cognitive-Behaviour 
Theory for Groups (n = 74). Assessments were performed at pre-, post-, and six-month follow-
up phases. MAT participants demonstrated significant and sustained improvements over 
control-group participants in FMS symptomatology, pain perception, sleep quality, 
psychological distress, non-attachment (to self, symptoms, and environment), and civic 
engagement. A mediation analysis found that (i) civic engagement partially mediated treatment 
effects for all outcome variables, (ii) non-attachment partially mediated treatment effects for 
psychological distress and sleep quality, and (iii) non-attachment almost fully mediated 
treatment effects for FMS symptomatology and pain perception. Average daily time spent in 
meditation was found to be a significant predictor of changes in all outcome variables. MAT 
may be a suitable treatment for adults with FMS and appears to ameliorate FMS 
symptomatology and pain perception by reducing attachment to self.  
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Fibromyalgia syndrome (FMS) is a chronic pain disorder that affects approximately 3% of 
adults, with higher rates of occurrence in females compared to males (Branco et al., 2010). 
Individuals with FMS typically experience symptoms of widespread musculoskeletal pain, 
sleep disturbance, poor quality of life, cognitive dysfunction (particularly memory 
impairment), psychological distress (i.e., depression, anxiety, and stress), and fatigue (Häuser, 
Wolfe, Tölle, Üçeyler, & Sommer, 2012; Jones, Sherman, Mist, Carson, Bennett, & Li, 2012; 
Wolfe, Brähler, Hinz, & Häuser, 2013). The condition is also associated with (i) high rates of 
presenting at medical services (Schaefer et al., 2011), unemployment (Scott & Jones, 2014), 
(ii) use of incapacity for work and/or disability benefits (Sicras-Mainar et al., 2009; Wolfe et 
al., 1997), (iii) hypochondriasis, self-preoccupation and self-attachment (Canzonieri, Pollak, 
Oliveira, Costa, & Natour, 2013; Van Gordon et al., 2016b; Wolfe, 2009), and (iv) low levels 
of civic engagement (Van Gordon et al., 2016b). 
There is no reliable laboratory test for FMS and diagnosis is often based on the 
exclusion of other pathologies as well as the patient’s verbal responses to gentle manual 
pressure being applied to tender body points (Van Gordon et al., 2016b). While some FMS 
patients appear to respond favourably to pharmacological treatments (principally tricyclic 
antidepressants and serotonin-norepinephrine reuptake inhibitors), many experience limited 
symptom reduction as well as adverse effects (Häuser et al., 2012; Luciano et al., 2014; Nüesch, 
Häuser, Bernardy, Barth, & Jüni, 2013). Consequently, an integrative treatment approach is 
currently preferred whereby pharmacological treatments are combined with (for example) 
aerobic exercise, cognitive-behavioural therapy, self-help, and/or psycho-education (Van 
Gordon et al., 2016b). 
The need for more efficacious FMS treatments – including those without the side-
effects of pharmacotherapy – has prompted a growth of scientific investigation into the 
applications of mindfulness for treating FMS (Langhorst, Klose, Dobos, Bernardy, & Häuser, 
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2013; Modrego, Morillo, López Montoyo, Correa, Borao, & García-Campayo, 2016). 
Mindfulness is understood to increase perceptual distance from distressing sensory and 
psychological stimuli, and this objectification of pain helps to regulate its impact on 
psychosocial functioning (Garcia-Martin et al., 2016; Morone, Lynch, Greco, Tindle & Weiner, 
2008; Van Gordon et al., 2016b). 
Until recently, the healthcare literature has predominantly focussed on what have been 
termed FG-MBIs. The two most empirically investigated FG-MBIs are MBSR (Kabat-Zinn, 
1990) and MBCT (Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2002). Findings from FG-MBI studies 
indicate that they may have applications in the treatment of FMS. For example, a meta-analysis 
(n = 674) – incorporating six RCTs of MBSR – concluded that it led to short-term 
improvements in quality of life and pain compared to treatment-as-usual or active control 
groups (Lauche, Cramer, Dobos, Langhorst, & Schmidt, 2013). A more recent review study (n 
= 702; 10 RCTs, prospective or retrospective studies) that included a greater range of FG-MBIs 
(i.e., in addition to MBSR) reported mild-to-moderate treatment effects (Henke & Chur-
Hansen, 2014). These findings are consistent with a meta-analysis (comprising nine RCTs with 
active control groups) in which effect sizes in the mild-to-moderate range were reported for the 
effectiveness of FG-MBIs in the treatment of chronic pain (Cohen’s d = 0.33; Goyal et al., 
2014). 
SG-MBIs reflect a new direction in mindfulness research and practice and have been 
formulated in order to address some of the limitations of FG-MBIs. SG-MBIs differ from FG-
MBIs by adopting a broader definition of mindfulness that is more acknowledging of its 
spiritual roots. In addition to being overtly spiritual in nature, SG-MBIs are distinct from FG-
MBIs due to them employing (i) a greater range of meditative techniques (generally delivered 
in a secular context), (ii) ethics as a key component of the taught programme, and (iii) an 
instructor training programme that typically requires several years of supervised mindfulness 
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practice (Van Gordon et al., 2015b). Some SG-MBIs also introduce participants to meditative 
concepts such as impermanence, interconnectedness, non-self or emptiness, and non-
attachment (Shonin & Van Gordon, 2015a).  
The introduction of the non-attachment principle is based on the Buddhist view that 
suffering arises as a result of an individual’s ‘attachment’ to both themselves and external 
phenomena (e.g., wealth, people, reputation, etc.; Feliu-Soler et al., 2016). As discussed in 
Chapter 6, the Buddhist notion of attachment has been defined as “the over-allocation of 
cognitive and emotional resources towards a particular object, construct, or idea to the extent 
that the object is assigned an attractive quality that is unrealistic and that exceeds its intrinsic 
worth” (Shonin et al., 2014g, p.126). Consequently, in the traditional meditation literature, 
reducing attachment (or augmenting non-attachment) is deemed to be an important feature of 
the path to psycho-spiritual wellbeing. Furthermore, given that self-attachment is deemed to 
play a role in the maintenance of FMS (Van Gordon et al., 2016b), FMS interventions that 
specifically aim to reduce attachment (to self, symptoms, and environment) warrant empirical 
investigation. 
A positive association has been observed between spirituality and positive affect in 
individuals with FMS (Moreira-Almeida & Koenig, 2008). Consistent with this finding, 
qualitative studies of SG-MBIs have demonstrated that participants of both healthy and clinical 
status attribute improvements in health outcomes to increased spiritual awareness. Although a 
study investigating the effectiveness of an SG-MBI for treating FMS has not been conducted 
to date, SG-MBIs have demonstrable applications for treating many of the individual symptoms 
of FMS including (for example) psychological distress (Van Gordon et al., 2014a), self-
preoccupation and maladaptive ego-constructs (Shonin, Van Gordon, & Griffiths, 2014a; 
Shonin & Van Gordon, 2015a), and sleep disturbance (Van Gordon et al., 2016d). Using these 
findings as a basis, the purpose of the present RCT was to address the need for a rigorous 
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empirical assessment of the effectiveness of an SG-MBI for treating FMS. Primary outcomes 
were fibromyalgia symptomatology, pain perception, sleep quality, and psychological distress. 
Secondary outcomes were non-attachment and civic engagement.   
 
Method 
Design 
An RCT (trial no.  NCT02800720) compared MAT with a purpose-designed active control 
condition. CONSORT guidelines for non-pharmacological interventions were followed where 
applicable (Boutron et al., 2008; Schulz et al., 2010). The trial was approved by the research 
team’s University Ethics Committee. A qualitative study exploring participant’s experiences 
and general feasibility was embedded in the RCT, and findings from the qualitative study are 
reported in Chapter 9. 
 
Participants 
Participants were male and female English-speaking adults with a current diagnosis of FMS 
(as confirmed by a letter from a GP, rheumatologist, or hospital pain consultant). Participation 
was on a voluntary basis and individuals were recruited via talks at FMS self-help groups, 
posters in GP surgeries, and emails sent to members of FMS support groups. Furthermore, 
some East-Midlands GPs were made aware of the study and were asked to informally raise 
awareness amongst relevant service users by suggesting that they could contact the research 
team for further information. 
As part of the informed consent process, participants were required to acknowledge that 
they understood that MAT (i) is deemed by its founders to be both a psychological and spiritual 
intervention, (ii) is not intended to be a course on Buddhism (i.e., it is secular in context) but 
makes extensive use of Buddhist meditative techniques and principles, and (iii) was founded 
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by two Western psychologists who are also Buddhist monks. This step was implemented for 
ethical and transparency reasons on account of the fact that some FG-MBIs have been criticised 
for emphasising or masking their affiliation with Buddhism to suit their needs (Purser, 2015).  
 
Eligibility Criteria 
In addition to a current FMS diagnosis, the eligibility criteria for participation in the study 
were: (i) being aged between 18 and 65 years, (ii) being able to read and write using the English 
language, (iii) not currently undergoing formal psychotherapy, (iv) no changes in 
psychopharmacology type or dosage one-month prior to intervention (although stable 
prescription medication was permitted), and (v) not currently practicing mindfulness or 
meditation. Participants were also required to confirm their availability to complete an eight-
week intervention and six-month follow-up assessment. Attendance at at-least seven of the 
eight weekly sessions is a prerequisite for course completion. In the current study, participants 
that did not attend the requisite number of sessions were classed as having dropped-out and 
were excluded from (or where unavailable to attend) future assessment phases. Participants 
were informed about the attendance requirements via the informed consent procedure.  
 
Randomisation and Blinding 
The first author (and principal investigator) was responsible for recruitment and participant 
screening. Following the screening process, eligible participants were assigned five-digit 
pseudonyms. The document linking participant demographic data and screening results to their 
pseudonyms was stored in a sealed opaque envelope in a lockable unit within the office of the 
principal investigator, and all other researchers were blinded as to its contents. A list of eligible 
participant pseudonyms, grouped by sex, was then passed to the second author who conducted 
the randomisation procedure (the principal investigator was not involved in the randomisation 
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process). On a sex-strata basis, participant pseudonyms were placed into a bowl and then 
selected one at a time prior to being placed, in alternating sequence, into one of two separate 
envelopes corresponding to the intervention and control group (participants were grouped by 
sex in order to yield sex-matched intervention and control groups). Randomisation was 
implemented prior to administering baseline psychometric tests in order to facilitate the 
blinding of researchers involved in conducting the randomisation procedure. Participants were 
blinded as to allocation condition until after completion of baseline assessments and were 
likewise blinded as to which allocation condition featured the target intervention. 
 
Sample Size Calculation 
Based on an equal distribution between allocation conditions, statistical power calculations 
using GPOWER Software (Faul & Erdinger, 1992) indicated a total sample size of 128 
participants would be required for an effect size of 0.5, an alpha of 0.05, and 80% power. 
Consistent with literature reviews conducted by other authors (e.g., Glombiewski, Sawyer, 
Gutermann, Koenig, Rief, & Hofmann, 2010), a comprehensive literature review conducted by 
the present author found that an effect size of 0.5 appears to be standard for efficacy studies of 
MBIs as well as FMS treatment studies. The power calculation was conducted with the primary 
outcome measures in mind. An over-recruitment margin of 20 participants was applied to 
account for drop out. 
 
Programme Description 
MAT is an eight-week SG-MBI in which mindfulness is an integral component, but is not the 
exclusive focus (Shonin, Van Gordon, & Griffiths, 2014a; Van Gordon et al., 2014a). The 
intervention is delivered by instructors who have undergone a three-year supervised MAT 
training programme. Participants attend eight weekly workshops (each lasting two hours) and 
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receive a CD of guided meditations to facilitate daily self-practice. The weekly sessions 
comprise three distinct phases: (i) a taught/presentation component (approximately 45 
minutes), (ii) a facilitated group-discussion component (approximately 35 minutes), and (iii) 
guided meditation and/or mindfulness exercises (approximately 30 minutes). A 10-minute 
break is scheduled prior to commencing the guided meditation exercises. In the third and eighth 
week of the programme, participants attend one-to-one support sessions (each of 50-minutes 
duration) with the programme instructor (for comprehensive information regarding the 
intervention protocol, see Van Gordon et al., 2014a). 
Due to the fact that individuals with FMS can experience difficulties in concentrating 
(referred to as ‘fibro fog’; Mease et al., 2008), in the present study the intervention was slightly 
modified to include an additional 5-minute break that occurred 45 minutes into the session (this 
was achieved by reducing the duration of the facilitated group discussion component to 30 
minutes). In order to directly target the key symptoms and correlates of FMS, the intervention 
was also modified in the present study to include an extended focus on: (i) mindfulness 
techniques specifically concerned with meditatively observing and objectifying somatic pain, 
(ii) compassion meditation in order to help participants become less preoccupied with their 
illness (i.e., by becoming more aware of the suffering of others), and (iii) ‘engaged 
mindfulness’ (a technique intended to raise participants’ awareness of the benefits – to both 
themselves and others – of contributing to the welfare of society in a manner that does not 
exceed the physical and/or psychological demands of their condition). 
 Rather than prescribe a fixed amount of daily meditation practice time, participants are 
encouraged to adopt a dynamic meditation routine and are guided on an individual basis to find 
the optimum frequency and duration of meditation sessions. According to Van Gordon et al 
(2014a), this avoids divisions being formed between formal seated meditation sessions and 
meditation during everyday life activities. In the present study, MAT was delivered by the 
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second author (30 years meditation teaching experience) and the first author provided 
supervision in order to identify any deviations from the standard intervention delivery format. 
Supervision was implemented by the first author (i) silently observing at least 15 minutes of 
each weekly session (not always following the same amount of elapsed time into the 2-hour 
session), and (ii) engaging in discussion with the program facilitator on a weekly basis. With 
the exception of the planned modifications specified above, no other deviations from the 
standard protocol were identified. 
MAT (and the control intervention) were delivered across multiple sites in the East 
Midlands in separate training rooms utilised by a meditation centre and GP surgery. Other than 
an over-head projector, chairs and tables, a singing bowl for use during the guided meditations, 
and sufficient space to practice walking meditation (that requires participants to walk in single 
file), no special equipment or arrangements were required. In the present study, the intervention 
was delivered using group-sizes of approximately 25 participants. 
 
Control Condition 
Cognitive Behavioural Theory for Groups (CBTG) is a purpose-designed control intervention 
formulated by Shonin et al., (2014d). CBTG is based on guidelines by MacCoon et al. (2012) 
for the development of suitable control groups for studies of MBIs. CBTG involves educating 
participants in cognitive-behavioural theory and principles. It is identical to the intervention 
condition on all non-specific factors such as overall course length, individual session duration, 
group and one-to-one discussion component, group-size, and inclusion of an at-home practice 
element. Weekly sessions comprise: (i) a taught presentation component (45 minutes), (ii) a 
facilitated group discussion component (30-minutes duration in the present study), (iii) guided 
discovery educational exercises (30 minutes), and (iv) the same number and duration of breaks 
as the target intervention. The weekly sessions are explicitly education-focussed and do not 
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include any practice or discussion of meditation.  
To control for a facilitator effect and ensure consistency of didactic style, CBTG was 
delivered by the same instructor who facilitated the MAT programme. To assess for differences 
in the instructor’s levels of enthusiasm between groups, participants in both the intervention 
and control groups were asked to rate (on a 1 to 5 Likert scale) the instructor’s levels of 
planning and motivation. As with the target intervention, the CBTG sessions were supervised 
to identify any deviations from the standard intervention delivery format. With the exception 
of an additional 5-minute break that was introduced in order to match the target intervention, 
there were no planned or unplanned modifications to the delivery of CBTG. 
 
Outcome Measures 
Study outcomes were assessed via the following well-established psychometric scales: 
Revised Fibromyalgia Impact Questionnaire (FIQ-R; Bennett, Friend, Jones, Ward, Han, & 
Ross; 2009): The FIQ-R assesses the impact of FMS across the three domains of function, 
overall impact, and symptoms. The FIQ-R includes 21 questions that are graded on a 0-10 
numeric scale and higher scores correspond to higher levels of negative impact. Questions are 
framed in the context of the past seven days and include items such as “difficulty in sitting in a 
chair for 45 minutes”, “fibromyalgia prevented me from accomplishing goals for the week”, 
and “please rate the level of pain”. The summed score for the function domain (range 0 to 90) 
is divided by three, the summed score for overall impact domain (range 0 to 20) remains 
unchanged, and the summed score for the symptom domain (range 0 to 100) is divided by two. 
The total FIQ-R score is the sum of the three modified domain scores and the maximum total 
score is 100. Based on over 250 studies employing either the FIQ-R or the original 
Fibromyalgia Impact Questionnaire, individuals diagnosed with FMS typically score between 
55-65 (Bennett et al., 2009). 
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Short-form McGill Pain Questionnaire (SF-MPQ; Melzack, 1987): The Pain Perception Index 
of the SF-MPQ comprises 15 sensory or affective pain descriptors (e.g., throbbing, aching, 
heavy, and punishing) that are rated on a four-point Likert scale (0 = none, 3 = severe). Scores 
for each pain descriptor are combined to give a total measure of pain perception. The maximum 
score is 45 and a mean improvement of more than 5 points is deemed to be clinically important 
(Hawker, Mian, Kendzerska, & French, 2011).  
Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scale (DASS; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995): The 21-item 
DASS assesses psychological distress and comprises three sub-scales: (i) depression, (ii) 
anxiety, and (iii) stress. The scale is scored on a four-point Likert scale (from: 0 = Did not 
apply to me at all, to 3 = Applied to me very much or most of the time) and features items such 
as “I found it hard to wind down” and “I felt that life was meaningless”. The DASS is 
completed in respect of the foregoing seven-day period. According to the DASS manual 
(Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995), the percentile cut-offs and corresponding mean scores for 
symptom severity are as follows: 0-78 (M ≤ 13) = normal, 78-87 (M = 14-18) = mild, 87-95 
(M = 19-28) = moderate, and > 95 (M ≥ 28 = severe).  
Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index (PSQI; Buysse, Reynolds Monk, Berman, & Kupfer, 1989): 
The seven-item PSQI assesses sleep quality during the past month across the domains of 
subjective sleep quality, sleep latency, sleep duration, habitual sleep efficiency, sleep 
disturbances, use of sleep medication, and daytime dysfunction. The PSQI is scored on a four-
point Likert scale (0 = no difficulty, 3 = extreme difficulty) and features items such as “during 
the past month, how would you rate your sleep quality overall?” The maximum score is 21 and 
a global score of ≥5 indicates a poor quality of sleep (Buysse et al., 1989).  
Non-Attachment Scale (NAS; Sahdra et al., 2010; Sahdra et al., 2015): The seven-item NAS is 
based on a Buddhist model of mental illness and evaluates the degree to which a person 
becomes attached to their experiences on the psychological, social, and environmental plane. 
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The NAS also assesses the degree to which a person is ‘attached to themselves’ because 
according to Buddhist theory, attachment to psychological or environmental phenomena arises 
due to a firm sense of selfhood (Van Gordon et al., 2016a). The NAS is constructed upon the 
Buddhist notion that the self does not inherently exist and that attachment to self and 
environment thus constitutes a maladaptive condition (see Shonin et al. [2014g] for a 
discussion of the differences between Buddhist and Western psychological conceptualisations 
of attachment). The NAS is scored on a six-point Likert scale (from 1 = disagree strongly to 6 
= agree strongly) and features items such as “When pleasant experiences end, I am fine moving 
on to what comes next”. The maximum score is 42 and higher scores reflect lower levels of 
attachment (or higher levels of non-attachment).  
Civic Engagement: Participants were asked to record how many hours during the previous 
seven days they had spent engaging in paid work, voluntary work, participating in an event or 
meeting hosted by a community organisation or group, and/or mentoring another non-family 
member of the community.  
 
Data Analysis 
A significance level of p < 0.05 and two-tailed tests were employed throughout. Independent 
samples t-tests (for continuous variables) and chi-square tests with Yates’s correction (for 
categorical variables) were used to identify any significant differences between groups in 
demographic characteristics or baseline-dependent variable mean scores.  
Mixed effects models (also known as multi-level models, random effects model, and 
hierarchical models) were used to examine the effect of intervention (MAT) and control 
(CBTG) on all six outcome measures (i.e., FIQ-R, SF-MPQ, DASS, PSQI, NAS, and Civic 
Engagement). Mixed effects modelling accounts for shared variance within-participants while 
modelling between-participant differences. The benefits of mixed effects models are well 
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established and include reduced assumptions (i.e., homoscedasticity, sphericity, and compound 
symmetry) and greater statistical power over traditional methods (Baguley, 2012a; Gelman & 
Hill, 2007; Quene & van der Berg, 2004; Snijders & Bosker, 1999). Furthermore, mixed effects 
models adequately account for baseline differences in outcome scores by modelling (per 
participant) the change in outcome measure relative to baseline across all measurement periods 
(i.e., pre-, post-, and follow-up). Prior to model estimation, distributions of all outcome 
variables and random effects residuals were inspected and deemed to be close approximations 
of normality. Using the absolute median deviation method to detect outliers (Leys, Ley, Klein, 
Bernard, & Licata, 2013), no data points were deemed to be extreme in the present data set. 
The RCT was conducted on an ‘intent-to-treat’ basis with missing data at end-point substituted 
using last-observation-carried-forward basis.  
 
Results 
Recruitment and Allocation 
Participant demographic characteristics are summarised in Table 8.1. A total of 231 individuals 
completed the screening questionnaire and 83 of these were screened-out on the grounds of 
ineligibility. The main reasons for exclusion were (i) currently receiving structured 
psychotherapy (32 individuals), (ii) unable to confirm current diagnosis of FMS (23 
individuals), (iii) recent change in psychopharmacology type or dosage (13 participants), and 
(iv) currently attending meditation or mindfulness classes (8 participants). Of the 148 
remaining participants, 74 were allocated to the intervention group and the same number to the 
control group (see Figure 8.1). MAT and the control group interventions were each delivered 
in three separate tranches (i.e., approximately 25 participants per tranche). 
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Table 8.1. Baseline demographic characteristics for each allocation condition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Characteristic MAT (n = 74) CBTG (n = 74) 
Age, mean (SD) 46.41 (9.06) 47.34 (9.83) 
Female (%) 82.4 83.8 
Employed (%) 52.70 48.65 
Education (%)   
School Leaver 55.41 59.46 
Vocational 25.68 25.68 
University 18.92 14.87 
Marital Status (%)   
Married 56.76 63.51 
Single 9.46 5.41 
Divorced 27.03 24.32 
Widow 6.76 6.76 
Ethnicity (%)   
White (British) 77.03 71.62 
White (Non-British) 9.46 9.46 
Asian 8.11 9.46 
Black (Caribbean) 5.3 9.46 
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Figure 8.1.  Flow of participants through recruitment and assessment phases 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Expressed an interest and  
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n = 231 
Randomisation 
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Excluded  
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Intervention group 
n = 74 
Withdrew 
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Withdrew 
n = 20 
Completed post-intervention assessment 
 n = 54 
Completed post-intervention assessment 
n = 52 
Completed follow-up assessment 
n = 45 
Completed follow-up assessment 
n = 40 
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Non-Completion, Attendance, and Fidelity of Implementation 
There were no significant differences between MAT and CBTG in the number of participants 
that dropped out of the study prior to completing the intervention (MAT = 20, CBTG = 22). 
There were no significant differences between dropout and completion samples (i.e., 
irrespective of allocation condition) in sex, education, employment status, marital status, and 
ethnicity. However, there was a significant difference for age where the mean dropout and 
completer age were 44.4 years (SD = 8.8) and 47.9 years (SD = 9.6) respectively (t (91) = -
2.19, p = 0.03). The main reasons for non-completion were that the participant: (i) did not 
attend at least seven of the eight weekly sessions (MAT = 10, CBTG = 12), (ii) found the 
intervention to be overly demanding (MAT = 6, CBTG = 6), or (iii) changed medicine or 
commenced structured psychotherapy after baseline assessment (MAT = 3, CBTG = 2). Of 
those participants that attended the post-intervention assessment phase, 9 MAT and 12 CBTG 
participants were lost to follow up. There were no significant differences between allocation 
conditions in participant ratings of the instructor’s levels of planning and motivation. MAT 
participants practiced meditation for an average of 41.11 minutes per day (SD = 15.26).  
 
Demographic and Baseline Characteristics 
There were no significance differences between allocation conditions in baseline demographic 
characteristics (i.e., sex, age, education, employment status, marital status, or ethnicity). 
Likewise, there were no significant differences between MAT and the CBTG group in baseline 
scores on each of the six outcome measures. 
  
Analysis of Outcome Measures 
A separate mixed effects model was estimated for each outcome measure (see Table 8.2 for 
means and SDs). Each model included Group (control, intervention) and measurement Interval 
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(pre-, post-, follow-up) as fixed effects (i.e., in the form of an interaction predictor 
[Group*Interval]) and Participant (within measurement Interval) as a random effect. This 
allowed a unique regression model (i.e., intercept and slope) to be specified for every 
participant across measurement intervals (see Figure 8.2 for an exemplar modelling DASS 
scores across measurement intervals). Results from the six estimated mixed effects models 
show an overall strong effect of intervention compared to control for all outcome measures 
(see Table 8.3 for summaries of each model). More specifically, relative to baseline and 
compared to control, intervention resulted in a (i) 6.24 (at post) and 7.92 (at follow-up) greater 
decrease in FIQ-R score, (ii) 2.01 (at post) and 3.01 (at follow-up) greater decrease in SF-MPQ 
score, (iii) 3.70 (at post) and 4.86 (at follow-up) greater decrease in DASS score, (iv) 1.50 (at 
post) and 2.28 (at follow-up) greater decrease in PSQI score, (v) 2.81 (at post) and 3.57 (at 
follow-up) greater increase in NAS score, and (vi) 1.69 (at post) and 2.05 (at follow-up) greater 
increase in Civic Engagement (see Figure 8.3 for a breakdown of intervention and control 
group outcome means across measurement intervals). Overall, results demonstrate that MAT 
significantly outperformed CBTG at both post- and follow-up assessment phases for all six 
outcome measures. 
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Table 8.2.  Means and standard deviations of outcome variable scores for group and time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  FIQ-R  SF-MPQ  DASS  PSQI  NAS  Civic 
Engagement 
 Group Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD 
                   
Pre  Intervention 55.24 10.06  28.04 4.64  26.61 5.33  14.11 2.43  18.45 4.11  17.24 11.62 
 Control 54.04 8.86  27.58 3.69  26.24 4.19  14.09 2.35  18.28 3.70  17.78 12.23 
Post Intervention 46.89 9.55  24.82 4.56  21.82 5.02  11.91 2.71  22.14 4.68  19.35 11.95 
 Control 51.93 8.80  26.38 3.75  25.16 4.11  13.39 2.53  19.16 3.92  18.20 11.83 
Follow-
up 
Intervention 45.65 10.95  23.84 5.38  20.65 5.96  11.36 3.09  22.78 5.39  19.85 11.80 
 Control 52.36 9.29  26.39 3.93  25.15 4.58  13.64 2.55  19.05 3.78  18.34 12.23 
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Table 8.3. Fixed effects estimates (at post and follow-up assessment phases) with 95% CIs for 
all six outcome measures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The reference category in all cases is the control group. This means a Post FIQ-R score 
of -6.24 can be interpreted as a -6.24 change in FIQ-R score in comparison to the control 
condition relative to baseline (i.e., Pre FIQ-R score). 
 
 
 
  
value  
 
CIs 
 
t-value 
 
p-value 
FIQ-R     
(Intercept) 54.04    
Post  -6.24 -8.24:-4.25 -6.13 <0.001 
Follow-up -7.92 -13.76:-7.76 -6.14 <0.001 
SF-MPQ     
(Intercept) 27.58    
Post  -2.01 -2.80:-1.26 -5.24 <0.001 
Follow-up  -3.01 -4.09:-1.94 -5.48 <0.001 
DASS     
(Intercept) 26.24    
Post -3.70 -4.77:-2.63 -6.80 <0.001 
Follow-up -4.86 -6.30:-3.43 -6.63 <0.001 
PSQI     
(Intercept) 14.09    
Post  -1.50 -2.03:-0.96 -5.53 <0.001 
Follow-up   -2.28 -2.94:-1.63 -6.83 <0.001 
NAS     
(Intercept) 18.28    
Post 2.81 1.92:3.70 6.17 <0.001 
Follow-up 3.57 2.50:4.63 6.56 <0.001 
Civic Engagement     
(Intercept) 17.78    
Post  1.69 0.53:2.84 2.86 <0.01 
Follow-up  2.05 1.10:3.00 4.24 <0.001 
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Figure 8.2. Mixed effect model for DASS 
 
Note: The plot shows each participant’s DASS score trajectory across measurement intervals 
(pre, post, follow-up). Narrow lines illustrate trajectories at the subject-level whereas two fuller 
lines illustrate the predicted population estimates by group (control vs. intervention). 
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Figure 8.3. Outcome means (intervention and control) across measurement intervals with two-
tier 95% CIs 
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Note: The inner tier of a two-tiered CI represents CIs for the mean whilst the outer tier 
represents a difference-adjusted CI. Difference-adjusted CIs represent the individual means but 
calibrates the CI to indicate whether the sample means differ (using 95% confidence in the 
difference as a standard) (Baguley, 2012b).  
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Intervention Engagement Effects 
A linear model was estimated, regressing the number of minutes meditated per day onto the 
difference between baseline and follow-up for each outcome measure. Results showed 
significant linear relationships between the number of minutes meditated and all outcome 
differences (see Table 8.4). This suggests that the level of engagement with meditation is a 
good indicator of its effect, as captured by six different outcome measures.  
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Table 8.4. Parameter estimates of linear models for minutes meditated and outcome measures 
Outcome measures Intercept Estimate SE t-value p-value 
FIQ-R 7.59 -0.50 0.06 -8.05 <0.001 
SF-MPQ 0.82 -0.16 0.03 -5.53 <0.001 
DASS 3.17 -0.28 0.03 -8.28 <0.001 
PSQI 0.72 -0.11 0.02 -6.71 <0.001 
NAS -2.87 0.21 0.02  9.20 <0.001 
Civic Engagement 0.05 0.09 0.03  2.59 <0.05 
 
Note: All outcome measure differences (baseline – follow-up) are predicted by the number of 
average minutes meditated per day  
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Mediation Analysis 
Several models were estimated to test the mediating effects of the two secondary outcome 
variables (Civic Engagement, NAS) on all primary outcome variables (FIQ-R, SF-MPQ, 
DASS, PSQI). Given the established relationships between IV-DV and IV-M (i.e., paths a and 
c of Figure 8.4) via the mixed effects models (see Table 8.3), only path b was inspected for a 
correlation between mediator and DV (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Analysis demonstrated 
significant relationships between each mediator and respective outcome measure (see Table 
8.5). Having established that all variables were correlated, a comparison between the direct 
(path c) and indirect effects (paths c + b) was undertaken to determine whether the relationship 
between the IV and DV was attenuated by the inclusion of a mediator (M).  
The results showed that Civic Engagement was a partial mediator of treatment effects 
across all outcome measures (FIQ-R, SF-MPQ, DASS, PSQI). This can be seen in Table 8.6 
where each IV-DV regression coefficient is reduced (but remains statistically significant) when 
Civic Engagement is introduced into the model. Treating NAS as a mediator resulted in partial 
mediation of treatment effects for DASS and PSQI but close to full mediation (i.e., IV-DV 
paths became non-significant with the inclusion of M) for FIQ-R and SF-MPQ (see Table 8.6). 
This suggests that non-attachment to the self and environment is an important mediating 
mechanism in reducing fibromyalgia symptoms.  
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Figure 8.4. Example of mediation model paths 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IV 
M 
DV 
c 
a 
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Table 8.5. Parameter estimates of path b treating the potential mediator as a predictor of each 
outcome measure 
 Intercept Estimate SE t-value p-value 
Civic 
Engagement  
     
FIQ-R  -2.66 -1.87 0.17 -10.80 <0.001 
SF-MPQ -1.55 -0.72 0.07 -9.44 <0.001 
DASS -1.85 -1.06 0.10 -10.35 <0.001 
PSQI  -0.93 -0.42 0.05 -8.33 <0.001 
NAS       
FIQ-R  -0.27 -2.10 0.08 -24.60 <0.001 
SF-MPQ -0.69 -0.78 0.04 -16.30 <0.001 
DASS  -0.58 -1.15 0.05 -19.62 <0.001 
PSQI  -0.30 -0.50 0.02 -17.11 <0.001 
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Table 8.6. Parameter estimates for mediation models with Civic Engagement and NAS as separate mediators of all primary outcome variables 
(FIQ-R, SF-MPQ, DASS, PSQI) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  
Step 1 = direct effect (DV~IV), Step 2 = indirect effect (DV~IV+M) [‘~’=predicted by] 
Sig. level: ‘***’ 0.001, ‘*’ 0.05 
  FIQ-R  SF-MPQ  DASS  PSQI 
  Step1 Step2  Step1 Step2  Step1 Step2  Step1 Step2 
Intercept 
 
-1.67 -0.77  -1.19 -0.84  -1.09 -0.59  -0.45 -0.27 
b (IV) 
b (Civic Eng.) 
 
-7.92*** -4.56***  
-1.63*** 
 -3.01*** 
 
-1.71*** 
-0.63*** 
 -4.86*** -3.01*** 
-0.89*** 
 -2.28*** -1.58*** 
-0.33*** 
F change 
 
87.84***   65.44***   79.18***   46.49***  
𝑅2 
 
0.21 0.51  0.17 0.42  0.23 0.50  0.24 0.42 
Intercept 
 
-1.67 -0.08  -1.18 -0.59  -1.09 -0.25  -0.45 -0.09 
b (IV) 
b (NAS) 
 
-7.91*** -0.55 
-2.06*** 
 -3.01*** -0.27 
-0.76*** 
 -4.86*** -0.97* 
-1.08*** 
 -2.28*** -0.61* 
-0.46*** 
F change 
 
450.50***   195.42***   271.21***   199.3***  
𝑅2 
 
0.20 0.80  0.17 0.64  0.23 0.73  0.24 0.68 
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Discussion 
In the present study, an RCT compared MAT with a purpose-designed control intervention in 
individuals with FMS. MAT participants demonstrated significant improvements over control 
group participants in levels of FMS symptomatology, pain perception, sleep quality, 
psychological distress, non-attachment, and civic engagement. The therapeutic gains attributed 
to MAT were maintained (and in some cases slightly augmented) at six-month follow-up.  
Approximately one in four MAT participants did not complete the intervention. This 
level of non-completion is consistent with other studies administering meditation-based 
interventions to individuals with FMS where non-completion rates between 21-37% have been 
reported (e.g., Kaplan, Goldenberg, & Galvin-Nadeau, 1993; Mannerkorpi & Arndorw 2004; 
Weissbecker, Salmon, Studts, Floyd, Dedert, & Sephton, 2004). However, in the present study, 
only six participants reported that they dropped out because the intervention was over-
demanding. A more common reason for non-completion was failure to attend at least seven of 
the eight weekly MAT sessions (i.e., ten participants reported that they were unable to attend 
one or more sessions due to unforeseen circumstances). Given that some studies investigating 
the applications of mindfulness for treating FMS have set the requisite attendance rate as low 
as 50% (e.g., Grossman, Schwarzer, Jena, Naumann, & Walach (2011), and given that FMS 
treatment studies typically report relatively high rates of drop-out (i.e., when compared to other 
patient groups), the present author deems that the non-completion levels observed here support 
the acceptability of MAT for the target population (i.e., an equivalent level of drop-out 
observed in an intervention with higher attendance requirements suggests that it is relatively 
more acceptable). Additional support for the acceptability of the intervention is derived from 
the fact that no significant differences in drop out were observed across allocation conditions. 
 With the exception of meditative practices and principles, the CBTG control condition 
was designed to replicate MAT on all other intervention design factors (e.g., duration, 
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facilitator-participant contact time, group discussion, instructor didactic style, etc.). Compared 
to a wait list control, treatment-as-usual, or ‘convenience’ comparison intervention, the use of 
a ‘matched’ active control condition allows therapeutic gains due to non-specific factors (e.g., 
group interaction, therapeutic alliance, etc.) to be filtered out. Consequently, findings from the 
present study provide a reliable indicator of the treatment effects that can be attributed to the 
‘active ingredient’ of MAT (i.e., meditation). The fact that therapeutic improvements were due 
to meditation is further supported by findings from the regression analysis that showed average 
daily time spend meditating was a significant predictor of changes in all outcome variables. 
Designing studies that permit such inferences to be made is particularly important for MBIs 
because such interventions typically employ a variety of therapeutic and relaxation techniques.  
 Irrespective of allocation condition, a slight but statistically significant age difference 
was observed in the present study between completers and non-completers. The fact that non-
completers were slightly older that completers (mean age of 47.9 and 44.4 years, respectively) 
could suggest that the acceptability of both MAT and CBTG is reduced in slightly older FMS 
populations. However, both the age difference and non-completion sample size are too small 
to draw reliable conclusions in this respect. Furthermore, this finding has not been observed in 
other studies of MAT or – to the best of the present author’s knowledge – in other MBI studies 
involving individuals with FMS. Nevertheless, future FMS treatment studies using MBIs could 
seek to investigate this finding further. 
The improvements experienced by participants across all primary outcome measures 
(i.e., fibromyalgia symptomatology, pain perception, psychological distress, and sleep quality) 
are largely consistent with FG-MBI studies involving individuals with FMS (e.g., Davis & 
Zautra, 2013; Henke & Chur-Hansen, 2014; Lauche et al., 2013). However, based on a single 
SG-MBI study, it is difficult to draw reliable conclusions as to the comparative effectiveness 
of SG-MBIs and FG-MBIs for individuals with FMS. Reliably formulating such conclusions 
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would require further controlled large-sample FMS treatment studies using SG-MBIs and/or 
several purpose designed head-to-head studies. Data on which particular MBI is most effective 
for FMS (or a given medical illness) is certainly of value to the medical community. However, 
rather than seek to out-perform or replace FG-MBIs, the primary intent underlying the SG-
MBI initiative appears to be that of providing service users with a greater choice of evidence-
based mindfulness intervention – including that of practicing mindfulness in a manner that is 
more consistent with the traditional spiritual conceptualisation of the technique (Van Gordon, 
Shonin, Lomas, & Griffiths, 2016f). 
Notwithstanding the consistency between findings from primary outcome measures in 
the present study and those from FMS treatment studies using FG-MBIs, a qualitative 
feasibility study that was embedded within the present RCT (i.e., see Chapter 9 or Van Gordon 
et al., 2016b) reported outcomes that are not typically associated with FG-MBIs. More 
specifically, analysis of interview transcripts from ten MAT participants that were randomly 
allocated to a qualitative arm yielded a master theme of spiritual growth. This theme is 
consistent with outcomes from the mediation analysis which showed that non-attachment to 
self almost fully mediated the treatment effects for FMS symptomatology and pain perception. 
In Buddhism, ‘spiritual growth’ and ‘reductions in attachment’ are arguably synonymous terms 
because according to the Buddhist conceptualisation, a practice can be deemed spiritual if it 
helps to transcend ‘selfhood’ (Van Gordon et al., 2016e).  
The abovementioned qualitative study also reported a theme of increased willingness 
to civically engage that participants attributed to greater spiritual awareness as well as a 
reduced emphasis on their own suffering and life problems (Van Gordon et al., 2016b). This is 
consistent with the finding in the current study of civic engagement partially meditating the 
treatment effects for all outcome variables. Being more ‘other-centered’ improves life 
perspective and dismantles self-obsessed and self-disparaging cognitive schemas (Shonin et 
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al., 2015c). Furthermore, a compassionate disposition and spiritual outlook has been shown to 
increase social-connectedness and prosocial behaviour (Hutcherson et al., 2008; Leiberg et al., 
2011). Thus, viewing the findings of this and the embedded qualitative study as a collective, it 
seems reasonable to conclude that a meditation-induced growth in spirituality played an 
important mechanistic role in improving both primary and secondary outcomes.  
 Key limitations of the study were reliance on self-report measures and the fact that 
outcomes were only assessed at three time points (i.e., pre-, post-, and six-month follow-up). 
An increased number of assessment phases would provide insights on which particular stages 
of the eight-week intervention have the strongest treatment effects. Furthermore, an assessment 
beyond the six-month stage would provide a better indication of maintenance effects as well 
as the need for booster sessions. A further factor that may limit findings is a phenomenon that 
has been termed the ‘popularity effect’ (Shonin et al., 2015a). Mindfulness and meditation are 
experiencing growing popularity amongst both the scientific community and general public. 
Consequently, outcomes of both FG-MBI and SG-MBI studies could be influenced by 
participants’ belief that they are receiving a ‘fashionable’ and/or ‘proven’ psychotherapeutic 
technique (Shonin et al., 2015a). This is a difficult confounding factor to control for because it 
is almost impossible to blind participants from the fact they are undergoing mindfulness 
training. Finally, although GPs and other health professionals assisted in raising awareness of 
the study, interested participants were required to contact the research team directly in order to 
be considered for recruitment. Thus, participants in the present study were effectively ‘self-
referring’ and it is difficult to gauge whether outcomes would be as favourable for individuals 
directly referred by their GP or another health professional. 
 The present study suggests that MAT is an effective FMS treatment and contributes 
further evidence supporting the applications of SG-MBIs in clinical and other applied settings. 
The considerable focus on the ‘self’ by some individuals with FMS means that SG-MBIs (that 
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place emphasis on reducing attachment to self) may be particularly suitable treatments for this 
population group. Further controlled empirical studies using large sample sizes are therefore 
warranted.  
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Chapter 9 
Meditation Awareness Training for individuals with fibromyalgia syndrome: 
An interpretative phenomenological analysis of participant’s experiences 
 
 
This chapter (whether in full or in part) was adapted for publication and was subsequently 
published as: 
Van Gordon, W., Shonin, E., & Griffiths, M. D. (2016). Meditation Awareness Training for 
individuals with fibromyalgia syndrome: An interpretative phenomenological analysis of 
participant’s experiences. Mindfulness, 7, 409-419. 
 
 
The final published version of this article is available at Springer: 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12671-015-0458-8 
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Abstract 
FMS is a complex and poorly-understood psychosomatic pain disorder. The illness has been 
the subject of controversy, both in terms of the alleged lack of interest and capability of the 
medical community to understand and support patients with FMS, and the burden that such 
individuals place upon economic and healthcare resources. Due to the lack of convincing data 
for the effectiveness of extant pharmacological and non-pharmacological FMS treatments, a 
recent direction in FMS research has been the empirical investigation of mindfulness and other 
meditation-based approaches. The present qualitative study explored whether following 
participation in a MBI, patients with FMS report experiencing changes in: (i) how they 
experience and relate to their illness, and (ii) their attitudes towards societal participation, work 
and unemployment. Ten individuals with FMS were randomly selected from the intervention 
arm of an RCT evaluating the effectiveness of MAT for the treatment of FMS. Transcripts of 
semi-structured interviews were analysed using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis, and 
five super-ordinate themes emerged from the dataset: (i) reservations about participating, (ii) 
improvements in psychosomatic wellbeing, (iii) spiritual growth, (iv) awareness of 
impermanence, and (v) increased sense of citizenship. MAT was experienced as both an 
acceptable and accessible intervention by individuals with FMS, and participants reported 
experiencing improvements in psychosocial functioning as well as a sense of societal 
responsibility. MAT appears to have utility for treating FMS, and for changing the attitudes of 
some individuals with FMS towards community engagement and societal contribution. 
 
 
 
 
 
172 
 
FMS is a poorly-understood chronic pain disorder involving symptoms of widespread 
musculoskeletal pain, non-restorative sleep, sleep disturbance, cognitive dysfunction, and 
fatigue (Häuser et al., 2012). FMS is frequently associated with functional mobility limitations, 
poor quality of life, psychopathology (in particular anxiety and depression), and irritable bowel 
syndrome (Wolfe et al., 2013). Individuals with FMS can incur up to three times the medical 
expenditure compared to chronic illness comparison groups (Wolfe et al., 1997a; Jones, et al., 
2012). Prevalence estimates for FMS are in the order of 2.9%, with higher rates in females 
compared to males (Branco et al., 2010).  
 According to Wolfe (2009), FMS is a highly controversial condition. In conjunction 
with a broad symptom spectrum, the absence of a reliable laboratory test for FMS has led some 
individuals (both medical professionals and members of the public) to doubt and/or question 
the legitimacy of the condition. In other words, because a diagnosis of FMS is reliant upon the 
exclusion of other illnesses as well as the patient’s medical history and their verbal responses 
to pressure being gently applied to tender points, it is difficult to definitively establish that a 
given individual is experiencing the illness. Furthermore, efforts to dispel what might be 
described as ‘stigma’ relating to the condition are not helped by the fact that FMS is associated 
with: (i) high rates of presenting at medical services (Schaefer et al., 2011), (ii) unemployment 
(Scott & Jones, 2014), (iii) use of social security (and in particular incapacity for work and/or 
disability) benefits (Sicras-Mainar et al., 2009; Wolfe et al., 1997b), and (iv) hypochondriasis 
(Canzonieri et al., 2013).  
Recommended front-line pharmacological treatments for FMS include the tricyclic 
antidepressant amitriptyline, and serotonin-norepinephrine reuptake inhibitors such as 
duloxetine and milnacipran (Häuser et al., 2012). However, the efficacy of pharmacological 
treatments for FMS is questionable. While a small number of patients experience substantial 
symptom reduction, many patients discontinue treatment due to limited symptom relief and/or 
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adverse effects (Häuser et al., 2012; Nüesch et al., 2013). Consequently, the current treatment 
of choice for FMS is a multicomponent approach involving psychopharmacology with (for 
example) aerobic exercise, cognitive-behavioural therapy, lifestyle change, self-help, and/or 
psycho-education (Nüesch et al., 2013). 
Consistent with the absence of convincing outcome data for the effectiveness of extant 
FMS treatments, in recent years emphasis has been placed upon the empirical validation of 
novel non-pharmacological treatments that do not incur the same adverse effects as 
pharmacotherapy. An important direction in this respect has been the empirical investigation 
of mindfulness and other meditation-based approaches (Henke & Chur-Hansen, 2014; 
Langhorst et al., 2013; Lauche et al., 2013). As discussed in Chapter 2, based on meta-
analytical findings, MBCT is advocated by the UK’s NICE and the APA for the treatment of 
recurrent depression in adults (APA, 2010; NICE, 2009). Similarly, a growing evidence base 
exists for the use of MBIs in treating each of the other key symptoms of FMS including anxiety 
(Vøllestad, 2015), chronic pain (Chiesa & Serretti, 2011; Cramer, Haller, Lauche, & Dobos, 
2012), sleep disturbance (Britton, Haynes, Fridel, & Bootzin, 2012), fatigue (Rimes & 
Wingrove, 2013), and cognitive dysfunction (Stange et al., 2011). 
 Research assessing the efficacy of mindfulness as a treatment for FMS is still at an early 
stage, and outcomes have been undermined by issues of poor methodological quality. 
Nevertheless, preliminary findings show a degree of promise. For example, a meta-analysis 
(inclusive of six controlled trials involving individuals with FMS; n = 674) concluded that 
MBSR led to short-term improvements in quality of life and pain compared to treatment-as-
usual or active control comparison groups (Lauche et al., 2013). More recently, a systematic 
review (inclusive of ten RCTs, retrospective studies, and longitudinal studies involving 
individuals with FMS; n = 702) incorporated a range of MBIs and concluded that although 
there appear to be mild-to-moderate salutary effects, further research is required (Henke & 
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Chur-Hansen, 2014).  
Davis and Zautra (2013) proposed that the absence of robust and conclusive data from 
mindfulness-based FMS treatment studies is due to the fact that MBIs require adaptation in 
order to target a greater range of symptoms over and above somatic pain. More specifically, 
Davis and Zautra suggested (and then empirically demonstrated) that more effective treatment 
outcomes can be realised by targeting deficits in positive affect and social relations (i.e., in 
addition to pain frequency and intensity). FMS is a complicated multi-dimensional illness, and 
the findings of Davis and Zautra suggest that there is a clear need for greater understanding in 
terms of the various components that make a given MBI an effective treatment for FMS. In 
particular, in addition to changing how individuals with FMS relate to their pain (and other 
symptoms), it appears that mindfulness-based treatments for FMS need to be: (i) purpose-
designed, (ii) orientated towards helping patients exploit social and metacognitive resources in 
order to foster better illness and life-coping skills, and (iii) based upon a patient-led and in-
depth knowledge of the illness.  
 Rather than RCT (and other efficacy-based) study designs, qualitative research is 
generally understood to be a more suitable means of evaluating how participants experience 
and respond to a given intervention. Specific methods of qualitative enquiry provide greater 
insight into the ‘life-world’3 of the patient (Smith et al., 2009), which is essential when 
attempting to formulate treatments for aetiologically complex and poorly understood 
psychosomatic conditions such as FMS. In terms of qualitative research involving individuals 
with FMS, to date a small but growing number of studies have explored the impact and 
characteristics of the condition from the patients’ point of view (see review by Sim & Madden, 
                                                          
3 In qualitative research, data are deemed to reflect the research participant’s subjective truth rather than objective 
truth per se (Ashworth, 2000). Therefore, the term ‘life-world’ is employed to refer to the participant’s situation 
as they see it. According to Ashworth (2000), it is more appropriate to refer to the participant’s life-world rather 
than their experience because “experience tends to lead us to think of some inner realm which is revealed by 
introspection, whereas a focus on the life-world directs attention to the whole experienced situation of the person” 
(pp.97-98). 
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2008). However, to the present author’s knowledge, no study has ever been undertaken that 
employs robust qualitative analysis in order to investigate the subjective experiences of FMS 
sufferers participating in an MBI. 
The primary aim of the present study was to utilise a rigorous qualitative methodology 
in order to examine how individuals with FMS experience participating in a purpose-designed 
MBI. The focus of this primary aim was to explore whether following receipt of mindfulness 
training, participants report experiencing changes in how they relate to their illness, including 
whether they experience improvements in life- and illness-coping skills. A further aspect of 
this first aim was to investigate how individuals with FMS experience and assimilate the 
practice of mindfulness, and examine which components of the intervention are experienced to 
be the most effective. In light of the apparent tendency for some individuals diagnosed with 
FMS to have limited aspiration and/or ability to contribute to the socio-economic welfare of 
their local and wider community, a secondary aim of the study was to explore whether 
following participation in an MBI, patients report experiencing changes in how they relate to 
and experience societal participation, work and/or unemployment.  
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
Computer generated numbers were used to randomly select ten participants from the 
intervention arm (n = 54) of an RCT assessing the effectiveness of a modified version of an 
MAT for the treatment of FMS. Participants were English-speaking adults with a current 
diagnosis of FMS (as confirmed by a letter from a GP, rheumatologist, or hospital pain 
consultant). Participation was on a voluntary basis and individuals were recruited into the RCT 
via GP and hospital referral, FMS self-help groups, and strategically placed poster 
advertisements (e.g., in GP surgeries).  
Based on the pre-defined inclusion/exclusion criteria for the RCT, all participants were 
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not currently: (i) undergoing formal psychotherapy, (ii) practising mindfulness or meditation, 
(iii) undergoing changes in psychopharmacology type or dosage (although stable prescription 
medication was permitted), and (iv) diagnosed with a neurological disorder. Participant 
demographic characteristics are summarised in Table 9.1. Ethical approval for the study was 
granted by the research team’s university Ethics Committee. 
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Table 9.1: Participant demographic characteristics 
 
Participant 
number 
Age Sex Education 
Marital 
status 
Ethnicity 
Pre-Intervention 
Employment 
Status 
Years 
Diagnosed 
with FMS 
1 64 
 
F School 
Leaver 
Widow White (British) 
 
Unemployed 8 
2 50 
 
F School 
Leaver 
Divorced White (British) 
 
Unemployed 5 
3 52 
 
F School 
Leaver 
Married White (British) 
 
Unemployed 11 
4 56 
 
F School 
Leaver 
Divorced White (British) 
 
Unemployed 9 
5 51 
 
F School 
Leaver 
Married White (British) 
 
Unemployed 3 
6 29 
 
F School 
Leaver 
Married White (British) 
 
Unemployed 2 
7 62 
 
F School 
Leaver 
Single White (British) 
 
Unemployed 6 
8 60 
 
M School 
Leaver 
Married White (British) 
 
Unemployed 8 
9 35 
 
F University 
Graduate 
Married White (British) 
 
Employed 4 
10 49 
 
F School 
Leaver 
Divorced White (British) 
 
Unemployed 7 
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Procedure 
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA; Smith et al., 2009) was used to explore the 
subjective experiences of FMS sufferers based on their participation in MAT. IPA is influenced 
by phenomenology in its emphasis on subjective experience, but also by symbolic 
interactionism in its appreciation that insight into the meaning individuals ascribe to their 
experiences can only be gleaned through a process of interpretation (Hamill, Carson, & 
Dorahy, 2010). IPA can be described as being: (i) idiographic because of its focus on how 
individuals allocate meaning to their experiences, (ii) inductive because it allows themes to 
naturally emerge from the dataset, and (iii) interrogative because it encourages a dialogue to 
emerge that evaluates how outcomes fit with extant theory and research (Smith, 2004). IPA 
typically uses small sample sizes as it is concerned with understanding particular phenomena 
in particular contexts (Smith et al., 2009). Homogeneity is therefore important in IPA as it 
ensures that all participants can make relevant and meaningful contributions in terms of 
investigating a specific phenomenon or research question. Although Table 1 demonstrates that 
the current sub-sample of participants had a high degree of homogeneity across factors such as 
ethnicity, sex and employment status, the aforementioned eligibility criteria were formulated 
to focus on the participant characteristics that were deemed to be most relevant in light of the 
study aims. More specifically, in the current study and in line with IPA guidelines that the 
“extent of this homogeneity varies from study to study” (Smith et al., 2009, p.49), it was deemed 
important that there was homogeneity in terms of a current FMS diagnosis, participation on a 
voluntary as opposed to referral basis, and not currently practising meditation (i.e., thus 
ensuring that all ten participants were in a position to share their lived experience of voluntarily 
undergoing a programme of meditation as a means of treating FMS). 
Mindfulness and meditation are subtle practices that require the mobilisation of 
attentional skills which, for most individuals, remain largely inactive during normal cognitive 
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functioning (Shonin & Van Gordon, 2015a). Consequently, individuals new to meditation are 
invariably without a benchmark against which to compare or contextualise their meditational 
experiences. The hermeneutic phenomenological approach used in IPA is a suitable method 
for analysing meditative experiences because it lends itself to a rich co-construction of the 
meaning individuals ascribe to their meditative experiences by researchers who are themselves 
proficient in meditation (Shonin et al., 2014a). This allows for findings to be reflexively 
interpreted within the context of a 2,600-year-old spiritual practice system without losing sight 
of the uniqueness of the participant’s experience, and the importance that they assign to it 
(Shonin & Van Gordon 2015a).  
 
Program description 
Participants received MAT (see Methods section of Chapter 8 for a description of MAT as well 
as modifications made to intervention design). 
 
Data collection 
Data collection (and analysis) followed a similar procedure to that employed in previous studies 
of MAT that have utilised IPA (e.g., Shonin & Van Gordon, 2015a; Shonin et al., 2014a). The 
second of the aforementioned one-to-one support sessions (i.e., in week eight of the 
intervention) included a semi-structured interview (SSI) designed to derive understanding into 
participants’ experiences of practising mindfulness, including their recollection of how MAT 
changed their attitudes towards FMS and life more generally. Examples of some of the 
questions included in the SSI are: ‘What were your expectations of the course?’, ‘Did the course 
differ from these expectations?’, ‘Has the type or amount of pain that you experience changed 
since learning to practise meditation?’, ‘Has meditation changed your ability to cope with 
FMS? (If yes, then in what ways?)’, ‘Do you think you will experience any challenges in terms 
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of continuing with the practice after the end of the course?’ The MAT instructor used discretion 
to discern the most suitable point to intersperse the SSI questions into the one-to-one support 
session dialogue. A Socratic questioning method was employed in order to encourage 
participants to freely express themselves, and participants were prompted for further 
clarification as required (Smith, 1995). The one-to-one support sessions were audio recorded 
and then transcribed verbatim. 
 
Data analysis 
Transcripts were read several times and coded to identify outcomes of experiential significance 
to the participant. Patterns of meaning were identified for each participant, and transcripts were 
then assessed for divergence and convergence (Dennis, Larkin, & Derbyshire, 2013). The 
entire analytical process, from reading the raw data through to identifying themes, was repeated 
in iterative fashion until saturation4 was achieved. The analytical process was then repeated by 
a second member of the research team (ES) as a form of independent audit (Smith, 1996). ES 
was deemed to be qualified to undertake the audit on the basis that they are an international 
expert in the psychology of meditation with at least three published studies that specifically 
involve using IPA to investigate participant experiences of meditation (as well as several other 
meditation studies using different qualitative approaches). The independent audit involved the 
second researcher remaining blind to the primary researcher’s analysis and findings while they 
coded and identified the themes present in the data. Areas of divergence were resolved through 
discussion and a 100% agreement was required for a theme or sub-theme to be included as part 
of the final thematic structure. Areas of divergence were minor and mostly related to whether 
                                                          
4 There exists a degree of uncertainty regarding the use and conceptualisation of the term ‘saturation’ in 
qualitative research. However, for the purposes of the present study, ‘saturation’ is used to refer to the process 
of Inductive Thematic Saturation (Birks & Mills 2015; Olshansky, 2015; Saunders, et al., 2017). This form of 
saturation corresponds to the point in the coding process where no new codes are occurring, and thus new themes 
are unlikely to arise.” 
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a theme concerning the experience of an increased capacity to cope with pain related to some, 
most, or all participants. Finally, validation techniques such as grounding in examples and 
requesting feedback from participants on the summary of themes were employed (Creswell, 
2007; Sandelowski & Barroso, 2002; Yardley, 2000). 
 
Results 
The analysis of participant’s transcripts generated five super-ordinate themes, each with two 
subordinate themes. The final hierarchical thematic structure is shown in Table 9.2, and a 
description of the emerging super-ordinate and subordinate themes (including illustrative 
verbatim extracts) is provided below.  
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Table 9.2. Master and subordinate themes 
 
Master Theme Subordinate Theme 
1. Reservations about participating 1a.  Limited understanding of 
mindfulness 
1b. Fear of losing diagnosis 
2. Improvements in psychosomatic 
wellbeing 
2a. Improved ability to cope with pain 
2b. Improved quality of life  
3. Spiritual growth 3a. Spiritual curiosity 
3b. Sense of being on a journey 
4. Awareness of Impermanence 4a. The uncertainty of life 
4b. Death awareness 
5. Increased sense of citizenship 5a. Greater motivation to contribute 
towards the wellbeing of society 
 5b. Greater sense of compassion  
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Reservations about Participating 
All participants expressed reservations about receiving the intervention. The most common 
reservation related to a limited understanding of mindfulness (subordinate theme 1a) and an 
association that participants had made between mindfulness and the supernatural. For example, 
participants 3, 8, and 10 were under the impression that mindfulness was a means of 
communicating with the deceased: 
 
I thought mindfulness was when you all sit around and talk with the dead  
(Participant 3) 
 
 [Mindfulness] can make you see ghosts (Participant 8)  
 
My friend did mindfulness and saw her dead aunt (Participant 10) 
 
Participant 1 was under the impression that mindfulness involved chanting ‘for hours 
on end in order to see white lights’ and Participants 2 and 4 believed that mindfulness was a 
means of developing clairvoyant powers. Other participants (5 and 7) associated mindfulness 
with the practice of voodoo, and Participant 6 believed that mindfulness was a technique for 
‘reading people’s minds’. In addition to associations with the supernatural, some participants 
(1, 6, and 10) harboured concerns that mindfulness was a method of brainwashing or ‘making 
people tell the truth’ (Participant 10). Participants (all except participant 3) also expressed 
concerns as to the demand characteristic of the program: 
 
 How am I going to be able to sit still with my eyes closed for two hours?  
(Participant 2) 
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I don’t mind giving it a try but don’t be surprised if I just get up and walk out if the pain 
kicks in (Participant 5) 
 
I’m worried that being here for two hours will drain me for the rest of the day 
(Participant 8) 
 
Although participants demonstrated a poor understanding of mindfulness (which in 
some cases involved being unconvinced as to its suitability or credibility as an FMS treatment), 
five of the participants appeared to be anxious that the intervention might be effective. When 
prompted for clarification and further information regarding this concern, participants 
explained that it related to a fear of losing the diagnosis of FMS (subordinate theme 1b):  
 
It took me three years to get [this diagnosis of] fibro, and when I got it, it was such a 
relief. If this [MAT] works, I’m not going back to how things were (Participant 1) 
 
What am I supposed to do if [MAT] works? (Participant 3) 
 
I’m worried I’ll lose my diagnosis and have to work (Participant 6) 
 
If mindfulness makes me better, can I still go to the fibro [self-help] group?  
(Participant 7) 
 
Do I have to tell people if I get fixed? (Participant 10) 
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Improvements in Psychosomatic Wellbeing 
As participants matured in their understanding and practice of meditation, they reported 
experiencing improvements in psychosomatic wellbeing. Three participants (4, 6, and 9) 
specifically reported reductions in pain intensity and/or frequency as a result of their 
participation in MAT: 
 
I’m definitely noticing that there is less pain now (Participant 4) 
 
The pain is the same in the evening when I’m tired, but it has eased off in the mornings 
(Participant 6)  
 
I used to ache even just after walking the dog but its better now (Participant 9) 
 
However, although a small number of participants reported reductions in pain, all 
participants reported that MAT improved their ability to cope with pain (subordinate theme 
2a). Participants mostly attributed this to improvements in their ability to objectify pain, and 
not to allow it to dominate their thought processes: 
  
The pain is still there. However, I am coping with it much better now (Participant 1) 
 
When I am tired it still gets on top of me … But when I’m feeling good, I can just sit 
with my breath and watch it. It’s there and is part of me. But it’s also separate from me 
(Participant 8) 
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‘You don’t realise just how much [pain] brings you down. It gets in your head and takes 
over. Everything becomes black and a struggle. It’s different though when I practise 
meditation. It’s like I’m a spectator’ (Participant 10) 
 
More specifically, participants appeared to acknowledge that although pain imposed a 
significant burden upon their lives, they still had choices in terms of how they relate to their 
pain:  
 
I see the pain except now I know I have a choice. I can either let it control my life or I 
can be in control (Participant 2) 
 
The pain is always going to be there but we [the participant and their pain] can work 
together. I never thought it would be possible (Participant 5) 
 
I see what I’m doing to myself and that I’ve the option to change my thoughts 
(Participant 9) 
 
Participants reported that their enhanced ability to cope with pain lead to improvements 
in quality of life (subordinate theme 2b). These improvements mostly manifested as increased 
levels of psychological wellbeing. Phrases such as ‘I’m happier now’ (Participants 2, 3, 5 and 
6), ‘it’s much better now’ (Participants 1, 6, and 7), ‘more alive’ (Participants 4, 7 and 10), 
‘more energy’ (Participants 8 and 10), and ‘feeling well’ (Participants 4 and 9) were used to 
describe this aspect of the participants’ experience. Participants also appeared to relate these 
improvements in quality of life to increases in sleep quality: 
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I’m sleeping better now (Participant 3) 
 
I meditate just before going to bed. I used to wake up about every hour but now I’m 
only waking up two or three times [per night] (Participant 6) 
 
I am able to take a nap during the day which I could never do before. I’ve got more 
energy in the evenings now (Participant 7) 
 
Spiritual Growth 
Related to the improvements in psychosomatic wellbeing that the participants experienced as 
part of theme 2, participants also reported that MAT caused them to grow in spiritual 
awareness. All participants (except Participants 6 and 9) considered this growth in spiritual 
awareness to be a key determinant of psychosomatic wellbeing. For example, Participant 2 
explained that ‘when I feel nourished spiritually, I feel better all over’ and Participant 7 stated 
that ‘meditation soothes the soul and that’s why I feel better’. Consistent with these 
experiences, MAT appeared to lead to an increase in spiritual curiosity (subordinate theme 
3a), which is perhaps best captured by the following excerpt from Participant 5: 
 
Normally my mind just does its own thing and I don’t notice it. I work myself into a 
mess without even knowing it. But by just sitting and being with myself, I’m starting 
to realise that there is this whole other part of me. I’m in my 50s and I’m only just 
beginning to work it out. It’s a really interesting part of my life and I’m curious to know 
more (Participant 5) 
 
Increased curiosity into the spiritual aspect of their being appeared to give participants 
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the sense of being on a journey (subordinate theme 3b). Examples of some of the phrases 
utilised by participants in this respect are ‘journeying within’ (Participants 2, 5, 9 and 10), 
‘spiritual journey’ (Participants 2, 6 and 7), ‘walking a path’ (Participants 1 and 3), and ‘come 
a long way’ (Participants 4 and 8). Participant 2 explained their experience of being on a 
spiritual journey as follows: 
 
I keep falling back into my old ways but I’m definitely getting stronger. I’ve got 
something to work towards now. I’m on a spiritual journey and it’s probably the most 
important thing I’ve ever done in my life. [Meditation] is like taking a spiritual shower. 
Being in the here and now helps me to feel whole again. It helps me to know what 
direction I should go in (Participant 2) 
 
Awareness of Impermanence 
The growth in spiritual awareness that participants experienced appeared to arise in conjunction 
with an increased awareness of impermanence. In particular, participants attributed their 
participation in MAT to a greater appreciation of the uncertainty of life (subordinate theme 4a), 
and the fact that the present moment never stands still. As demonstrated by the following 
extracts, participants appeared to regard their growing awareness of impermanence as a 
positive experience: 
 
Things are always shifting. Nothing stays still, not even for a moment. Yes, I see that 
now. It’s true. It’s definitely true. There’s no knowing what tomorrow will hold 
(Participant 3) 
 
Impermanence is the way things are …I am going to try to be more in the here and now. 
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Who knows what the future holds? I mean, I’ve still got to plan, you know, because 
you’ve got to. But there’s actually no point really. I don’t want to wish my life away 
(Participant 7) 
 
In addition to a greater understanding of the uncertainty of life, part of the participants’ 
growing appreciation of impermanence appeared to manifest as an increased awareness of 
death (subordinate theme 4b). Again, participants appeared to relate to this as a positive 
experience, and all participants appeared to derive motivation and a greater sense of life 
perspective from understanding that death is a matter of when, rather than if:  
 
When you know, I mean really know, that death is something that you are definitely 
going to have to face, it puts everything in perspective (Participant 1) 
 
Death is a matter of when, and not if. It’s strange but I find this really uplifting 
(Participant 4) 
 
There is no time to fool about really. You know, death can happen [at] any time. I’ve 
been given quite a wake-up call (Participant 6) 
 
When I forget [to be mindful] and get [absorbed] back in myself, I stop and think about 
death. It helps me to see the big picture (Participant 8) 
 
Increased Sense of Citizenship 
Coupled with an increased awareness of impermanence, the sense of being on a spiritual 
journey appeared to instil in participants a greater sense of citizenship. More specifically, all 
190 
 
participants reported a greater motivation to contribute towards the wellbeing of society 
(subordinate theme 5a). As demonstrated by the following excerpts, this motivation appeared 
to stem from an understanding by participants that they have a role in society, and that through 
their actions, they can influence the people and situations around them: 
 
A lot of the things people get involved with aren’t all that important. Me and my pals 
have a tendency to get caught up in our own world and not see the [big] picture. I want 
to change that now. I want to reach out and help others. It’s hard to explain. Everybody 
has got their fair share of problems. It’s important that I remember this (Participant 1) 
 
I’ve got something to give. I’ve got a role to play in helping [other people]  
(Participant 3) 
 
If I think positively, I can make things better. I don’t just mean for me but for 
everybody. I can change things around here (Participant 10) 
 
Consistent with this greater motivation to contribute towards the wellbeing of society, 
Participants 4 and 5 had made the decision to undertake paid work. Participants 4 and 5 also 
appeared to be uplifted and derive a great deal of satisfaction from this decision, but they also 
appeared to be concerned as to whether it was a sensible long-term choice: 
 
I’ve recently taken a job at [employers name redacted]. It’s been three years since I’ve 
worked but I’m getting back into it. I’m really enjoying it … I take lots of breaks. I pace 
myself … [but] I’m worried I’ve made the right choice, and I’m worried about what 
will happen when this [MAT] program finishes. I hope I haven’t jumped in too 
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soon…But I’m just going with the flow. It’s such a relief to be off the benefits. I mean, 
I’m still getting my disability money, but that’s all I’m getting now (Participant 4) 
 
I’ve gone back to my old job. I’m taking it easy, just three afternoons [each week] at 
the moment. It’s good. It’s nice to see them all again. It feels good to give something. 
And it’s good to get paid too. I hope I don’t go back to how I was. I can’t go back there. 
This meditation is keeping me afloat (Participant 5) 
 
As intimated by the content of some of the excerpts included under subordinate theme 
5a, participants reported that MAT helped them to develop a greater sense of compassion 
(subordinate theme 5b). Examples of some of the phrases utilised by participants in this respect 
were ‘help others’ (Participants 1, 4, 6, 9 and 10), ‘reach out’ (Participants 1, 2, 8, and 10), 
‘duty to help’ (Participants 5, 6, and 10), ‘feel others’ pain’ (Participants 2 and 8), and ‘feel 
empathy’ (Participants 3 and 9). Participant 9 described this greater sense of compassion as 
follows:  
 
It’s strange but when I think more about others, I feel better about myself. It’s a struggle 
at first but then it gets easier. It becomes more natural. I see people and I want to help 
[them]...[Compassion] makes me much more forgiving (Participant 9) 
 
Discussion 
In the present study, IPA was used to analyse the experiences of ten individuals with FMS that 
participated in an eight-week MAT program. Participants were randomly selected from the 
intervention arm of an RCT evaluating the effectiveness of MAT as a treatment for FMS. All 
ten participants provided rich accounts of their experiences, and the following five super-
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ordinate themes (each comprising two subordinate themes) emerged from the dataset: (i) 
reservations about participating, (ii) improvements in psychosomatic wellbeing, (iii) spiritual 
growth, (iv) awareness of impermanence, and (v) increased sense of citizenship.  
 In respect of the first super-ordinate theme of reservations about participating, other 
studies have likewise reported that specific population groups harbour reservations about 
receiving an MBI. For example, a qualitative study exploring how individuals with severe 
health anxiety (i.e., hypochondriasis) experience MBCT found that some participants were 
sceptical and uncertain about mindfulness, believing it was unscientific and might involve 
chanting with bells (Williams, McManus, Muse, & Williams, 2011). Although understanding 
and awareness of mindfulness is likely to improve as it becomes more readily utilised in applied 
psychological settings, the fact that the migration of mindfulness from Eastern contemplative 
traditions has only occurred in earnest within the last two decades, means that it is 
understandable that some individuals in the West have reservations and/or inaccurate views 
about the nature of the practice. Notwithstanding this, to the author’s knowledge, the 
association made by almost all participants in the present study between mindfulness and the 
supernatural has not been reported in any previous qualitative or quantitative studies of 
mindfulness.  
A likely explanation for the prevalence of this view amongst the current group of 
participants is that a number of individuals attended the same FMS self-help groups, and 
knowing that the research project was scheduled to take place, it is likely that participants 
discussed and shared their (erroneous) views about mindfulness in advance of volunteering for 
the study. However, irrespective of how these views originated, this finding suggests that there 
is clearly a need to raise awareness about mindfulness in specific clinical and socio-
demographic groups, and in the wider population more generally. 
 As part of the reservations that participants had towards mindfulness, half of the 
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participants expressed a fear of MAT actually causing them to lose their diagnosis of FMS 
(subordinate theme 1b). Previous research has demonstrated that individuals with FMS often 
experience difficulty in: (i) understanding their symptoms, (ii) receiving a diagnosis of FMS, 
and (iii) having their needs and symptoms understood by both medical professionals and family 
members (Dennis et al., 2013; Hickie, Pols, Koschera, & Davenport, 2004; Peterson, 2007). 
Consequently, it is unsurprising that individuals with FMS place importance on the diagnostic 
label, and that they derive some degree of relief from being informed that their symptoms 
correspond to a ‘valid’ medical condition (Hughes, Martinez, Myon, Taïeb, & Wessely, 2005; 
White, Nielson, Harth, Ostbye, & Speechley, 2002).  
Under such circumstances, the fear of some participants that MAT might be effective 
in removing their symptoms (and FMS diagnosis) does not, by default, imply that the current 
population group (and FMS sufferers more generally) prefer to avoid paid work and/or specific 
societal responsibilities. However, given the association between FMS and usage of state 
benefits (in particular disability benefits) (Sicras-Mainar et al., 2009; Wolfe et al., 1997b), a 
slightly more sceptical perspective might deem that this specific study outcome adds credence 
to the view that a small proportion of individuals with FMS ‘hide’ behind their diagnosis, and 
use it as a means of avoiding social and civic responsibility. 
 The second super-ordinate theme identified in the current study was that participants 
experienced improvements in psychosomatic wellbeing. Although a small number of 
participants specifically reported reductions in pain intensity and/or frequency, most 
participants experienced that MAT improved their ability to cope with pain (i.e., rather than 
decrease the intensity of pain per se). Consistent with the findings of other qualitative studies 
of MBIs involving individuals with pain disorders (e.g., Morone et al., 2008), participants 
attributed their improved pain-coping skills to the process of mindfully observing 
uncomfortable somatic sensations. Mindfulness is understood to increase perceptual distance 
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from painful and/or distressing sensory and psychological stimuli, and this perceptual gap is 
believed to help objectify pain and thus ameliorate its impact on psychosocial functioning 
(Singh, Lancioni, Wahler, Winton, & Singh, 2008; Van Gordon et al., 2015a). Unsurprisingly 
and consistent with a number of recent quantitative studies of MBIs involving individuals with 
FMS (Davis & Zautra, 2013; Henke & Chur-Hansen, 2014; Lauche et al., 2013), participants 
reported that this greater ability to cope with pain lead to improvements in quality of life 
including increased levels of: (i) self-efficacy, (ii) happiness, (iii) energy and motivation, and 
(iv) sleep quality. 
In terms of seeking to connect and understand their various experiences of MAT, 
participants made it clear that the aforementioned improvements in quality of life did not 
originate in isolation from the spiritual growth that was identified and reported as part of the 
third super-ordinate theme. Spiritual growth has occasionally been identified as an outcome of 
studies of FG-MBIs (e.g., Roth & Stanley, 2002; Mackenzie, Carlson, Munoz, & Speca, 2007). 
However, consistent with the findings of the present study, the more open and explicit focus in 
MAT on spiritual development appeared to foster a greater degree of spiritual curiosity 
(subordinate theme 3a), including the sense of being on a spiritual journey (subordinate theme 
3b). Outcomes of spiritual growth have been reported in previous qualitative studies of MAT 
involving: (i) individuals with issues of depression, anxiety, and stress (Shonin et al., 2014a), 
and (ii) middle-hierarchy office managers (Shonin & Van Gordon, 2015a). These earlier MAT 
studies reported that increased spirituality helped to improve life perspective, and provide a 
buffer against loneliness, negative affect, and low sense of purpose. These collective findings 
from qualitative investigations into MAT (including findings from the current study) are 
consistent with outcomes from cross-sectional studies involving individuals with fibromyalgia 
in which a positive association between spirituality and positive affect, and a negative 
association between spirituality and depression-anxiety symptoms, has been identified (see 
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review by Moreira-Almeida & Koenig, 2008).  
 In addition to mindfulness, a central focus of MAT is teaching the principles of, and 
providing guidance for meditating upon, impermanence. As implied by the extracts of 
participants that were included as part of super-ordinate theme 4 (see Results section), the 
Buddhist notion of impermanence refers to the fact that: (i) phenomena are in a constant state 
of flux, (ii) life is (therefore) highly uncertain, (iii) all phenomena and living beings must 
eventually die and/or dissolve, and (iv) since phenomena (including sentient beings) are in a 
constant state of change, they lack a permanently existing ‘self’ (i.e., they are of the nature of 
‘non-self’) (Shonin et al., 2014g).  
 According to a Buddhist model of mental illness, an experiential understanding of 
impermanence and non-self are prerequisites for cultivating psycho-spiritual wellbeing 
(Shonin et al., 2014g). In the opinion of the present author, empirical investigation into the 
applications and health benefits of impermanence and non-self remains under-developed. 
Nevertheless, the handful of studies that have been conducted in this area indicate that the 
‘practices’ of impermanence and non-self may have therapeutic utility. For example, non-
attachment to self and experience is correlated with higher levels of subjective wellbeing, pro-
social behaviour, and eudemonic wellbeing, and with lower levels of fatalistic outlook, 
intimacy avoidance, dissociation, and alexithymia (Sahdra et al., 2010; Sahdra et al., 2015). 
Similarly, in previous qualitative studies of MAT, participants have assigned importance and 
meaning to their meditation-related experiences of impermanence and non-self, and attributed 
these experiences to gains in subjective wellbeing (Shonin & Van Gordon, 2015a; Shonin et 
al., 2014a). According to Shonin and Van Gordon (2015a), understanding that the notions of 
permanence and a self that exists independently (i.e., of all other phenomena) are logically 
implausible helps people to: (i) change their perspective on life and appreciate that it is a time-
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limited occurrence, (ii) avoid becoming self-absorbed and/or self-obsessed, (iii) engage in 
meaningful activities and inter-personal interactions, and (iv) become more ‘other-centred’.  
 The fifth and final master theme to emerge from the dataset was an increased sense of 
citizenship. Here, participants reported that MAT helped them to: (i) feel and understand that 
they have a role in society, (ii) have confidence that they can influence their immediate and 
wider social (and living) environment, (iii) be more willing to make meaningful contributions 
towards the welfare of society (including opting to take-up paid work in the case of two 
participants), and (iv) feel motivated to support others. These findings are consistent with the 
significant emphasis placed in MAT on compassion, and on helping participants understand 
the benefits to be derived from engaging with, and contributing to, community and societal 
welfare. The inclusion in MAT of dedicated teachings and meditations on compassion follows 
the traditional Buddhist model of teaching and practising spiritual development, wherein 
compassion assumes a central role (Shonin et al., 2014a).  
 Based on a recent systematic review of Buddhist-derived compassion (and loving-
kindness) meditation intervention studies, compassion meditation has been shown to foster 
improvements in (but not limited to): (i) positive and negative affect, (ii) psychological distress, 
(iii) positive thinking, (iv) interpersonal relations, and (v) empathic accuracy (Shonin et al., 
2014d). By becoming increasingly aware of the needs and suffering of others, it is understood 
that individuals are better able to add perspective to their own problems and suffering, which 
helps to dismantle self-obsessed maladaptive cognitive structures and self-disparaging schemas 
(Gilbert, 2009). Compassion meditation has also been shown to foster greater affection towards 
others which, in turn, helps to augment social-connectedness and prosocial behaviour 
(Hutcherson et al., 2008; Leiberg et al., 2011). 
 The rationale behind including techniques designed to foster compassion and 
citizenship in the MAT teaching syllabus is solely based on the fact that such aptitudes are 
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associated with improved levels of subjective wellbeing and psychosocial functioning (Shonin 
et al., 2014a). Indeed, participants are left to evaluate how to apply such teachings and practices 
in their own life situation, and they are not provided with guidance in terms of which activities 
and/or societal responsibilities would be suitable for their particular circumstances. 
Furthermore, participants are informed that premature and/or over-engagement in physical, 
social, and compassionate activities could be counter-indicative to their overall levels of 
psychological wellbeing. Thus, given the fact that MAT does not guide or explicitly encourage 
participants to assume specific roles or duties (including voluntary or unpaid work), it is 
promising that some participants in the present study felt able and equipped to return to paid 
work, and that others had the inspiration and/or intention to find ways of being more actively 
involved in their local and wider community.  
FMS is a complex and poorly-understood psychosomatic pain condition. As noted 
earlier, the illness has been the subject of controversy, both in terms of the alleged lack of 
interest or capability of the medical community to understand and support patients with FMS, 
and the burden that such individuals place upon economic and healthcare resources. Given the 
lack of convincing data for the effectiveness of extant pharmacological and non-
pharmacological FMS treatments, there is a need to formulate and empirically evaluate novel 
interventional approaches. The modified version of MAT employed in the present study was 
experienced as an acceptable and accessible intervention by individuals with FMS, and 
participants likewise reported experiencing improvements in psychosomatic and psycho-
spiritual wellbeing.  
Nevertheless, as with all qualitative studies, the findings do not provide robust evidence 
as to the efficacy of the intervention for all individuals with FMS, and irrespective of efforts to 
‘bracket off’5 the epistemological and ontological stance of the research team, the nature of 
                                                          
5 Bracketing refers to the process of setting aside prior assumptions about the nature of the experience under 
investigation (Ashworth, 2000). This is to avoid inadvertently contaminating the description of participants’ 
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IPA means that there can never be complete certainty that any disconnect between participants’ 
experiences and their subsequent interpretation has been removed (Shonin & Van Gordon, 
2015a). Further empirical (qualitative and quantitative) investigations are warranted in order 
to further evaluate the potential utility of MAT (and other purpose-designed MBIs) for treating 
FMS, and for changing the attitudes of some individuals with FMS towards societal 
participation and community engagement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
lifeworld due to importing theories, findings, or preconceived ideas. (Ashworth, 2000; Smith et al, 2009). In the 
current study, the bracketing process was facilitated by forming a ‘mind-map’ (Tattersall, Watts, & Vernon, 2007) 
that involved using a blank piece of paper to sketch all known facts and theories (i.e., relating to the practice of 
meditation by individuals with FMS and related pain disorders) as well as the themes that were anticipated to arise 
from the data analysis. According to Tattersall et al. (2007), mind-mapping can help to raise awareness or clear 
the mind of previous assumptions and is thus a useful means of facilitating the bracketing process during 
phenomenological enquiry. 
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Chapter 10 
Meditation Awareness Training for The Treatment of Sex Addiction: A Case Study 
 
This chapter (whether in full or in part) was adapted for publication and was subsequently 
published as: 
Van Gordon, W., Shonin, E., & Griffiths, M. D. (2016). Meditation Awareness Training for 
the treatment of sex addiction: A case study. Journal of Behavioral Addiction, 5, 363-372. 
 
The final published version of this article is available at Akadémiai Kiadó: 
http://www.akademiai.com/doi/pdf/10.1556/2006.5.2016.034   
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Abstract 
Sex addiction is a disorder that can have serious adverse functional consequences. Treatment 
effectiveness research for sex addiction is currently underdeveloped, and interventions are 
generally based on guidelines for treating other behavioural (as well as chemical) addictions. 
Consequently, there is a need to clinically evaluate tailored treatments that target the specific 
symptoms of sex addiction. It has been proposed SG-MBIs may be an appropriate treatment 
for sex addiction because in addition to helping individuals increase perceptual distance from 
craving for desired objects and experiences, some SG-MBIs specifically contain meditations 
intended to undermine attachment to sex and/or the human body. The current study conducts 
the first clinical investigation into the utility of mindfulness for treating sex addiction. An in-
depth clinical case study was conducted involving an adult male suffering from sex addiction 
that underwent treatment utilising MAT. Following completion of MAT, the participant 
demonstrated clinically significant improvements in addictive sexual behaviour, as well as 
reductions in depression and psychological distress. The MAT intervention also led to 
improvements in sleep quality, job satisfaction, and non-attachment to self and experiences. 
Salutary outcomes were maintained at six-month follow-up. The current study extends the 
literature exploring the applications of mindfulness for treating behavioural addiction, and 
findings indicate that further clinical investigation into the role of mindfulness for treating sex 
addiction is warranted. 
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Although sex addiction was not accepted for inclusion in the latest (fifth) edition of the DSM-
5 (American Psychological Association, 2013), excessive non-paraphilic sexual behaviour was 
included in the DSM-III as a ‘Sexual Disorder Not Otherwise Specified’ (American 
Psychological Association, 1987). Furthermore, both the American Society of Addiction 
Medicine (2011) and the International Classification of Diseases (10th ed.; World Health 
Organisation, 2007) accept that excessive sexual behaviour can form the basis of a medical 
illness. Estimates of sex addiction prevalence vary considerably according to gender, age, 
culture, sexual orientation, taxonomy (e.g., paid sex, cybersex, pornography, etc.), and 
diagnostic criteria (which likewise vary considerably), and range between 1-8% in the general 
population (e.g., Carnes, 1999; Kinsey, Pomeroy, & Martin, 1948; Seegers, 2003; Traeen, 
Spitznogle, & Beverfjord, 2004; Sussman, Lisha & Griffiths, 2011). Sex addiction (sometimes 
referred to – amongst many other names – as hypersexuality disorder) has been defined as “a 
sexual desire disorder characterised by an increased frequency and intensity of sexually 
motivated fantasies, arousal, urges, and enacted behaviour in association with an impulsivity 
component – a maladaptive behavioural response with adverse consequences” (Kafka, 2010, 
p. 385). 
 Sex addiction is associated with (amongst other things) increased risk-taking 
behaviours (e.g., substance use, multiple sex partners), depression and anxiety, impulsivity, 
loneliness, low self-worth, and insecure attachment styles (see reviews by Dhuffar & Griffiths, 
2015; Rosenberg, Carnes, & O’Connor, 2014; Sussman et al, 2011). Key symptoms include 
each of the six criteria of Griffiths’ (2005) components’ model of addiction: (i) salience (sexual 
behaviour becomes the most important activity in the person’s life and dominates their 
thinking, feelings, and behaviour), (ii) mood modification (the subjective experiences that 
individuals report as a consequence of engaging in sex-related behaviour), (iii) tolerance (the 
need for increased levels or intensity of the sexual behaviour to achieve the desired effect), (iv) 
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withdrawal (i.e., psychophysiological withdrawal symptoms – such as irritability and 
moodiness – upon discontinuation of the pattern of sexual behaviour), (v) conflict (both 
interpersonal and intrapsychic conflict due to spending excessive amounts of time engaged in 
sex-related behaviour), and (vi) relapse (the tendency for repeated reversions to earlier patterns 
of sexual behaviour to recur after prolonged periods of abstinence or control). 
 Examples of interventions typically employed for treating sex addiction are CBT, 
dialectical behavioural techniques, psychoanalysis, family therapy, motivation training, 12-
step and peer-support programmes, self-help, diet and exercise enhancement, and 
psychopharmacology (Dhuffar & Griffiths, 2015; Griffiths, 2012; Rosenberg et al., 2014). 
However, treatment effectiveness research for sex addiction is underdeveloped and most of the 
aforementioned interventions are based on recommendations for treating other behavioural (as 
well as chemical) addictions (Rosenberg et al., 2014). Consequently, there is a need to 
empirically and clinically evaluate tailored treatments that target the specific symptoms of sex 
addiction. 
A recent development in treatment for both chemical and behavioural addiction has 
been evaluative research into the therapeutic effectiveness of mindfulness. Promising emergent 
findings exist for the use of mindfulness in treating substance/alcohol use disorders 
(Witkiewitz, Marlatt, & Walker, 2005), gambling disorder (Griffiths, Shonin, & Van Gordon, 
2015; Shonin et al., 2014b), workaholism (Shonin et al., 2014c) and internet addiction 
(Iskender & Akin, 2011). However, to date, no study has explored the applications of 
mindfulness for treating sex addition. Nevertheless, Shonin et al. (2013a) suggested that 
mindfulness is likely to be a suitable treatment for sex addiction because in addition to helping 
individuals increase perceptual distance from craving for desired objects and experiences, some 
SG-MBIs specifically utilise meditations intended to undermine attachment to sex and/or the 
human body. 
203 
 
According to Van Gordon et al. (2015b), rather than teaching participants to be ‘non-
judgemental’ (as advocated by many FG-MBIs), a reason why SG-MBIs may be more suited 
to the treatment of behavioural addictions is because they encourage mindfulness practitioners 
to be (i) ethically aware of both the short-term and long-term consequences of their actions, 
and (ii) spiritually empowered to relate to mindfulness as a ‘way of life’, rather than a 
therapeutic technique to be applied in some circumstances but not others. 
This chapter represents the first study to explore the utility of mindfulness for treating 
sex addiction. More specifically, it presents an in-depth clinical case study of an adult male 
suffering from addictive sexual behaviour that underwent treatment utilising a SG-MBI. 
 
Case Vignette and Assessment 
Clinical History 
“Adam” is in his early thirties and is a single divorced white British male without dependants. 
His psychiatric history comprises two periods of depressive episodes (each lasting 
approximately six months) that occurred three years ago (Major Depressive Disorder, 
Recurrent Episode, Mild; DSM-IV-TR Code 296.31) and five years ago (Major Depressive 
Disorder, Single Episode, Mild; 296.21). In both episodes, antidepressants were administered. 
Adam’s clinical history is otherwise unremarkable but he explained that 42 months ago, whilst 
still married, he “started to become addicted to sex”. Apart from attending a self-help group 
for a six-week period approximately one year ago, he had not previously sought treatment for 
his hypersexual behaviour. 
 
Case History 
Occupational history 
Adam works in a sales position that involves regular domestic travel and overnight hotel stays. 
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His role affords him use of a fully expensed company car and provides him with considerable 
flexibility in terms of work location. He typically spends three nights per week in a hotel and 
he generally visits the company offices one day each week. Adam has been employed in his 
current role for the past four years. He previously performed various sales roles and completed 
a two-year salaried graduate training programme upon leaving university. Opportunities for 
promotion with Adam’s current employer are advertised nationally, but employees are 
encouraged to apply (and are often given priority). During the previous two years, Adam has 
been encouraged by senior management to apply for two internal positions, but decided not to 
do so because he was “comfortable” in his current role. 
 
Family history 
Adam was raised by his biological parents who both work in public sector roles. Adam’s 
parents divorced when he was 16 years old, and both parents remarried. Adam describes his 
parents as “caring and supportive”, and feels that both he and his only sibling (a younger sister) 
received a good upbringing. He is on good terms with his parent’s respective partners, and has 
“got used” to the fact that there is presently minimal communication between his biological 
mother and father. Adam has not disclosed details of his mental health problems to any of his 
family members.  
 
Educational history 
Adam graduated from a British university with a BSc degree that he passed with upper second-
class honours. At the time of graduating he considered completing a Masters of Business 
Administration but decided to take paid employment instead. He attended state schooling and 
his A-level grades enabled him to attend his first choice of university.  
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Social history 
Up until the time of his divorce, most of Adam’s social engagements involved he and his wife 
meeting with other married couples. Adam met his wife approximately two years after leaving 
university, and was married for four years. Since the divorce, Adam has remained single and 
his current social engagements principally involve meeting with (i) colleagues from work, (ii) 
one long-term male friend that he had known since university, (iii) known and unknown 
individuals (mostly other business professionals) that he meets in hotels, and (iv) individuals 
that he interacts with as a result of his problematic sexual behaviour. 
 
Religious history 
Adam did not describe his biological parents as being particularly religious. They classified 
themselves as Anglican Christians and according to Adam, attended church only at Christmas. 
Adam stated that whilst at university, “I became interested in my spiritual side” and he began 
to explore Christianity more earnestly. However, Adam became disillusioned with certain 
organised Christian traditions and decided that there was a “big difference between the 
teachings of Christ and the teachings of the Church”. Consequently, Adam developed an 
interest in Buddhism. He tried meditation and visited the Buddhist countries of Thailand and 
Nepal (including visiting Buddhist temples in these countries). Adam frequented a Buddhist 
centre in the UK for a period of six months during his mid-twenties. He enjoyed learning about 
Buddhism but started to lose interest because he found the instructors to be “two-faced and 
superficial”. Adam maintains an interest in Buddhist practice but has had minimal contact with 
Buddhism over the past three years.  
 
Behavioural Observations 
At his initial assessment with the psychotherapist (and at each subsequent meeting), Adam was 
206 
 
cognisant as to person, place, time, and circumstance. He was well presented and wore ironed 
smart-casual attire (several items of clothing displayed a designer label). His face was clean-
shaven and he used a styling product on his hair that had recently been cut. Adam wore cologne 
and his mobile phone and watch appeared to be recent and high-end models. Adam made the 
same effort with his appearance during each of the subsequent therapy sessions. 
 At the initial assessment (and at the second and third weekly sessions), Adam’s eyes 
were moderately blood shot, and although he denied feeling tired, he appeared fatigued. The 
psychotherapist’s best estimate is that Adam is six feet (183 cm) tall and weighs 85-87.5kg. 
This would correspond to a Body Mass Index of 26-27, meaning that Adam is slightly 
overweight. Adam has no visible tattoos or piercings. Without being asked, he turned his phone 
to silent at the start of the assessment session (and at each subsequent session). 
Adam is confident and well spoken. He helped himself to biscuits and coffee (he drank 
two cups of coffee during the 90-minute session). Although Adam did not exhibit problems in 
expressing himself, the account of his problematic sexual behaviour provided at the initial 
session appeared rehearsed. When discussing his symptoms in detail, Adam talked for longer 
than needed and would attempt to brush over important details. He would sometimes talk out-
of-turn (i.e., without waiting for the psychotherapist to conclude their sentence). The frequency 
of such interruptions – that appeared to be an attempt to change subject – increased by 
approximately 50% when the dialogue started to address the intimate specifics of his sexual 
behaviour. At these times, Adam assumed a more tense body posture and became over-
confident, and borderline defensive. This behaviour appeared to be an effort to conceal 
embarrassment and/or mask his guilt.  
 At his initial assessment session, Adam stated “I feel awkward talking about all this” 
and “you’re the first person I’ve properly talked to”. At times, he appeared to be exhibiting low 
mood symptoms (e.g., pessimistic, lethargic, irritable) and on several occasions, he was cold 
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and abrupt. When confronted by the psychotherapist with this latter observation Adam 
apologised and explained that “I’ve got a lot on my plate right now”.  
 
Presenting Complaints  
Adam explained that approximately four years ago (i.e., one year before he divorced), he took 
steps to try to invigorate a “stale sex life” and failing marriage. Adam introduced his wife to 
watching pornographic films both before and during sexual intercourse. He stated that neither 
he nor his wife had been particularly interested in pornography prior to this time. Adam 
reported that for a period of approximately two months, the frequency and duration of sexual 
contact with his wife increased. However, the effect was relatively short-lived because 
according to Adam, his wife “became bored with it”. Adam, on the other hand, found 
pornographic films to be sexually stimulating and he continued to watch them without his 
wife’s knowledge. 
Adam began to accrue a collection of online and offline pornographic films, and started 
using them as a focus for masturbation. Six months after he first started to watch pornography 
(i.e., six months before he divorced), Adam was masturbating approximately five times per 
week. He stated that it was at about this time that he also started to become sexually aroused 
by watching men masturbate themselves, and by watching gay sex films (up until this point, 
Adam had always described himself as being heterosexual). He started to add gay sex films to 
his online and offline portfolio, and decided that he was bi-sexual. 
Adam stated that approximately five months before he divorced, “pornography stopped 
being enough” and “I needed to explore myself sexually”. He stated that “my wife didn’t want 
to know so I occasionally started to use female and male escorts”. Adam explained that at this 
time, he would meet with an escort approximately once a fortnight. He reported that although 
his marriage was failing, a divorce became inevitable when his wife found out that he had been 
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watching gay pornographic films on his computer. Adam had left his computer to answer the 
door but had left the online film playing. The film was seen by his wife who “freaked out” and 
moved out of their house five days later. 
Adam explained that for a period of approximately 18 months following the divorce, 
he was “in control” and was enjoying his newly found sexual freedom. He had built up a 
network of female and male sexual contacts across the country, including a small number of 
individuals with whom he engaged in sexual activities on an unpaid (i.e., casual) basis. Adam 
stated that at that time (i.e., 18 months before presenting for treatment), his monthly salary no 
longer covered the cost of his sexual exploits that typically cost £350 per week. Consequently, 
he decided to sell his home in order to raise capital and he moved into rented accommodation.  
At the initial assessment meeting and following considerable encouragement, Adam 
disclosed that in terms of his current sexual behaviour, he typically (i) uses the services of an 
escort six times per week (each paid sexual encounter normally lasts for 30-60 minutes, and 
those lasting for 60 minutes will normally result in Adam ejaculating twice), (ii) spends £500 
per week on escort services, (iii) has unpaid sex three times per week (drawing from a changing 
pool of up to ten male and female casual sex partners), (iv) has cybersex (normally involving 
masturbation) five times per week, (v) watches “gay or straight sex videos” for approximately 
60 minutes each day in three-four separate viewing sessions (i.e., each of 15-20-minutes 
duration), and (vi) masturbates five times a week whilst watching pornographic films. Adam 
stated that he always has protected sex and that as far as he is aware, he has never contracted a 
sexually transmitted disease. He confirmed that he has never engaged in sexual contact with 
(or watched pornographic films involving) individuals under the age of 18 years.  
Adam explained that during the past year, he sometimes felt “empty and cheap” 
following a sexual encounter. He stated that “I know I need to change [but] I enjoy it too much”. 
Adam has attempted to reduce the frequency of sex-related encounters and expenditure on 
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several occasions during the past 12 months. However, he explained that “whenever I try and 
cut back it lasts for a few days, or sometimes a week, but then it gets too much and I’ll end up 
[having paid sex and/or masturbating] seven or eight times over the course of 48 hours”. He 
stated “I know it’s wrong for a Buddhist to be like this”. 
Adam acknowledged that he often masturbates (i.e., during cybersex or whilst watching 
a pornographic film) to help him sleep, and that he typically sleeps for 5-6 hours per night. He 
reported that recently, he has “started to become careless” and has used his work telephone 
and work laptop for sex-related purposes. Adam explained that unless an individual he meets 
online gives a strong indication that a date will lead to sexual contact (e.g., by sending sexually 
provocative photographs), he declines to meet in person. He acknowledged that his current 
pattern of sexual behaviour is likely to minimise his chances of meeting long-term relationship 
partners but explained that “I’m not sure I’m ready for a wife or serious partner at this stage 
in my life”.  
Adam denied any suicidal ideation as well as gambling, substance, or alcohol 
dependency (but explained that the majority of his sexual encounters are accompanied by some 
form of alcohol consumption). He occasionally smokes cigarettes but asserted that his usage is 
for “social purposes” and that he is not nicotine dependent. Adam typically smokes 5-10 
cigarettes per day, mostly when socialising during the evening or when meeting sex partners 
during the day or evening.  
 
Diagnostic Impressions 
Adam’s problematic sexual behaviour was predated by a phase of major depression that 
occurred 18 months prior to the onset of his sex addiction (Adam experienced a second phase 
of major depression that occurred six months after the onset of his problematic sexual 
behaviour). Given the chronology, it is likely that Adam’s addiction to sex was an expression 
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(i.e., rather than the cause) of an underlying mood disorder. Adam was assessed using DSM-5 
criteria that confirmed the psychotherapist’s impression that he was currently experiencing a 
depressive episode, and that his previous diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder (Recurrent, 
Mild) was still current. In addition to sleep impairment, another important feature of Adam’s 
clinical profile was Religious or Spiritual Problems (DSM-5 code V62.89) resulting in (i) 
distressing experiences that involve loss or questioning of faith, and (ii) a questioning of 
spiritual values. 
 
Treatment Outcome Measures 
The 45-item Sexual Addiction Screening Test – Revised (SAST-R; Carnes, Green, & Carnes, 
2010) was administered to assess addictive sexual behaviour. SAST-R items are rated as either 
present or absent, and a ‘yes’ response to six or more of the 20-items on the core scale indicates 
probable sex addiction. Various subscales assess the dimensions of sex addiction and require 
either two or three ‘yes’ responses (to either four or five questions) to indicate a problem on 
that specific dimension. Examples of SAST-R items are “Has anyone been hurt emotionally 
because of your sexual behaviour?” and “Do you ever think your sexual desire is stronger than 
you are?” Adam’s baseline score on the core scale was 16 (out of a possible 20), indicating 
that he met the diagnostic criteria for sex addiction. He responded with ‘yes’ answers to the 
majority of the subscale questions, suggesting that the following symptoms were key aspects 
of his problematic sexual behaviour: (i) preoccupation, (ii) loss of control, (iii) relationship 
disturbance, and (iv) affect disturbance.  
The 21-item Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) 
assesses emotional distress and comprises sub-scales of depression, anxiety, and stress. The 
scale is scored on a four-point Likert scale (from: 0 = Did not apply to me at all, to 3 = Applied 
to me very much or most of the time) and features items such as “I felt that life was 
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meaningless”. The DASS is completed in respect of the foregoing seven-day period and scores 
for each of the three sub-scales can be summed together to provide an overall assessment of 
psychological distress (Van Gordon et al., 2014a). According to the DASS manual (Lovibond 
& Lovibond, 1995), the percentile cut-offs (and corresponding mean scores) for symptom 
severity are as follows: 0-78 (M ≤ 13) = Normal, 78-87 (M = 14-18) = Mild, 87-95 (M = 19-
28) = Moderate, and > 95 (M ≥ 28 = Severe). Adam’s baseline score was 24 (i.e., moderate). 
The Abridged Job in General Scale (AJIGS; Russel, Spitzmuller, Lin, Stanton, Smith, 
& Ironson, 2004) is an eight-item measure of job satisfaction. The scale contains the following 
adjectives or short phrases in relation to the job a person is currently employed in: “makes me 
content”, “better than most”, “good”, “disagreeable”, “excellent”, “enjoyable”, “poor”, and 
“undesirable”. For each item, respondents are asked if they agree (‘yes’), are not sure (‘?’), or 
disagree (‘no’). A score of three is assigned for ‘yes’, one for ‘?’, and zero for ‘no’. Individual 
items are summed to give a global score and negatively worded items are reverse-scored. 
Higher scores indicate greater levels of job satisfaction. Adam’s score on intake was seven (out 
of a possible 24), indicating a low-level of job satisfaction. 
The seven-item Non-Attachment Scale (NAS; Sahdra et al., 2015; Sahdra et al., 2010) 
is based on a Buddhist model of mental illness and assesses the extent to which an individual 
is attached to the various psychological, social, and material aspects of their life. By default, 
the NAS also measures the extent that individuals are ‘attached to themselves’ because 
according to Buddhist theory, attachment to psychological or external phenomena is dependent 
upon a firm sense of selfhood (Van Gordon et al., 2016e). The scale is constructed upon the 
Buddhist idea that the self does not exist intrinsically and that attachment to self (and 
psychological and material objects) therefore constitutes a maladaptive condition (see Shonin 
et al. [2014g] for a detailed explanation of how attachment is conceptualised differently in 
Buddhism compared to Western Psychology). The NAS is scored on a six-point Likert scale 
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(from 1 = disagree strongly to 6 = agree strongly) and features items such as “When pleasant 
experiences end, I am fine moving on to what comes next”. Higher scores reflect lower levels 
of attachment (or higher levels of non-attachment). Adam’s baseline score was 16 (out of a 
possible 42). 
The seven-item Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index (PSQI; Buysse et al., 1989) assesses the 
sleep quality during the past month across domains of subjective sleep quality, sleep latency, 
sleep duration, habitual sleep efficiency, sleep disturbances, use of sleep medication, and 
daytime dysfunction. The PSQI is scored on a four-point Likert scale (0 = no difficulty, 3 = 
extreme difficulty) and features items such as “during the past month, how would you rate your 
sleep quality overall?” A global score of ≥5 indicates a poor quality of sleep. Adam’s baseline 
score was 14 (out of a possible 21). 
The Goal Attainment Scale (GAS; Kiresuk & Sherman, 1968) assesses treatment goal 
attainment, and involves the client and therapist agreeing upon a series of goals. The level of 
goal attainment is determined by behavioural descriptions of functioning. Scores range from 
minus 2 (regression) through 0 (expected outcome attained) to plus 2 (expected outcome 
exceeded) for each of the agreed goals. Scores for individual goals are combined and then the 
GAS conversion key is utilised to calculate a global score. In this clinical case study, five 
equally weighted goals were formulated. A score of 50 indicates an expected level of goal 
achievement and higher scores indicate greater levels of goal achievement.  
Changes in each of the following outcome measures – based on the preceding 14-day 
period – were assessed using daily dairy-keeping by Adam (baseline values shown in brackets): 
(i) time spent watching online and offline pornographic films (13.5 hours), (ii) time spent 
engaged in cyber-sex (10 hours), (iii) frequency of paid sexual encounters (12 meetings), and 
(iv) expenditure on escort services (£1,050). Each of the aforementioned outcomes were 
assessed at four separate time points: (i) baseline (t1), (ii) mid-treatment (t2 [week 5]), (iii) 
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therapy termination (t3 [week 10]), and (iv) six-month follow-up (t4). All of the above scales 
are established screening instruments with good psychometric properties. 
 
Case Formulation 
Adam’s initial expression of interest in pornography appeared to be well intended (i.e., a step 
taken to help recover his marriage). However, with his marriage deteriorating and perceiving 
that his wife was uninterested in sex, he experienced masturbating using pornography and 
occasional contact with sex escorts to be an increasingly important outlet for satisfying his 
sexual urges. For approximately a 12-month period, Adam exhibited a reasonable degree of 
behavioural control over his sexual urges, and it is likely that his use of pornography and sex 
escorts did not become addictive and problematic until after he divorced. 
Rather than seek long-term relationship partners after divorcing, Adam became locked 
into his pattern of sexual behaviour and allowed it to intensify. Inevitably, his sexual behaviour 
became maladaptive and an addiction feedback loop ensued. Watching pornography or 
engaging in paid (or casual) sexual contact induced temporary positive affective and sensory 
states. These, in turn, gave rise to affirmative memories (Baker, Piper, McCarthy, Majeskie, & 
Fiore, 2004). Subsequent contact with sexual stimuli triggered these memories, and resulted in 
a craving to re-experience the affective and sensory response. The craving was satisfied by 
further engagement in the same type of sexual behaviour that, in addition to the desired 
modification in mood, led to encoding of additional associative memories (Houlihan & Brewer, 
2015). Adam continued to reinforce his pattern of problematic sexual behaviour until 
interpersonal and intrapsychic conflict reached a point that he could no longer deny that his 
behaviour was unsustainable in the long-term.  
Adam’s initial use of pornography and sex escorts was probably unrelated to his 
underlying symptoms of depression. However, at the point he sought the help of a 
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psychotherapist, sex and sex-related behaviour (i) had become a means of avoiding feelings of 
depression (and other problems in his life), and (ii) were augmenting his low mood symptoms 
and causing feelings of guilt to manifest.  
 
Predisposing Factors 
The divorce of Adam’s parents during his teenage years inevitably imposed an emotional 
burden. However, Adam appeared (both at present time and at the time of his parents’ divorce) 
to accept it and commented that “they did their best to minimise the impact on [me and my 
sister]”. The first signs of notable intrapsychic conflict arose while Adam was at university and 
was experiencing a ‘spiritual yearning’. Adam’s spiritual needs were not met by his encounters 
with either Christianity or Buddhism, and this appeared to augment his psychological and 
spiritual tension. According to Van Gordon et al (2016e), spiritual undernourishment can be a 
key determinant of psychopathology and probably played a role in the onset of Adam’s 
depression and hypersexual behaviour.  
 
Protective and Problematic Factors 
Adam’s interest in spiritual development (and in particular Buddhism) could be potentially 
utilised as a protective factor. In fact, Adam confirmed that his primary motivation for 
approaching the psychotherapist was because of their expertise in the therapeutic use of 
Buddhist principles and practices. The relatively undemanding nature of Adam’s job does not 
help his situation. Adam is not challenged in his current role where he receives minimal 
supervision. His primary reason for declining to apply for internal advancement opportunities 
was that the increased responsibility would interfere with his sexual activities. However, if 
Adam’s interest in his career could be rekindled, a role with more responsibility could also 
become a potential protective factor. 
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Intervention 
In conjunction with the absence of psychotic features, Adam’s craving for sex indicated the 
suitability of a meditation-based recovery model. According to meditational theory, the 
contemplative observance of cravings and negative affective states helps to objectify these 
psychological phenomena, such that they become less consuming and can be ‘let go of’ (Van 
Gordon et al., 2016e). Following informed consent, Adam received the secular MAT 
intervention that was administered by the second author (a psychotherapist and meditation 
teacher). MAT follows a comprehensive approach to meditation whereby mindfulness is an 
integral part – but does not form the exclusive focus – of the programme (Van Gordon et al., 
2014a).  
In addition to mindfulness, MAT incorporates practices that are traditionally followed 
by (Buddhist) meditation practitioners including techniques aimed at cultivating: (i) 
citizenship, (ii) perceptive clarity, (iii) ethical and compassionate awareness, (iv) meditative 
insight (e.g., into subtle concepts such as emptiness and impermanence), (v) patience, (vi) 
generosity (e.g., of one’s time and energy), and (vii) life perspective. Each of the ten weekly 
sessions attended by Adam lasted for 90 minutes and comprised three phases: (i) discussion 
with the therapist (approximately 40 minutes), (ii) a taught component (approximately 20 
minutes), and (iii) a guided meditation (approximately 20 minutes). A ten-minute break was 
scheduled immediately prior to the guided meditation, and Adam received a CD of guided 
meditations to facilitate daily self-practice.  
 
Ethics 
The study received ethical approval from the ethics committee of the author’s academic 
institution. The participant provided written consent for their data to be published in an 
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academic journal in anonymised form.  
 
Early Intervention Phase (Weeks 1-2) 
The early intervention phase focussed on establishing therapeutic alliance, as well as core 
therapeutic conditions such as active listening, unconditional positive regard, accurate 
empathy, respect, and genuineness (Wells, 1997). Psycho-education was likewise important 
during this treatment phase in order to reinforce Adam’s understanding of (i) addiction and the 
addiction feedback loop, (ii) psychotherapy according to a meditational framework, and (iii) 
the aetiology, prevalence, and symptom course of hypersexual behaviour.  
During the second week of therapy, five GAS compatible goals were proposed by 
Adam (and agreed by the psychotherapist): (i) 50% reduction in the frequency of paid and 
casual sex encounters, (ii) eliminating the use of pornography and cyber-sex websites, (iii) 
limiting sexual contact to three paid or casual sex partners with whom Adam felt sex was more 
meaningful, (iv) applying for one internal or external employment advancement opportunity 
each week, and (v) uptake of a regular exercise routine. A goal of reducing sex-related financial 
spending was discounted because it was deemed as something that might encourage riskier 
sexual behaviour (e.g., using street prostitutes that typically charge lower prices for their sexual 
services than escorts).  
A further key aspect of the early intervention phase was introducing Adam to the 
practice of mindful awareness, and in particular breath awareness. He was taught to use breath 
observance as an ‘attentional anchor’ by focussing approximately 50% of his awareness on his 
breathing, and 50% on what was happening in the present moment. In this manner, Adam 
started to develop the necessary foundations for subsequent meditative development as well as 
a method of arresting ruminative thinking.  
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Mid-Intervention Phase (Weeks 3-8) 
The mid-intervention phase comprised five key elements that were administered in conjunction 
with mindfulness training: 
1. Body composition and decomposition: This aspect of the practice drew upon Buddhist 
sutras that include detailed meditations on the composition of the body, and its 
decomposition following death. The objective was to help Adam understand more 
about the ‘true’ nature of the object of his desire (i.e., the body). For example, one of 
the guided meditations involved mentally deconstructing the body and identifying its 
constituent parts that in themselves, are not particularly desirable (e.g., nails, hair, 
mucus, faeces, urine, pus, vomit, blood, sinew, skin, bone, teeth, flesh, sweat, etc.). 
Another guided meditation involved visualising the process of decay that the body 
undergoes following death (i.e., as part of understanding the true nature of body and 
the inevitable future that awaits it). 
2. Meditative exposure therapy: Adam experienced difficulty in implementing this 
technique outside the therapeutic sessions, and explicitly requested a more direct and 
supportive approach. Consequently, a controlled scenario was enacted whereby Adam 
sat opposite the therapist with a laptop computer that had the sound turned off. He was 
administered a guided meditation while one of his online sex films was playing (the 
psychotherapist could not see the film). Adam was requested to keep his eyes closed 
but to intermittently and briefly open them in order to glance at the film. He was 
instructed to relate to the psychological and somatic processes that were triggered by 
the film as ‘simply phenomena’. In other words, Adam was taught to objectify such 
processes and interact with them as a ‘participating observer’. Adam was thus shown 
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that he could psychologically accommodate and work with sex urges, but without them 
dictating his mental state and behaviour.  
3. Compassion and loving-kindness meditation: Adam was introduced to compassion and 
loving-kindness meditation for various reasons, but the principal purpose was to raise 
awareness of others’ suffering, including the individuals with whom he was paying to 
have sex. Adam was encouraged to view such individuals as human beings (i.e., with 
problems and hopes of their own), and not just as objects to gratify his sexual urges. 
4. Analytical meditation: Adam was guided using meditations intended to undermine a 
belief that the self (or for that matter any phenomenon) intrinsically exists (see 
‘Discussion’ section below for further explanation).  
5. Sex in context: This aspect of Adam’s treatment was mostly discussion-based and 
focussed on helping Adam contextualise some of his meditative insights and 
experiences. Techniques such as guided discovery, logical reasoning, and Socratic 
questioning were employed to help Adam test the validity of his assumptions 
concerning sex. For example, Adam was guided to accept that (i) desire to have sex is 
normal and biologically driven, (ii) there is no ‘right’ amount of sex (i.e., everybody is 
different), (iii) sex is an important part of life, but there are many other (arguably more) 
important aspects, (iv) where two adults consent to engage in sexual contact, it is 
generally their frame of mind (i.e., rather than the type of sex act performed) that 
determines whether the encounter is ‘wholesome’ or ‘debasing’, (v) from a Buddhist 
perspective, using the services of adult sex escorts was not necessarily ‘wrong’, so long 
as nobody was being hurt (admittedly, there are numerous – including philosophical – 
supportive and critical arguments that could be applied in this respect), and (vi) sex 
within the context of a long-term relationship was likely to be safer and more 
meaningful.  
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Therapy Termination (Weeks 9-10) 
The final phase of treatment concentrated on preparing Adam for therapy termination. Whilst 
he felt that his psychological wellbeing and control over sexual urges had considerably 
improved, Adam expressed concerns over relapse due to loss of face-to-face therapeutic 
contact. To help alleviate such concerns, Adam was advised to continue with his daily practice 
of meditation and to keep a daily register of sexual behaviour, stress levels, and sleep patterns. 
Coping strategy cue cards were formulated that Adam agreed to refer to on a bi-weekly basis. 
Finally, a procedure for emergencies was discussed, dates and times for planned telephone 
contact were agreed, and three 90-minute booster sessions were arranged at four-week 
intervals. 
 
Results 
Following completion of MAT (i.e., t3), Adam was assessed against DSM-5 diagnostic criteria 
for major depression. He exhibited clinically significant change (i.e., to below the diagnostic 
threshold) that was maintained at six-month follow-up (i.e., t4). As shown in Figure 10.1, his 
t3 and t4 scores on all other outcome measures likewise suggested that the intervention had 
been successful. Adam answered ‘yes’ to five of the SAST-R items, indicating that he was no 
longer suffering from addictive sexual behaviour. His post-treatment scores on the DASS 
demonstrated a ‘normal’ level of symptom severity, and his t3 scores on both the AJIGS and 
NAS were doubled compared to baseline (with a trend towards further improvement at t4). 
Adam’s t3 score on the PSQI was markedly reduced (from t1= 14 to t3 = 8), but was still above 
the threshold (of ≥ 5) for non-problematic sleep. Further improvements in sleep quality were 
demonstrated between t3 and t4, and Adam’s PSQI score of five at six-month follow-up was 
just outside the cut-off for ‘normal’ sleep quality. 
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 Between t3 and t4, Adam abstained from watching pornography and using online sex 
websites. His expenditure on sex escorts decreased by 60% between t1 and t3 (to £420 per 14 
days; three paid encounters per week), and 73% between t1 and t4 (£280 per 14 days; two paid 
encounters per week). Adam likewise reduced the number of individuals in his network of 
unpaid casual sex partners (from t1 = 10, to t3-t4 = 3), and between t3 and t4 he would generally 
meet with one unpaid casual sex partner each week (compared to three such weekly meetings 
at t1). Adam’s post-treatment GAS score of 74 corresponded to achievement across all goal 
fronts. At t4, Adam reported that he (i) had secured an internal promotion that was due to 
commence in two months’ time, (ii) was attending a Buddhist meditation group on a weekly 
basis, and (iii) no longer feels guilty about his sexual behaviour that “works for me and is much 
more meaningful”.  
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Figure 10.1. Change in outcome variable scores over time. Where t1 = baseline, t2 = week 5, 
t3 = week 10 (therapy termination), t4 = 6-month follow-up. Dotted lines indicate cut-off for 
‘normal’ symptom severity (where available) in an adult population 
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Discussion 
This chapter reports findings from the first clinical study to investigate the utility of 
mindfulness for treating sex addiction. The intervention utilised in the present study (i.e., MAT) 
belongs to the second-generation of MBIs, and follows a comprehensive approach to 
mindfulness teaching and practice. The male adult participant (Adam) demonstrated clinically 
significant improvements in addictive sexual behaviour as well as depression and 
psychological distress. Improvements post-therapy were also observed in sleep quality, job 
satisfaction, and non-attachment to self and experiences. Salutary outcomes were maintained 
at six-month follow-up. 
 The current study highlights the need for tailoring treatment outcomes on a case-by-
case basis. An ideal outcome would have been Adam expressing an interest in finding a long-
term relationship partner, and abstaining from paid and unpaid casual sex encounters. However, 
the participant was clear that a long-term relationship was not on their personal agenda, and so 
therapeutic goals had to be adjusted accordingly. Although Adam continued to use sex escorts 
post-treatment, his use of them was at a much lower frequency, and scores on the SAST-R 
suggested that he was no longer addicted to sex. Furthermore, scores on all other measures of 
Adam’s sexual behaviour indicated that he was now able to regulate his sexual urges. 
A key proposed mechanistic pathway is that mindfulness increases perceptual distance 
from addiction-driven urges, and thus facilitates a process of ‘urge surfing’ (Appel & Kim-
Appel, 2009). In other words, observing a behavioural urge helps to objectify it, and this allows 
it to dissipate of its own accord. However, in reality, the ‘biological intensity’ of sexual craving 
could mean that mindfulness alone is insufficient, and that other meditative treatment 
techniques are required. Indeed, according to the traditional Buddhist literature, it typically 
takes years for an individual to become proficient in mindfulness practice (Shonin et al., 
2014g). This suggests that individuals with problematic behavioural urges (and other mental 
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health issues) are unlikely to accrue the necessary grounding in mindfulness (i.e., such that they 
can regulate engrained maladaptive cognitions) after attending just eight to ten mindfulness 
training sessions. 
 According to Shonin et al (2013a; 2014e), when using meditation to treat behavioural 
addiction, it is essential not only to help individuals learn how to meditatively objectify craving 
(i.e., by practising mindfulness), but also to empower them to use meditation techniques that 
directly undermine attachment to the object of addiction. SG-MBIs, that generally integrate a 
range of contemplative techniques, are therefore arguably well suited to treating behavioural 
addiction. In addition to targeting craving for sexual contact (i.e., by employing meditations on 
the composite and impermanent nature of the body), MAT also includes meditations intended 
to undermine belief in an intrinsic and independently existing self (Van Gordon et al., 2014a). 
The rationale behind this approach stems from Ontological Addiction Theory (OAT) in which 
‘ontological addiction’ is deemed to be the underlying cause of maladaptive cognitive and 
behavioural processes (Shonin et al., 2013a).  
As discussed in Chapter 6, ontological addiction is defined as “the unwillingness to 
relinquish an erroneous and deep-routed belief in an inherently existing ‘self’ or ‘I’ as well as 
the ‘impaired functionality’ that arises from such a belief” (Shonin et al., 2013a, p.64). Belief 
in selfhood is considered ‘erroneous’ because the ‘self’ manifests only in reliance on all other 
phenomena in the universe. If belief in the intrinsic existence of the self is undermined, then 
by default, so too is belief in the intrinsic existence of any object that the ‘self’ desires. 
According to OAT, sexual contact is certainly not a worthless experience, but as with all other 
activities, it should be undertaken without over-allocating cognitive and emotional resources 
such that sex (or a human body) is assigned an attractive quality that is unrealistic and that 
exceeds its intrinsic worth (Shonin et al., 2014g). 
 As observed in other clinical case studies of MAT involving individuals with 
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behavioural addictions (e.g., problem gambling [Shonin et al., 2014b]; workaholism [Shonin 
et al, 2014c]), further mechanisms by which MAT may have been therapeutically active are: 
(i) meditative calm leading to reductions in autonomic arousal, psychological arousal, and 
impulsivity, (ii) ‘bliss substitution’ whereby the sensory and psychological pleasure derived 
from meditation increases capacity to defer sexual gratification, (iii) increased levels of loving-
kindness, compassion, and self-compassion that foster ethical awareness and undermine self-
disparaging schemas, and (iv) spiritual nourishment that increases sense of purpose as well as 
work and life satisfaction. 
To date, research exploring the applications of mindfulness in relation to sexual 
behaviour have explicitly focussed on improving sexual dysfunction and/or enjoyment (e.g., 
Brotto, Basson, & Luria, 2008; Brotto et al., 2012). The current study extends this literature by 
reporting on the use of mindfulness as a therapeutic intervention for treating sex addiction. As 
with all clinical case studies, the single-subject design, and the absence of a control condition, 
means that findings may not generalise to other individuals suffering from sex addiction. The 
study was also limited by the use of a 14-day period for assessing aspects of sexual behaviour, 
as this time period may not reflect long-term behaviour patterns. Nevertheless, Adam’s 
promising treatment outcomes indicate that further clinical evaluation of the utility of MAT for 
treating sex addiction is warranted. 
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Chapter 11 
Meditation Awareness Training for the treatment of workaholism: 
A controlled trial 
 
This chapter (whether in full or in part) was adapted for publication and was subsequently 
submitted for published as: 
Van Gordon, W., Shonin, E., Dunn, T., Garcia-Campayo, J., Demarzo, M., & Griffiths, M. D. 
(2016). Meditation Awareness Training for the treatment of workaholism: A non-randomised 
controlled trial. Journal of Behavioral Addiction, 6, 212-220. 
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Abstract 
Workaholism is a form of behavioural addiction that can lead to reduced life and job 
satisfaction, anxiety, depression, burnout, work-family conflict, and impaired productivity. 
Given the number of people affected, there is a need for more targeted workaholism treatments. 
Findings from previous case studies successfully utilising SG-MBIs for treating behavioural 
addiction suggest that SG-MBIs may be suitable treatments for workaholism. The present study 
conducted a controlled trial to investigate the effects of MAT on workaholism. Male and female 
adults suffering from workaholism (n = 73) were allocated to MAT or a waiting-list control 
group. Assessments were performed at pre-, post-, and three-month follow-up phases. MAT 
participants demonstrated significant and sustained improvements over control-group 
participants in workaholism symptomatology, job satisfaction, work engagement, work 
duration, and psychological distress. Furthermore, compared to the control group, MAT 
participants demonstrated a significant reduction in hours spent working but without a decline 
in job performance. It is concluded that (i) MAT may be a suitable intervention for treating 
workaholism, and (ii) further controlled intervention studies investigating the effects of SG-
MBIs on workaholism are warranted. 
 
.  
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Introduction 
Workaholism has been defined as “being overly concerned about work, driven by an 
uncontrollable work motivation, and to investing so much time and effort to work that it impairs 
other important life areas” (Andreassen, Hetland, & Pallesen, 2014a, p. 8). Prevalence rates 
for workaholism in Western counties are typically in the order of 8-10% (Sussman et al., 2011). 
However, only one study (i.e., Andreassen et al., 2014b) has ever carried out a nationally 
representative survey of workaholism and it reported that 8.3% of Norwegian adults were 
addicted to work. Despite this relatively high figure, there is concern that prevalence rates could 
increase even further with the proliferation of technology-driven modern working styles (e.g., 
use of laptops, tablets, and smartphones) that blur the work-leisure boundary (Andreassen, 
Griffiths, Sinha, Hetland, & Pallesen, 2016; Quinones, Griffiths & Kakabadse, 2016). Unlike 
work engagement that is associated with increases in life satisfaction and job performance, 
workaholism is associated with reduced life and job satisfaction (e.g., Karanika-Murray, 
Pontes, Griffiths & Biron, 2015; Shimaz, Schaufeli, Kamiyama, Kawakami, 2015), stress and 
incivility (e.g., Lanzo, Aziz, & Wuensch, 2016), and anxiety and depression (e.g., Andreassen 
et al., 2016). Workaholism can also lead to burnout, work-family conflict, and impaired 
productivity (Griffiths & Karanika-Murray, 2012; Sussman, 2012).  
 Workaholism is a form of behavioural addiction, of which other examples include 
addictions to gambling, video gaming, shopping, exercise, and sex (Demetrovics & Griffiths, 
2012). According to Griffiths’ (2005) components model of addiction, an individual is deemed 
to suffer from a behavioural addiction when in respect of the object of their addiction, they 
satisfy six criteria. In relation to work this would be: (i) salience (i.e., work is the single most 
important activity in their life), (ii) mood modification (i.e., work is used to alleviate emotional 
stress and/or to engender euphoric or arousing states), (iii) tolerance (i.e., needing to work 
longer hours or at greater intensity to derive the same mood-modifying effects), (iv) withdrawal 
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(i.e., suffering emotional and/or physical distress when not being able to work), (v) conflict 
(i.e., interpersonal conflict with family members and other individuals, conflict with non-work 
activities such as socialising and exercising, and intra-psychic conflict), and (vi) relapse (i.e., 
reverting to earlier patterns of excessive working following periods of being in control).  
 Despite the significant health and economic burden imposed by workaholism, there are 
very few peer-reviewed studies examining the treatment of workaholism (Shonin et al., 2014c). 
Consequently, guidelines for treating workaholism are largely based on theoretical proposals 
and/or anecdotal clinical reports that are unsupported by empirical evidence. Consistent with 
the need for more targeted treatments, there has been growing interest in the use of MBIs for 
treating behavioural addiction, including workaholism (Shonin et al., 2014c; Van Gordon, 
Shonin, Skelton, & Griffiths, 2014c). More specifically, a handful of intervention studies have 
been conducted indicating that mindfulness has applications for treating addictions to gambling 
(see reviews by Griffiths, Shonin, & Van Gordon, 2016; Maynard, Wilson, Labuzienski, & 
Whiting, 2015; Shonin et al., 2013a; 2014e). In addition, two separate clinical case studies 
(each incorporating a quantitative data-assessment component) have demonstrated that 
mindfulness can lead to clinically significant positive change (maintained through to six-month 
follow-up) in sex addiction (Van Gordon et al., 2016a) and workaholism (Shonin et al., 2014c).  
The latter case study involved a director of a blue-chip company working more than 65 
hours a week and who presented with complaints of (i) work-related sensation-seeking (e.g., 
obsessing over winning high-value contracts), (ii) non-restorative sleep, (iii) frequent 
migraines, (iv) irritability and incivility when not working, (v) exhaustion, (vi) dysphoric mood 
episodes, (vii) work-family conflict, and (viii) impaired concentration (Shonin et al., 2014c). 
The participant received MAT (the same intervention was also administered in the 
aforementioned sex addiction case study and in one of the aforementioned studies on the 
treatment of gambling addiction).  
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As with many FG-MBIs, MAT introduces mindfulness techniques aimed at increasing 
perceptual distance from mental urges. However, MAT is deemed to be particularly suited to 
treating behavioural addictions because the additional meditation techniques that it 
incorporates are believed to invoke the following mechanisms of action: (i) reducing relapse 
and withdrawal symptoms via substituting maladaptive addictive behaviours with a ‘positive 
addiction’ to the blissful and tranquil states associated with specific forms of meditation, (ii) 
regulating dysphoric mood states and addiction-related shameful and self-disparaging schemas 
via the cultivation of compassion and self-compassion, (iii) reducing myopic focus on reward 
by undermining the intrinsic value that individuals assign to the object of addiction (a central 
view in Buddhism is that phenomena are in fact ‘empty’ of inherent existence; Van Gordon et 
al., 2016a), (iv) reducing salience by fostering a better understanding of the ‘impermanent’ 
nature of existence (e.g., a senior/lucrative occupational role must one day be relinquished, 
etc.), (v) growth in spiritual awareness that broadens perspective and prompts a re-evaluation 
of life priorities, and (vi) increased capacity to defer gratitude due to improved patience 
(Shonin, Van Gordon, & Griffiths, 2014e). 
Building upon preliminary (but promising) findings observed during the use of MAT 
in the aforementioned workaholism clinical case study (and also during studies of MAT 
involving other forms of behavioural addiction), the purpose of the present study was to 
conduct a controlled trial to investigate whether the salutary effects of MAT are observed in a 
larger sample of individuals suffering from workaholism. The primary study outcome was 
reduction in workaholism and the secondary study outcomes were improved job satisfaction, 
improved job performance, decreased psychological distress, decreased work duration, and 
decreased work involvement. 
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Methods 
Participants 
Participants were male and female English-speaking adults working in full-time employment. 
Participation was on a voluntary basis and participants were recruited via: (i) posters and flyers 
strategically located across city and out-of-city work locations (e.g., business parks, factories, 
etc.) in the East Midlands (UK), (ii) the client database of a local meditation centre (limited to 
individuals who had expressed an interest in receiving meditation training but had not yet done 
so), and (iii) presentations by two of the research team to personnel of key local employers. 
Furthermore, some East-Midlands occupational physicians and occupational health nurse 
advisors were made aware of the study and were invited to informally raise awareness amongst 
relevant employees by suggesting that they could contact the research team for further 
information. 
 
Eligibility criteria 
The presence of workaholism was confirmed using the Bergen Work Addiction Scale (BWAS; 
Andreassen, Griffiths, Hetland, & Pallesen, 2012). To be considered eligible for the study, 
participants were required to score 4 or more on at least four of the scale’s seven items (see 
below for a fuller description of the BWAS). Other eligibility criteria for participation in the 
study were (i) aged between 18 and 65 years, (ii) not currently absent from work (e.g., due to 
leave of absence, maternity leave, sickness, etc.), (iii) no periods of annual leave planned for 
the duration of the eight-week intervention, (iv) not currently undergoing formal 
psychotherapy, (v) not currently practicing meditation, and (vi) no changes in 
psychopharmacology type or dosage one-month prior to intervention (although stable 
prescription medication was permitted). Furthermore, participants had to be working a 
minimum of 32 paid hours per week. Rather than an indication of workaholism (that is not 
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necessarily a function of hours worked per week), the purpose of this latter inclusion criteria 
was to ensure that all participants were engaged in fulltime employment and thus maximise 
homogeneity in terms of participant work characteristics. 
 
Procedure 
Allocation procedure 
Randomisation was not employed because some participants that met the eligibility criteria 
indicated that they would be unavailable to attend the requisite number of MAT sessions due 
to pre-planned work or family engagements scheduled to occur on the same day as delivery of 
the MAT intervention. These pre-planned engagements included training days, attending 
conferences/workshops, medical appointments, family engagements, and weekly team-
meetings, etc. Therefore, allocation to MAT or a waiting-list control group occurred firstly by 
assigning all participants reporting availability issues to the waiting-list control group, and then 
subsequently visually inspecting demographic data in order to match MAT and control group 
participants as closely as possible on sex, age, education level, salary, and employment type 
(i.e., white collar or blue collar workers). 
 
Programme description 
Participants received MAT (for comprehensive information regarding the intervention 
protocol, see Methods section of Chapter 8 as well as Van Gordon et al. [2014a]). In the present 
study, MAT was delivered by the second author (30 years meditation teaching experience) and 
the first author provided supervision to identify any deviations from the standard intervention 
delivery format. Supervision was implemented by the first author (i) silently observing at least 
15 minutes of each weekly session (not always following the same amount of elapsed time into 
the two-hour session, and (ii) engaging in discussion with the program facilitator on a weekly 
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basis. No unplanned deviations from the standard intervention protocol were identified. The 
intervention was delivered using group-sizes of approximately 18 participants. 
 
Measures 
Study outcomes were assessed via the following well-established psychometric scales: 
Bergan Work Addiction Scale (BWAS; Andreassen et al., 2012; Orosz et al., 2016): The BWAS 
is embedded within general addiction theory and contains seven items reflecting core 
characteristics of addiction (i.e., salience, conflict, mood modification, withdrawal, tolerance, 
problems, and relapse). Questions are answered on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 
(never) to 5 (always). Examples of BWAS items are “How often during the last year have you 
worked so much that it has negatively influenced your health?” and “How often during the last 
year have you experienced that others have told you to cut down on work without listening to 
them?”. High scores indicate greater levels of workaholism and scoring 4 or more on at least 
four of the scale’s seven items indicates that the individual is suffering from workaholism 
(Andreassen et al., 2012).  
Abridged Job in General Scale (AJIGS; Russel et al., 2004): The AJIGS is a measure of job 
satisfaction and includes the following eight adjectives or short phrases: “makes me content”, 
“better than most”, “good”, “disagreeable”, “excellent”, “enjoyable”, “poor”, and 
“undesirable”. For each item, respondents are asked if they agree, are unsure, or disagree. A 
score of 3 is assigned for agree, 1 for unsure, and 0 for disagree. Individual items are summed 
to give a global score and negatively-worded items are reverse-scored. Higher scores indicate 
greater levels of job satisfaction. 
Role-Based Performance Scale (RBPS; Welbourne, Johnson, & Erez, 1998): The 20-item 
RBPS is a measure of general work performance. The RBPS assesses performance across five 
different aspects of an individual’s roles: (i) job (e.g., quantity and quality of work output, 
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standard of internal and external customer service), (ii) career (e.g., skill development, personal 
career goal attainment), (iii) innovator (e.g., improving processes and routines, generating and 
implementing new ideas), (iv) team member (e.g., responding to others’ needs in his/her work 
group, ensuring his/her work group succeeds), and (v) organisational citizen (e.g., working for 
the overall benefit of the company). Scoring is on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = needs much 
improvement, 5 = excellent) and each role typology contains four items. When summed 
together, scores for each role typology provide an overall indication of job performance. The 
RBPS is completed by participants’ direct line manager and thus provides a more objective 
measure of work performance. The RBPS was submitted directly to the research team by 
participants’ line managers. 
Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scale (DASS; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995): The 21-item 
DASS assesses psychological distress and comprises three subscales that focus on depression, 
anxiety, and stress. The scale is scored on a four-point Likert scale (0 = Did not apply to me at 
all, to 3 = Applied to me very much or most of the time) and includes items such as “I found it 
hard to wind down” and “I felt that life was meaningless”. Scores from the three subscales can 
be summed together to provide an overall indication of psychological distress. The DASS is 
completed in respect of the foregoing seven-day period. According to the DASS manual 
(Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995), the percentile cut-offs and corresponding mean scores for 
symptom severity are as follows: 0-78 (M ≤ 13) = normal, 78-87 (M = 14-18) = mild, 87-95 
(M = 19-28) = moderate, and > 95 (M ≥ 28 = severe). 
Work Duration and Work Involvement: Participants were asked to keep a diary and record (i) 
the total number of hours worked each week, and (ii) how many of these hours were 
accumulated whilst working during non-work hours (e.g., evenings and weekends). 
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Statistical Analysis 
A significance level of p < 0.05 and two-tailed tests were employed throughout. Independent 
samples t-tests (for continuous variables) and chi-square tests with Yates’s correction (for 
categorical variables) were used to identify any significant differences between groups in 
demographic characteristics or baseline-dependent variable mean scores.  
Mixed effects models (also known as multi-level models, random effects model, and 
hierarchical models) were used to examine the effect of intervention (MAT) and control on all 
six outcome measures (i.e., BWAS, AJIGS, DASS, RBPS, Work Engagement, and Work 
Involvement). Mixed effects modelling accounts for shared variance within-participants while 
modelling between-participant differences (Baguley, 2012a). The benefits of mixed effects 
models include fewer assumptions (i.e., homoscedasticity, sphericity, and compound 
symmetry) and greater statistical power over traditional approaches (Baguley, 2012a; Gelman 
& Hill, 2007; Quene & van der Berg, 2004; Snijders & Bosker, 1999). Furthermore, mixed 
effects models account for baseline differences in outcome scores by modelling (per 
participant) the change in outcome score relative to baseline across all measurement phases 
(i.e., pre-, post-, and three-month follow up) (Van Gordon, et al., 2017). Prior to model 
estimation, distributions of all outcome variables and random effects residuals were inspected 
and deemed to be close approximations of normality. Using the absolute median deviation 
method to detect outliers (Leys et al., 2013), no data points were deemed to be extreme in the 
present data set. The trial was conducted on an ‘intent-to-treat’ basis with missing data at end-
point substituted on a last observation-carried-forward (LOCF) basis. 
 
Ethics  
The study procedures were carried out in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. The 
Institutional Review Board of [University name redacted] approved the study. All participants 
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were informed about the study and all provided informed consent. For ethical and transparency 
reasons, participants were required to acknowledge (i.e., as part of the informed consent 
procedure) that they understood that MAT (i) is deemed by its founders to be both a 
psychological and spiritual intervention, (ii) is not intended to be a course on Buddhism (i.e., 
it is secular in context) but makes use of Buddhist meditative techniques and principles, and 
(iii) was founded by two Western psychologists who are also Buddhist monks. This step was 
implemented because there are reports that some FG-MBIs have inappropriately emphasised 
or concealed their affiliation with Buddhism to suit their needs (Van Gordon et al., 2017).  
 
Results 
Recruitment and Allocation 
Participant demographic characteristics are summarised in Table 11.1. A total of 108 
individuals completed the screening questionnaire and 35 of these were excluded on the 
grounds of ineligibility. The main reasons for exclusion were (i) did not meet the BWAS 
criteria for workaholism (15 individuals), (ii) not in full-time paid employment (six 
individuals), (iii) currently absent from work (five individuals), (iv) currently receiving 
structured psychotherapy (four individuals), (iv) recent change in psychopharmacology type or 
dosage (three individuals), and (v) already attending meditation or mindfulness classes (two 
individuals). Of the 73 remaining participants, 37 were allocated to the intervention group and 
the remainder to the waiting-list control group (see Figure 11.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
236 
 
Table 11.1. Baseline demographic characteristics for each allocation condition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Characteristic MAT (n = 37) Control (n = 36) 
Age, mean (SD) 38.60 (7.80) 38.83 (8.98) 
Male (%) 59.50 58.33 
Employment Type (%)   
Blue Collar 32.43 36.11 
White Collar 67.57 63.89 
Salary Range (£1000s/year; %)   
<20 2.70 5.56 
20-40 54.05 58.33 
40-60 35.14 27.78 
60-80 5.41 2.78 
>80 2.70 5.56 
Education (%)   
School Leaver 21.62 22.22 
Vocational 29.73 33.33 
University 48.65 44.44 
Marital Status (%)   
Married 62.16 66.67 
Single 13.51 11.11 
Divorced 21.62 19.44 
Widow 2.70 2.78 
Ethnicity (%)   
White (British) 48.65 50.00 
White (Non-British) 18.92 27.78 
Asian 16.22 8.33 
Black (Caribbean) 16.22 13.89 
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Figure 11.1.  Flow of participants through recruitment and assessment phases 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Expressed an interest and  
completed screening forms 
n = 108 
Allocated to MAT or Control 
n = 73 
Excluded  
n = 35 
MAT 
n = 37 
Withdrew 
n = 9 
Control group 
n = 36 
Withdrew 
n = 5 
Completed post-intervention assessment 
 n = 32 
Completed post-intervention assessment 
n = 26 
Completed follow-up assessment 
n = 29 
Completed follow-up assessment 
n = 21 
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Non-Completion 
A total of five MAT and nine control group participants dropped out of the study prior to the 
post-intervention assessment phase. Using a chi-square test of independence, differences in 
frequencies of drop-out and completion were not statistically significant (χ2(1) = 1.71, p = 
0.19). The reasons provided for non-completion were: changed job (six individuals), sickness 
(five individuals), and became too busy due to work demands (three individuals). Of those 
participants that attended the post-intervention assessment phase, a further three MAT and five 
control group participants were lost to follow up. The response-rate by participants’ line-
mangers on the RBPS was approximately 80%. All MAT participants that completed post-
intervention assessments attended at least seven of the eight weekly group sessions. MAT 
participants practiced meditation for an average of 40.08 minutes per day (SD = 15.91). 
 
Demographic and Baseline Characteristics 
Chi-square tests showed no significant difference between allocated conditions in terms of sex 
(χ2(1) <0.01, p = 1), education (χ2(3) = 0.69, p = 0.87), employment type (χ2(1) <0.01, p = 
0.93), salary range (χ2(4) = 1.40, p = 0.84), family status (χ2(4) = 2.1858, p = 0.70), and 
ethnicity (χ2(3) = 1.61, p = 0.65). Results also showed no significant difference between mean 
age of the Control (M = 38.83, SD = 8.97) and Intervention (M = 38.59, SD = 7.79) groups (t 
(70) = 0.121, p = 0.90) or Contracted Hours of the Control (M = 39.50, SD = 3.63) and 
Intervention (M = 39.94, SD = 4.88) groups (t (70) = -0.44, p = 0.66). 
Independent samples t-tests were carried out to assess differences at baseline between 
allocated conditions across all outcome measures. Results showed no significant difference in 
baseline scores between control and intervention for BWAS (t (70) = 0.22, p = 0.82), AJIGS (t 
(70) = -0.43, p = 0.67), DASS (t (70) = 0.51, p = 0.61), RBPS (t (56) = 0.79, p = 0.43), Work 
Engagement (t (70) = -0.41, p = 0.69), and Work Involvement (t (70) = -0.06, p = 0.96) (see  
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 Table 11.2 for means and SDs).  
Table 11.2.  Means and standard deviations of outcome variable scores for control and intervention groups at all time periods 
 
 
  BWAS  AJIGS  DASS  RBPS  Work 
Engagement 
 Work Involvement 
 Group Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD 
                   
Pre  Intervention 29.30 3.04  9.46 2.94  28.03 3.78  73.56 6.11  53.49 5.25  13.54 5.18 
 Control 29.44 2.61  9.17 2.83  28.44 3.23  74.86 6.51  52.97 5.54  13.47 5.16 
Post Intervention 21.65 5.39  13.70 3.16  19.19 4.95  70.53 23.34  49.68 4.99  9.73 5.65 
 Control 29.27 3.15  9.17 2.71  28.22 3.08  65.67 22.56  53.03 5.62  13.53 4.92 
Follow-up Intervention 21.32 5.57  14.27 3.67  18.16 5.64  70.58 24.01  49.27 5.32  9.32 5.77 
 Control 29.06 3.97  9.19 2.86  27.97 3.45  65.74 22.40  53 5.56  13.50 4.85 
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Analysis of Outcome Measures 
A separate mixed effects model was estimated for each outcome measure. Each model included 
Group (control, intervention) and measurement Interval (pre-, post-, follow-up) as fixed effects 
(i.e., in the form of an interaction predictor [Group*Interval]) and Participant (within 
measurement Interval) as a random effect. This allowed a unique regression model (i.e., 
intercept and slope) to be specified for every participant across measurement intervals (see 
Figure 11.2 for an exemplar modelling BWAS scores across measurement intervals). Results 
from the six estimated mixed effects models show an overall strong effect of intervention 
compared to control for all outcome measures, with the exception of RBPS (see Table 11.3 for 
summaries of each model). A visual comparison between control and intervention groups 
across all outcome measures and time intervals can be seen in Figure 11.3. 
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Table 11.3. Fixed effects estimates (at post and follow-up assessment phases) with 95% CIs 
for all six outcome measures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The reference category in all cases is the control group. This means a post-BWAS score 
of -7.48 can be interpreted as a -7.48 change in BWAS score in comparison to the control 
condition relative to baseline (i.e., pre-BWAS score). 
 
  
value  
 
CIs 
 
t-value 
 
p-value 
BWAS     
(Intercept) 29.44    
Post  -7.48 -9.11:-5.86 -9.09 <0.001 
Follow-up -7.58 -9.41:-5.76 -8.22 <0.001 
AJIGS     
(Intercept) 9.17    
Post  4.24 3.18:5.31 7.87 <0.001 
Follow-up  4.78 3.54:6.03 7.59 <0.001 
DASS     
(Intercept) 28.44    
Post -8.62 -10.46:-6.77 -9.24 <0.001 
Follow-up -9.39 -11.41:-7.37 -9.20 <0.001 
RBPS     
(Intercept) 74.88    
Post  5.90 - 0.97 0.34 
Follow-up   6.21 - 1.01 0.31 
Work Engagement     
(Intercept) 52.97    
Post -3.87 -5.21:-2.52 -5.69 <0.001 
Follow-up -4.24 -5.66:-2.82 -5.90 <0.001 
Work Involvement     
(Intercept) 13.47    
Post  -3.87 -5.21:-2.52 -5.69 <0.001 
Follow-up  -4.24 -5.66:-2.82 -5.90 <0.001 
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Figure 11.2. Mixed effect model for BWAS 
 
Note: The plot shows each participant’s BWAS score trajectory across measurement intervals 
(pre, post, follow-up). Narrow lines illustrate trajectories at the subject-level whereas two fuller 
lines illustrate the predicted population estimates by group (control vs. intervention). 
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Figure 11.3. Outcome means (Intervention and Control) across measurement intervals with 
two-tier 95% CIs. 
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Note: The inner tier of a two-tiered CI represents CIs for the mean whilst the outer tier 
represents a difference-adjusted CI. Difference-adjusted CIs represent the individual means but 
calibrates the CI to indicate whether the sample means differ (using 95% confidence in the 
difference as a standard) (Baguley, 2012b).  
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Discussion 
A non-randomised controlled trial compared MAT (an SG-MBI) with a waiting-list control 
group in full-time employed adults suffering from workaholism. MAT participants 
demonstrated significant improvements over control group participants in levels of 
workaholism, job satisfaction, psychological distress, work duration, and work engagement. 
Furthermore, compared to the control group, MAT participants demonstrated a significant 
reduction in hours spent working but without a decline in job performance. Therapeutic gains 
were maintained through to three-month follow up. 
 The present study is the first controlled study to investigate the utility of mindfulness 
for treating workaholism. Findings were consistent with a previous single-participant case 
study which showed that MAT led to clinically significant change in workaholism 
symptomatology (Shonin et al., 2014c). However, unlike the case study that involved a senior 
manager working in a large corporation, the present study involved participants of wide ranging 
education levels (i.e., school leaver, vocational qualification, university education, etc.), salary 
profiles (salary range: less than £20,000 a year to more than £80,000 a year), and occupational 
backgrounds (i.e., blue collar and white collar workers). Therefore, findings from the present 
study expand the range of worker profiles for which MAT is likely to be beneficial. 
Compared to FG-MBIs, SG-MBIs such as MAT integrate a greater spirituality 
component that has been shown to increase life purpose and prompt a re-evaluation of life 
priorities (Van Gordon et al., 2016b). It has been proposed that the growth in spiritual 
awareness associated with meditation can reduce the salience that individuals assign to work 
or another given behaviour (Shonin et al., 2013a, 2014e). Participation in MAT is also 
associated with reduced attachment to self and environment (Van Gordon et al., 2017). 
According to Buddhist theory, being less attached to the self means that an individual also 
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becomes less attached to desirous objects in their environment (i.e., on the basis that it is the 
selfhood of an individual that assigns value to an object, substance, or behaviour rather than 
the object or behaviour possessing intrinsic value per se) (Van Gordon et al., 2016a). Thus, 
reduced self-attachment associated with participation in MAT may help to reduce myopic focus 
on reward, including urges for feelings of elation or escape elicited by problematic working.  
The observed improvements in secondary study outcomes support the consensual 
scientific opinion that workaholism contraindicates job satisfaction and psychological 
wellbeing more generally (Shimazu et al., 2015). Mindfulness requires participants to be less 
future- or goal-orientated and to focus attentional resources on the task at hand (i.e., the present 
moment). For individuals suffering from workaholism, it is conceivable that goal-based 
working could reinforce an addiction feedback loop due to the mood-modification and reward 
effects experienced at the point of goal attainment. Therefore, being less goal-orientated as part 
of a mindful approach to working may reduce sensation seeking along with its associated 
negative consequences. 
The fact that the present study did not find significant improvements for MAT versus 
control in job performance is not consistent with findings from (i) the aforementioned MAT 
workaholism case study (Shonin et al., 2014c), and (ii) a RCT that administered MAT to 
middle-managers of healthy clinical status (Shonin et al., 2014d). A plausible explanation for 
this finding is that missing data for the RBPS (i.e., due to drop-out and the fact that 20% of 
participants’ line managers did not complete and return the scale) is likely to have increased 
the standard error. Indeed, the fact that there was no significant change in job performance 
between allocation conditions could reflect a more efficient use of time by MAT participants, 
particularly given that work involvement and work engagement decreased for MAT versus 
control (i.e., MAT led to a reduction in hours spent working without causing job performance 
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to decline). Nevertheless, it remains unclear at present as to whether the reduced focus on 
accomplishing goals embodied by mindfulness, can, paradoxically, facilitate goal attainment 
and improved job performance more generally. 
Although there appears to be a role for MAT in the treatment of workaholism, several 
factors limit the generalisability of these findings. In particular, selection bias may have been 
introduced due to a lack of randomisation, and the use of a waiting-list rather than active control 
condition means that non-specific factors (e.g., group interaction, psycho-education, 
therapeutic alliance, intrinsic motivation, etc.) may have influenced outcomes (i.e., rather than 
meditation per se). Other factors that may limit the findings are the fact that (i) the follow-up 
assessment occurred after only three months had expired following intervention completion 
(i.e., a follow-up assessment at six or nine months would have provided a better indication of 
maintenance effects), (ii) self-employed workers were not represented in the present study, (iii) 
the sample size was reduced due to the number of control group participants dropping out of 
the study prior to the post-intervention assessment phase (pre-post drop-out rate of 27.8% for 
control versus 13.5% for MAT), and (iv) interested participants were required to contact the 
research team directly in order to be considered for recruitment (i.e., participants were ‘self-
referring’ and it is thus difficult to gauge whether outcomes would be as favourable for 
individuals directly referred by their employer or by an occupational health professional). 
A primary focus of interventions such as MAT is to encourage participants to integrate 
mindfulness into all aspects of work and family life. Therefore, MAT may be a practical and 
cost-effective workaholism intervention compared to treatments that require a reduction of 
work responsibilities or segregation from the work-environment (Shonin et al., 2014c). 
Furthermore, findings from the present study support outcomes of other studies indicating that 
MAT may be a cost-effective and feasible intervention for improving work-related wellbeing 
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and work effectiveness more generally (including in individuals of healthy clinical status 
demonstrating adaptive levels of work enthusiasm and/or work engagement). Further research 
addressing the aforementioned study limitations is required to augment the evidence-base in 
terms of MAT’s effectiveness as a workaholism treatment. However, the present controlled 
trial adds further empirical support for the applications of SG-MBIs for treating workaholism 
and other forms of behavioural addiction. 
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SECTION C 
CONTRIBUTION TO PRACTICE: 
UNDERSTANDING AND TREATING SUFFERING 
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Chapter 12 
Mindfulness and the Four Noble Truths 
 
This chapter (whether in full or in part) was adapted for publication and was subsequently 
published as: 
Van Gordon, W., Shonin, E., Griffiths, M. D., & Singh, N. N. (2015). Mindfulness and the 
Four Noble Truths. In: E. Shonin, W. Van Gordon, & N. N. Singh (Eds). Buddhist Foundations 
of Mindfulness (pp. 9-27). New York: Springer.  
 
The final published version of this article is available at Springer: 
http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-319-18591-0_2#page-1  
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Abstract 
The Four Noble Truths are recorded as being the first teaching given by the Buddha after he 
attained enlightenment and they represent the foundations for the entire collection of teachings 
that the Buddha subsequently expounded. Indeed, every aspect of Buddhist practice is 
somehow encompassed by this simple yet profound teaching, and no study or practice of any 
component of the Buddha’s teachings—including mindfulness—is complete without a 
thorough understanding of how it relates to the Four Noble Truths. This chapter employs 
Logical Deductive Analysis in order to examine the validity and logical soundness of the Four 
Noble Truths and then discusses their individual and collective implications for 
comprehending, practising, and working with mindfulness. 
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The teaching of the Four Noble Truths is recorded as being the first teaching given by the 
Buddha after he attained enlightenment. It is arguably the most important of all Buddhist 
teachings and provides the foundation for the entire collection of discourses that the Buddha 
subsequently provided. Without exception, every aspect of Buddhist practice is somehow 
encompassed by this simple yet profound teaching, and no study or practice of any component 
of the Buddha’s teachings—including mindfulness—is complete without a thorough 
comprehension of how it relates to the Four Noble Truths. This chapter examines the 
significance and meaning of the Four Noble Truths and then discuss their individual and 
collective implications for understanding, practising, and working with mindfulness. 
 
The Four Noble Truths 
In the Discourse that Sets the Wheel of Dharma in Motion (Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta, 
SN 56:11) that forms part of the Connected Discourses on the Truths (Saccasamyutta, SN 56), 
the Buddha is recorded as expounding the Four Noble Truths as follows (Bodhi, 2000, p. 1844):  
 
1. “Now this, bhikkhus, is the noble truth of suffering: birth is suffering, aging is 
suffering, illness is suffering, death is suffering; union with what is displeasing is 
suffering; separation from what is pleasing is suffering; not to get what one wants 
is suffering; in brief, the five aggregates subject to clinging are suffering. 
2. Now this, bhikkhus, is the noble truth of the origin of suffering: it is this craving 
which leads to renewed existence, accompanied by delight and lust, seeking delight 
here and there; that is, craving for sensual pleasures, craving for existence, craving 
for extermination. 
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3. Now this, bhikkhus, is the noble truth of the cessation of suffering: it is the 
remainderless fading away and cessation of that same craving, the giving up and 
relinquishing of it, freedom from it, nonreliance on it. 
4. Now this, bhikkhus, is the noble truth of the way leading to the cessation of 
suffering: it is this noble eightfold path; that is, right view ... right concentration.” 
 
During subsequent teachings, the Buddha provided additional accounts and 
explanations of the Four Noble Truths (e.g., Saccavibhanga Sutta [The Exposition of the Truths 
Sutta], Majimma Nikāya, 141 [MN 141]). However, consistent with the generally accepted 
abbreviated form of the Four Noble Truths, for the purposes of this chapter the Four Noble 
Truths will be summarised and referred to as follows:   
1. Suffering exists 
2. There is a cause of suffering 
3. There is cessation of suffering 
4. There is a path that leads to the cessation of suffering 
 
The Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta records that on the occasion when the Buddha first 
taught the Four Noble Truths (an event referred to as the “first turning of the wheel of Dharma”) 
at the Deer Park in Sarnath near Varanasi, the primary recipients of the teaching were the five 
aesthetics (the Buddha’s first disciples). However, a frequently overlooked observation 
concerning the Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta is that the sutta also records that the earth 
dwelling devas were recipients of this teaching. The inclusion within the audience of two very 
different types of being—those in human form and those of the deva-realm—has important 
implications for understanding the significance of Four Noble Truths, and of the Buddha’s 
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teaching more generally. Most importantly, it implies that there are both outer and inner (or 
hidden) aspects to the Buddhist teachings that can be interpreted and transmitted on both 
exoteric and esoteric levels (Gampopa, 1998). 
Understanding that the Buddhist teachings are multi-layered in their meaning and 
profundity is an essential take-home message for anybody wishing to comprehend, practice or 
work with any aspect of the Buddhadharma. In fact, as illustrated and discussed in the section 
below that utilises deductive logical analysis (DLA) in order to investigate the theoretical and 
spiritual validity of the Four Noble Truths, each individual teaching given by the Buddha 
embodies the meaning and potency of the entire spectrum of the Buddha’s wisdom and 
knowledge (Gampopa, 1998). It is probably for this reason that there exist reports of some of 
the Buddha’s followers directly ascending to liberation simply upon hearing the Buddha utter 
the Four Noble Truths. Some examples are: (i) the Venerable Añña Kondañña (one of the five 
aesthetics) who awoke to the “dust-free, stainless vision of the dhamma” (Bodhi, 2000, p. 1846) 
(the prefix Añña before the name Kondañña denotes “one who has understood” or “one who 
has realised”), and (ii) the householder Upāli who “saw the Dhamma, understood the Dhamma, 
fathomed the Dhamma, attained the Dhamma; he crossed beyond doubt, did away with 
perplexity, gained intrepidity, and became independent of others in the teacher’s dispensation” 
(Nanamoli & Bodhi, 2009, p. 485).    
In addition to appreciating the spiritual significance and potency of the Four Noble 
Truths, a further essential take-home message concerning this teaching is that the statements 
that comprise the Four Noble Truths were never intended to be ambiguous. Indeed, not only 
were the noble truths intended to represent the Buddha’s experiential understanding and 
expression of the truth, but they were also intended to represent statements of fact. For example, 
the Buddha’s statement that suffering exists does not just mean that there is the potential for 
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suffering to exist, it means that with the exception of those beings that have realised the third 
noble truth (i.e., the cessation of suffering), all beings suffer (Van Gordon et al., 2016e). 
Likewise, the noble truth of suffering does not mean that sentient beings suffer at certain times 
but not at other times, it means that sentient beings that have not ascended to liberation are 
continuously immersed in suffering.  
 
Suffering Exists 
In Western culture suffering is generally construed as the experience of either somatic or 
psychological pain. Therefore, in the absence of such pain and whilst experiencing favourable 
socio-environmental conditions, individuals are generally not categorised as suffering or ill 
according to Western medical conventions (e.g., as defined by the World Health Organisation). 
However, within Buddhism, the term suffering takes on a much more encompassing meaning. 
Irrespective of whether a sentient being is currently experiencing psychological or somatic 
pain, and irrespective of whether a sentient being considers itself to be suffering, Buddhism 
asserts that the very fact an unenlightened being exists means it suffers (Shonin et al., 2016).  
This type of enduring latent suffering referred to above is known in Buddhism as all-
pervasive suffering (Gampopa, 1998). In essence, it is the suffering that arises due to an 
individual’s ignorance as to the ultimate nature of self and reality. Given that unenlightened 
beings have a distorted perception of reality, Buddhism asserts that they are deluded (Tsong-
Kha-pa, 2004). Accordingly, within Buddhism and to a large extent, the terms suffering, 
deluded and ignorant can all be used interchangeably.  
One means of conceptualizing the Buddhist interpretation of suffering as a form of 
delusion (or ignorance) is by drawing parallels between the two conditions of mindlessness and 
hallucination. Mindlessness refers to a lack of present moment awareness whereby the mind is 
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preoccupied with future (i.e., fantasised) conjectures or past (i.e., bygone) occurrences (Shonin 
et al., 2014g). Therefore, an individual afflicted by mindlessness might be said to be engaging 
in the non-perceiving of that which is. Hallucination, on the other hand, can be described as 
being the perceiving of that which is not. Thus, given that both states involve an erroneous 
perception of the here and now, the present author has previously argued that mindlessness is 
actually a form of inverted hallucination (Shonin et al., 2014g). 
According to Buddhist thought, the overwhelming majority of people are deemed to be 
delusional (i.e., suffering) and in a permanent inverted-hallucinatory state (Shonin et al., 
2014g). However, as the 12th century Tibetan Buddhist Gampopa (1998, p. 96) aptly pointed 
out, although all unenlightened beings (human or otherwise) experience all-pervasive 
suffering, they are generally ignorant of this fact: 
 
Ordinary people will not feel the all-pervasive suffering as, for example, when one is 
stricken with a serious plague and a small pain in the ears and so forth is not noticeable. 
But the saintly beings—the noble ones beyond samsara such as the stream enterers and 
so forth—will see the all-pervasive suffering as suffering.  
 
In addition to all-pervasive suffering that might be described as a more subtle form of 
suffering, Buddhism recognises two other primary forms of suffering that are much more 
tangible. The first is known as the suffering of change and refers to the fact that whatever 
temporary happiness there might be, it simply cannot endure. As stated by the Buddha in his 
explication of the first noble truth, birth leads to the suffering of sickness and old age, and 
sickness and old age lead to the suffering of death. Being in love leads to the suffering of 
separation and having possessions (e.g., wealth, health, reputation, family, friends) leads to 
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suffering when one is ultimately parted from such favourable circumstances. In short, suffering 
is ubiquitous to the human condition and the principle of impermanence means that just as with 
all phenomena and experiences, favourable circumstances are transient and are subject to 
dissolution (Dalai Lama, 1995).  
The third primary form of suffering recognised in the Buddhist teachings is that of the 
suffering of suffering. This is the most palpable form of suffering and is typified by experiences 
such as somatic pain, psychological distress, illness, hunger or starvation, thirst or dehydration, 
being too hot, and being too cold. Buddhism asserts that the human being comprises five 
aggregates (i.e., form, feelings, perceptions, mental formations, and consciousness; Sanskrit: 
skandhas; Pali: khandhas) and that each individual aggregate is likewise composite (Dalai 
Lama & Berzin, 1997). For example, the first aggregate of form (or the body) in-turn comprises 
the five elements of water, wind (i.e., air), earth (i.e., food), sun (i.e., heat/energy), and space 
(i.e., in the bodily cavities and between molecules and so on) (Shonin et al., 2014g). Due to the 
fact the human body exists in reliance upon a delicate balance of innumerable causes, 
components and conditions, Buddhism teaches that even a slight imbalance in these elements 
and components results in both the suffering of suffering (e.g., pain and discomfort) and 
ultimately, the suffering of change (e.g., illness and death) (Gampopa, 1998).   
 
The Cause of Suffering 
As a means of operationalizing within Western psychological and scientific domains 
Buddhism’s position concerning the aetiology of suffering, the concept of ontological 
addiction was recently formulated (See Chapter 6 for a detailed explanation of ontological 
addiction). Due to a firmly-embedded, yet scientifically and logically implausible belief that 
the self is an inherent and independently existing entity, Buddhism teaches that afflictive 
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mental states arise as a result of the imputed “self” incessantly craving after objects it considers 
to be attractive or harboring aversion towards objects it considers to be unattractive (Shonin et 
al., 2014g). Put simply, Buddhism asserts that because sentient beings believe they inherently 
exist, they constantly crave after objects and/or situations that they deem will better their 
predicament (Dalai Lama & Berzin, 1997). Not only is this craving itself a form of suffering, 
but as explained by the Buddha, it causes an unending torrent of sorrows to ensue: 
 
Whoever is overcome by this wretched and sticky craving, his sorrows grow like grass 
after the rains (Dhammapada, 24, 335; Buddharakkhita, 1986, p. 113). 
 
In Buddhist terminology, the word craving has very similar connotations to the meaning 
of the word attachment, which is deemed to be an undesirable quality that leads to the reification 
of the ego-self. Attachment has previously been defined as “the over-allocation of cognitive and 
emotional resources towards a particular object, construct, or idea to the extent that the object 
is assigned an attractive quality that is unrealistic and that exceeds its intrinsic worth” (Shonin 
et al., 2014g, p. 126). Thus, attachment takes on a different meaning in Buddhism vis-a-vis its 
construction in Western psychology where attachment (i.e., in the context of relationships) is 
generally considered to exert a protective influence over psychopathology (Shonin et al., 2014g). 
Based on a Buddhist construction of attachment, lower levels of attachment have been shown to 
predict greater levels of mindfulness, acceptance, non-reactivity, self-compassion, subjective 
wellbeing, and eudemonic wellbeing (Sahdra et al., 2010). Furthermore, the Buddhist attachment 
construct is positively correlated with avoidance (i.e., of intimacy), dissociation, fatalistic 
outlook, and alexithymia (i.e., an impaired capacity to identify or describe feelings) (Sahdra et 
al., 2010). 
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 It is important to understand that although there are many similarities between the 
Buddhist notion of craving/attachment and the connotation of these terms in (for example) 
substance misuse and behavioural addiction contexts, additional levels of meaning are implied 
by the Buddhist construction. Indeed, the type of craving referred to in the Buddhist model of 
suffering is incredibly deep-rooted and stems from a wrong view that has been developed and 
cemented over innumerable lifetimes of samsaric wandering (Gampopa, 1998). Therefore, as 
stated by the Buddha, sentient beings have a propensity for craving and any path that does not 
facilitate the severing of craving at its roots will only result in a short term reduction in suffering:   
 
Just as a tree, though cut down, sprouts up again if its roots remain uncut and firm, even 
so, until the craving that lies dormant is rooted out, suffering springs up again and again 
(Dhammapada, 24, 338; Buddharakkhita, 1986, p. 133). 
 
The Cessation of Suffering 
There is debate amongst Buddhist schools as to exactly what constitutes liberation (i.e., 
the cessation of suffering) and whether it represents the conclusion of the spiritual journey. For 
example, some Buddhist systems contend that liberation and enlightenment are two distinct 
conditions whereby liberation signifies the removal of obscurations caused by emotional 
defilements (Sanskrit: klesavarana), but not of all obscurations to knowledge (Sanskrit: 
jneyavarana). However, despite the slight variations in how different Buddhist approaches 
interpret the meaning of the term liberation, all Buddhist schools agree that spiritual liberation 
implies breaking free of samsaric wandering.  
Within Buddhism, beings are said to be samsaric if they are bound to the cycle of birth, 
death, and rebirth. Buddhism contends that the particular category (i.e., hell being, preta, animal, 
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human, demi-god, god) and quality (i.e., attractive/ugly, rich/poor, healthy/unhealthy) of an 
individual’s rebirth is directly influenced by their karmic baggage (Tsong-Kha-pa, 2004). In this 
context, karmic baggage refers to the imprint that each individual’s thoughts, words and deeds 
leaves upon their mind and that in-turn determines how they react to and perceive the conditions 
and occurrences around them.  
Although the present author would argue that a being—including those that have 
attained Buddhahood—never actually concludes its spiritual journey, the Buddha’s statement 
that there is cessation of suffering implies that liberation from suffering is not a half-way stage 
on the path to enlightenment. The reason for this is because it is logically implausible to assert 
that there exists a state in which suffering has completely ceased, but that in this state a being is 
still subject to a subtle class of ignorance (i.e., suffering) due to still not having awoken to 
complete omniscience and enlightenment. Therefore, the present author would argue that to 
experience the cessation of suffering means to have fully actualised: (i) omniscience, (ii) 
deathlessness, (iii) emptiness, (iv) unconditional blissful abiding, (iv) freedom to take rebirth in 
any realm according to the needs of beings, (v) great compassion (Sanskrit: maha karuna), and 
(vi) command over animate and inanimate phenomena.  
Implicit as part of advancing on the path towards liberation is the accumulation of 
spiritual wisdom. There are numerous delineations of the term wisdom in Buddhism but the 
present author would define it as “the extent to which an individual accurately apprehends 
both themselves and reality”. In other words, the Buddhist notion of wisdom refers to the 
gradual (or in some cases instantaneous) development of insight that permits an individual to 
undergo recovery from ontological addiction by reconstructing their erroneous view of self and 
reality (Shonin et al., 2013a). Therefore, the Buddhist interpretation of wisdom contrasts with 
the Western psychological depiction where wisdom is generally measured against indices of 
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knowledge, adaptive psychological functioning, and socio-environmental mastery (Baltes & 
Staudinger, 2000).  
Consistent with Buddhist thought, the degree of respect awarded to a particular 
Buddhist practitioner or teacher is (or should be) based on the amount of spiritual wisdom they 
have accumulated (Shonin & Van Gordon, 2015b). Indeed, for all intents and purposes, 
Buddhism assigns a similar meaning to the word wisdom (Sanskrit: prajna) as it does to the 
word enlightenment (i.e., the wiser a person is, the closer they are to enlightenment and vice 
versa). Shonin and Van Gordon (2014d, p.1) described the Buddhist construction of wisdom 
as follows: 
 
A wise person knows every inch of their mind. They know why it exits, where it exists, 
and how it exists. Not only do they know their mind, but they also know that part of 
them that knows that it knows the mind. They appreciate fully that they are both the 
observed mind as well as the mind that observes. Because they know their own minds, 
they also know every inch of everybody else’s minds and they are fully aware that all 
minds are interconnected. They are aware that their mind is without limitations and they 
know that all other sentient beings also have the potential to have a mind without 
limitations. In short, their outlook is vast and unconditionally compassionate—
everything is encompassed in it. 
 
Although the wise person has realised the full potential of their mind, they are in no 
way conceited or boastful about this. In fact, the wiser a person is, the more humble 
they are. Wise people don’t have goals or agendas per se, and they place no importance 
on being recognised for their efforts or successes. Their main objective is to simply be, 
263 
 
and from this state of simply being, profound tranquillity and lucidity arises that allows 
them to act in a way that is inconceivably skilful yet completely uncontrived. 
 
A noteworthy observation concerning the Buddhist construction of wisdom is that 
intelligence is not a prerequisite for being wise. Obviously, there are numerous categories (e.g., 
emotional, social, logical, linguistic and so on) and interpretations of intelligence, but here the 
term is used according to its popular definition of the ability to acquire and apply knowledge 
and skills. Thus, based on a Buddhist view, it is probable that a wise person will be intelligent 
in the conventional sense, but it is also conceivably possible that they will not be. Buddhism 
regards intelligence as a tool that wise people can cultivate and make use of as required, but it 
also asserts that wise people appreciate the need to handle intelligence carefully. This is 
because in the absence of wisdom, intelligence can become an obstacle to enlightenment and 
therefore an obstacle to the development of a dynamic and fluid wisdom (Shonin & Van 
Gordon, 2014d). 
 
The Path 
The fourth noble truth that there is a path that leads to the cessation of suffering principally 
refers to the Noble Eightfold Path that comprises the elements of (i) right view, (ii) right 
intention, (iii) right speech, (iv) right action, (v) right livelihood, (vi) right effort, (vii) right 
mindfulness, and (viii) right concentration. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide a 
detailed discussion of the eightfold path and its relationship to mindfulness, so the following 
briefly outlines three considerations concerning the eightfold path that are deemed to be 
pertinent in the context of the current discussion: 
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1. The Noble Eightfold Path is One Path: As inferred by the Buddha’s teachings on the 
noble eightfold path in the Mahãcattãrisaka Sutta (The Great Forty Sutta; MN 117), 
although the eightfold path comprises eight individual elements, these elements should 
be considered as the individual strands that comprise a single rope. A rope is at its 
strongest when all of the strands are wound together and it is only when practised and 
embodied as a single path that the noble eightfold path provides all of the factors 
necessary to attain liberation. In fact, the same principle applies to the entire collection 
of Buddhist teachings. Irrespective of the complexity, aspect (i.e., esoteric or exoteric) 
and intended audience of a particular strand of teachings, all authentic Dharma 
teachings take their place as part of a cohesive whole and they originate from a single 
source. In effect, there is only one path to liberation, but it manifests in various guises 
in order to appeal to the differing needs, dispositions and capacities of suffering beings.   
2. Treading the Path Requires Right Effort: In order to realise their associated outcomes, 
Dharma teachings require continuous effort on behalf of the practitioner.  This may 
seem like an obvious statement, but what is perhaps less obvious is the type of effort 
that is required. An individual can only be said to be making the “right effort” when 
they adhere to each of the following sets of advice provided by the Buddha: 
a. Understand and accept that nobody but themselves can eliminate their suffering: 
 
You yourselves must strive; the Buddhas only point the way. Those 
meditative ones who tread the path are released from the bonds of Māra 
(Dhammapada, 20, 276; Buddharakkhita, 1986. p. 109). 
 
b. Make nothing less than complete liberation the object of their practice: 
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He whose cankers are destroyed … whose object is the void, the 
unconditioned freedom – his path cannot be traced, like that of birds in 
the air (Dhammapada, 7, 93; Buddharakkhita, 1986, p. 37). 
 
c. Adopt the middle way between extremes (e.g., of trying too hard and not trying 
hard enough, of being attached to possessions/material comforts and of being 
averse to having possessions/material comforts, etc.): 
 
He who holds aloof from house holders and ascetics alike … … him do 
I call a holy man (Dhammapada, 26, 404; Buddharakkhita, 1986, p. 
159). 
 
d. At all times hold the teacher and teachings as dear to their heart: 
 
Of all the paths the eightfold path is the best; of all the truths the four 
noble truths are the best; of all things passionlessness is the best; of men 
the Seeing One (the Buddha) is the best (Dhammapada, 20, 273; 
Buddharakkhita, 1986, p. 109). 
 
e. View their life as a practice ground and persevere at all times:  
 
Ever grows the glory of him who is energetic, mindful and pure in 
conduct, discerning and self-controlled, righteous and heedful. By effort 
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and heedfulness, discipline and self-mastery, let the wise one make for 
himself an island which no flood can overwhelm  (Dhammapada, 2, 24-
25; Buddharakkhita, 1986, p.11). 
  
f. Offer loving-kindness and compassion unconditionally to all suffering beings: 
 
Come bhikkhus, abide pervading one quarter [of directional space] with 
a mind imbued with loving-kindness, likewise the second, likewise the 
third, likewise the fourth; so above, below, around and everywhere, and 
to all as to yourselves, abide pervading the all-encompassing world with 
a mind imbued with loving-kindness, abundant, exalted, immeasurable, 
without hostility and ill will. Abide pervading one quarter with a mind 
imbued with compassion, likewise the second, likewise the third, 
likewise the fourth; so above, below, around and everywhere and to all 
as to yourselves, abide pervading the all-encompassing world with a 
mind imbued with compassion, abundant, exalted, immeasurable, 
without hostility and ill will (Nanamoli & Bodhi, 2009, p. 434; MN 50). 
 
3. Any Attachment to a Path must be Relinquished: In essence, walking the path is the 
practice of simply being and allowing the mind to relax into its natural state. Striving 
to do something other than this is an example of attachment and serves only to obscure 
pure perception: 
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Whoever meditates on me will not encounter me precisely on account of 
that meditation. As I am the manifestation of the fundamental nature, [in my 
state] suffering does not arise, and consequently, there is no need to try to 
eliminate it [by walking a path] (Norbu & Clemente, 1999 p. 187). 
 
Deductive Logical Analysis of the Four Noble Truths 
Robust empirical investigation permits the credible testing of hypotheses that involve 
observable variables. However, the utility of empiricism comes into question when attempting 
to investigate subtle spiritual phenomena or metaphysical propositions (Puhakka, 2015). For 
example, to date, no scientifically credible empirical study has been conducted that allows 
reliable conclusions to be drawn regarding the claim made in the third noble truth that sentient 
beings can transcend to a state of spiritual liberation in which suffering has completely ceased. 
However, as far as Buddhism is concerned, the absence of scientific evidence in support of a 
given theory or assertion does not necessarily present a cause for concern. This is not to say 
that Buddhism does not recognize or value empirical findings, because it most certainly does. 
Indeed, what in our opinion constitutes a particular strength of Buddhist doctrine is that if 
robust scientific evidence comes to light that invalidates a particular aspect of Buddhist 
thought, then Buddhism is dynamic and humble enough to re-evaluate its spiritual and 
philosophical outlook accordingly.  
However, although Buddhism recognizes the importance of empirical evidence, the 
value it assigns to different forms of scientific evidence arguably proceeds in the reverse 
direction compared with contemporary research paradigms. For example, the research and 
scientific community generally places experimental evidence (particularly from RCTs) much 
higher up the hierarchical-evidence pyramid than it does expert opinion. Buddhism, on the 
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other hand, places much greater value on the opinion of spiritual adepts who are deemed to 
have directly tasted and penetrated the truth of existence. However, rather than some religious 
systems where followers are required or encouraged to accept claims made by the spiritually 
inspired as “the gospel truth”, the emphasis in Buddhism is for practitioners to adopt such 
claims as hypotheses to be accepted or rejected based on their own meditative and spiritual 
experience.  
In conjunction with the investigating of spiritual hypotheses on the personal and 
experiential level, a key technique utilised in Buddhist practice is the examining of a given 
proposition via the use of DLA. DLA lends itself to the testing of hypotheses or theoretical 
assumptions that involve non-observable variables. In essence, the technique makes use of top-
down (i.e., deductive) logical principles (e.g., detachment, syllogism, contraposition, etc.) such 
that reliable conclusions can be drawn from a given starting premise. Of course, any 
conclusions reached by using DLA are only as reliable as the soundness of the original premise. 
However, where the assumptions of logical validity and scientific soundness are not violated 
throughout a given deductive logical sequence, then the final outcome can be regarded as being 
necessarily true. In this section, DLA is used to test the logical validity of the Four Noble 
Truths, and in particular, to assess whether those aspects of the Four Noble Truths that relate 
to non-observable phenomena represent logically plausible assertions. 
Taken at face value, the Buddha’s Four Noble Truths do not follow a coherent logical 
sequence. In the first noble truth the Buddha states that “there is suffering,” but in the third 
noble truth he states that “there is non-suffering” (i.e., cessation). Thus, the third noble truth 
negates the first noble truth and the second noble truth does not provide a plausible or logical 
explanation of why this is so. However, Buddhism (and contemporary science) accepts the 
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principle of causality (i.e., effects rely on causes) and so by factoring this premise into a 
deductive logical sequence, the link between the first and third noble truths becomes apparent: 
 
Sequence 1 (taking the first noble truth as a starting premise; P = Premise; C = Conclusion): 
P1: There is suffering 
P2: Phenomena exist in reliance upon causes 
C: Therefore, there is a cause to suffering 
 
Sequence 2 (taking the conclusion of Sequence 1 as the starting premise): 
P1: There is a cause to suffering 
P2: Phenomena exist in reliance upon causes 
C2: Therefore, removal of the causes of suffering leads to the removal of suffering 
 
Sequence 1 above validates from a logical perspective both the first and second of the 
Buddha’s noble truths (i.e., that suffering exists and it has a cause). Taking the outcome of 
Sequence 1 as the stating premise, Sequence 2 then provides the logical validation for both the 
third and fourth noble truths (i.e., that there is the cessation of suffering which also has a 
cause—the cause of the end of suffering is treading the path that eradicates suffering). 
Thus, in a single sentence format, the Four Noble Truths could be rendered as follows: 
“There is suffering which has a cause and there is liberation which has a cause”. However, 
because Buddhism accepts the principle of causality, even the above sentence could be 
condensed to a simpler form. For example, in stating that there is suffering, there is no 
requirement to then state that there is a cause to suffering because this is already implied. 
Likewise, since the statement “there is suffering” infers that suffering relies for its existence 
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on certain causes (i.e., ignorance, attachment, and aversion), then it is already implied that the 
removal of these causes will lead to the eradication of suffering. In other words, the entire 
meaning of the Four Noble Truths can be captured by simply stating that “there is suffering” 
or “suffering exists” (or for want of being less pessimistic, the statement that “there is 
liberation” likewise implies each of the other noble truths). 
However, although the statement “there is suffering” implies that suffering has a cause 
and that removal of the cause will lead to the cessation of suffering, it could be argued that this 
statement does not, by logical default, imply the existence of a path that can eradicate this 
suffering (i.e., the fourth noble truth). However, as demonstrated by Sequence 3 below, such 
an objection can be easily overcome because upon stating that “there is suffering,” the existence 
of “non-suffering” (i.e., liberation) is automatically established. In other words, at the same 
time as positing the existence of a relative phenomenon, the existence of its opposite is also 
posited. For example, if it is accepted that the “left” exists, then it must also be accepted that 
the “right” exists. The “left” only exists because there is “right”—if “right” is eliminated, then 
“left” no longer exists. 
 
Sequence 3 (taking the conclusion of Sequence 1 as the starting premise): 
P1: There is suffering (which is diametrically opposed to liberation) 
P2: The law of duality governs the existence of relative phenomena 
C1: Therefore, there is liberation 
P3: Phenomena exist in reliance upon causes 
C2: There is a cause to liberation 
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Accordingly, the statement that “suffering exists” also implies that “liberation exists” 
and vice versa. Based on the principle of causality, having accepted that liberation exists, it 
now follows logically that liberation has a cause. The cause of liberation is none other than the 
path (i.e., the fourth truth) and it must now be accepted that (i) there exists a state of existence 
in which suffering has completely ceased, and (ii) the meaning and essence of all four of the 
Buddha’s noble truths is implicit within each truth individually.  
 
Mindfulness of Suffering and its Causes 
The Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta (Sanskrit: Smṛtyupasthāna Sūtra; MN, 10) teaches that mindfulness 
should be developed across the following four frames of reference: (i) body, (ii) feelings, (iii) 
mind, and (iv) phenomena (collectively known as the “four establishments of mindfulness” or 
the “four foundations of mindfulness”). One of the principal reasons for this is because these 
four frames of reference are the precise locality where suffering abides. Outside of the body, 
feelings, mind, and (their perception of) phenomena, sentient beings do not experience 
suffering. As previously discussed, for a sentient being that has not attained liberation, 
suffering continuously manifests in each of these four domains. Therefore, to practice 
mindfulness correctly means to be fully aware of the suffering within the body, feelings, mind, 
and phenomena at any given point in time. This includes both the suffering that is currently 
manifest (i.e., the suffering of suffering) and the suffering that lies dormant and is yet to 
manifest (i.e., the suffering of change).  
Consistent with the advice provided in the Mindfulness of Breathing In and Out Sutta (Pali: 
Ānāpānasati Sutta; Sanskrit: Ānāpānasmṛti Sūtra; MN 118), mindfulness of the suffering of 
suffering can be cultivated by using the breath to “tie the mind” to the present moment whilst 
awareness is directed to any palpable suffering present in the abovementioned focal points (i.e., 
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body, feelings, mind, and phenomena) (Shonin et al., 2014g). For example, the third exercise 
of the Ānāpānasati Sutta simply involves resting awareness on the body and the next exercise 
involves observing the body becoming calm and tranquil as a natural consequence of it being 
mindfully observed. The same process of attending mindfully to a particular focal point and 
then observing it calm and tranquilise (of its own accord) occurs again in the seventh and eighth 
exercises (which relate to calming mental formations), and once more in the ninth and tenth 
exercises (which relate to calming the mind).  
Despite the above technique being taught by the Buddha for calming and introducing 
rapture into the body and mind, it is important to understand that contrary to the intent of some 
contemporary approaches to mindfulness practice, Buddhism does not promote the utilisation 
of mindfulness for the treatment of medical ailments and/or for the short-term relief of pain. 
According to Buddhist theory, a condition of their existence is that in one way or another, 
(unenlightened) sentient beings must experience the consequences of their ego-driven actions 
(i.e., karma) and will continue to experience suffering all the way up until they attain 
enlightenment (Gampopa, 1998). Of course, this is not to say that Buddhism does not support 
the use of medical or pharmacological intervention in order to minimise an individual’s 
discomfort or pain. To advocate such an approach would run contrary to a central theme of 
Buddhist practice, which is the offering of loving-kindness and compassion towards all life 
forms. However, the point is that arresting a particular course of suffering at one point in time 
inevitably serves as the cause for an episode of suffering at a future point. Consequently, rather 
than striving to provide sentient beings with temporary relief from their (self-created) 
problems, Buddhism is concerned with equipping individuals with the knowledge, means and 
motivation to permanently eradicate suffering at its roots (Dalai Lama, 1995). 
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Thus, the practice of mindfulness of suffering is not about seeking a rapid recovery from a 
particular somatic or psychological problem. Rather, it is about developing a spiritual 
relationship with suffering so that the individual perceives and works with suffering in such a 
manner that suffering itself becomes a principal cause of liberation. Accordingly, the following 
are based on a synthesis of key Buddhist discourses and principles for working with suffering 
and outlines what the present author believes to be essential requirements for practising 
mindfulness of the suffering of suffering effectively: 
 
1. Accept the presence and inevitability of suffering for the duration of the spiritual 
journey. 
2. Understand that the causes of suffering can be permanently eradicated.  
3. Objectify suffering by adopting it as a meditative object. 
4. Perceive that suffering continuously changes in both severity and variety. 
5. Recognise that the intensity of suffering is inversely associated with the degree of 
tranquillity in the mind that experiences it. 
6. Understand that suffering provides the raw material that the spiritual practitioner works 
with in order to attain liberation (without experiencing the starkness and unyielding 
nature of suffering, it is unlikely that sentient beings would choose to strive towards 
enlightenment). 
7. Understand that ultimately, suffering is a relative phenomenon and it relies for its 
existence on a “self” that can experience it. 
8. Instinctively understand that the perceiver of suffering lacks inherent existence and, as 
such, suffering is a creation of the mind.  
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As referred to earlier in this chapter, unlike the suffering of suffering which is difficult for 
individuals not to notice, the suffering of change requires a deeper insight. Therefore, adopting 
it as the object of mindful awareness requires slightly more effort and intuition on behalf of the 
practitioner. Accordingly, in order to cultivate mindfulness of the suffering of change, the 
practitioner should aim to maintain a continuous awareness—to the point that it taints all 
thought processes and arises automatically—of what are collectively known as the Four 
Summaries of the Dhamma (Nanamoli & Bodhi, 2009, p. 686-687; MN 82): 
 
1. Life in any world is unstable, it is swept away 
2. Life in any world has no shelter and no protector 
3. Life in any world has nothing of its own; one has to leave all and pass on 
4. Life in any world is incomplete, insatiate, the slave of craving 
 
As implied by the Four Summaries of the Dhamma, the practise of mindfulness of the 
suffering of change requires perspective and clarity of vision on behalf of the practitioner. It 
also requires a full understanding of the principle and law of impermanence. Phenomena are 
born, they live, and they pass away. There are no exceptions to this rule—It is a mark of 
existence. The very fact that an individual enjoys good health serves as a cause for poor health 
at a future point. The fact that an individual is alive serves as the cause for death.  
Mindfulness of the suffering of change requires the practitioner to have internalised and 
embodied the truth of impermanence to such a degree, that it changes the way they interpret 
and process sensory information around them. The change being referred to here could, in 
effect, be described as a form of metacognitive reappraisal. Instead of apprehending objects 
and situations as fixed or even existing, by practising mindfulness of the suffering of change, 
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the practitioner begins to perceive and instinctively understand that reality is completely fluid, 
transient, and ephemeral (Norbu & Clemente, 1999). As such, the extent to which they crave 
after objects or experiences significantly diminishes and in this manner they no longer create 
the causes of suffering. Shonin and Van Gordon (2013, p. 107) have referred to this stage of 
realisation as “piercing through the present moment” and it gives rise to an awareness that 
transcends the constraints of thinking in terms of past, present, and future. The Buddha 
described this ability to non-conceptually observe and accept the coming and going of 
phenomena as follows:  
 
But let be the past, Udāyin, let be the future. I shall teach you the Dhamma: When this 
exists, that comes to be; with the arising of this, that arises. When this does not exist, 
that does not come to be; with the cessation of this, that ceases (Nanamoli & Bodhi, 
2009, p.655; MN 79). 
 
Thus, attending with present moment awareness to the suffering that lies latent in every 
situation—Including within (so-called) favourable circumstances—ultimately leads to the 
development of pure perception. In other words, practising mindfulness of suffering has the 
effect of honing an individual’s perceptive faculties to the point that the practitioner is 
effectively forced to apprehend reality in its true form and render suffering as a cause for 
liberation. 
A further and final consideration concerning the practice of mindfulness of suffering is 
developing an awareness of the suffering of others. Included in this awareness should be an 
appreciation of the suffering that others are currently experiencing, as well as the suffering that 
might arise in others due to unskilful thoughts, words and deeds on behalf of the practitioner. 
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Accordingly, the Dalai Lama (1995) has taught that spiritual practitioners have a responsibility 
for ensuring that their speech, writing, and general behaviour are infused with gentleness, 
wisdom and awareness. In this respect, Buddhism asserts that all human beings are creators 
with the difference between the everyday person and the realised practitioner being that the 
latter is fully aware of their inherent creative potency: 
 
The realised being is like a master artist who uses the tools of insight, compassion, and 
skilful means to create a dynamic masterpiece of interwoven mind and matter upon the 
canvas of all-pervasive emptiness … Each of our thoughts, words, and actions dictate 
who we are now and who we will be in the future. Those same thoughts, words, and 
deeds also influence who others will be in the future (Shonin & Van Gordon, 2014e, p. 
346). 
 
In fact, the practitioner’s responsibility for the effects of their actions does not stop at 
how they will influence other sentient being’s happiness or suffering, but also includes how 
they might introduce disorder into the ambient and natural environment around them. For 
example, based on the principle of interconnectedness, Shonin and Van Gordon (2014e) 
asserted that the mind directly influences the natural environment and that natural disasters 
such as tsunamis, earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions can be attributed to growing levels of 
negativity, selfishness, and ignorance in the hearts and minds of the population. Therefore, the 
type of awareness required to practice mindfulness of suffering effectively is not only 
incredibly encompassing, but it is unconditionally compassionate and extends well beyond the 
interests of the self. 
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Mindfulness of Cessation and its Causes 
Mindfulness of cessation and its causes principally involves maintaining a continuous 
meditative awareness of the practitioner’s inherent potential for spiritual awakening. Buddhism 
asserts that practising mindfulness with the full knowledge and understanding that liberation is 
a real possibility—including within this lifetime—adds a new dimension to an individual’s 
mindfulness practice and nourishes them with spiritual and meditative energy (Shonin & Van 
Gordon, 2015b). This “right intention” facilities a broadening of perspective as well as the 
arising of a firm resolve to overcome any obstacles to complete spiritual awakening. According 
to Shonin and Van Gordon (2015b, p. 144), by practising mindfulness with a firm intention to 
actualise their potential for liberation, the practitioner is able to tap into the lineage blessings 
that lie latent within them: 
   
The lineage we are referring to here is the universal Dharma lineage – or you can call 
it the lineage of mindfulness if you prefer. It belongs to nobody yet everybody can 
access it. It exists within every sentient being but only reveals itself to those that choose 
to live in awareness. In order to acquire this universal lineage, we do not need 
anybody’s permission. We do not need to be empowered by another person and we do 
not need to attend any initiation ceremonies. We empower ourselves simply by being 
sincere and diligent in our practice. In fact, if you are sincere in your mindfulness 
practice – if your intentions are pure and wholesome –then progress and results will 
follow naturally. At this point, it doesn’t matter in the slightest whether you belong to 
a religion or a meditation tradition, nor does it matter whether you have undergone an 
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extensive study of the spiritual texts. You can take your place as an authentic heir to 
the mindfulness lineage. 
 
The Buddha’s third noble truth that there is cessation or liberation represents the 
primary goal of Buddhist practice. Consequently, every moment that spiritual practitioners 
apply themselves to spiritual development should be infused with both a firm belief in the truth 
of liberation and, the knowledge that they are already innately liberated. This absolute 
conviction that liberation is a realistic eventuality avails to the practitioner hidden spiritual 
resources (Khyentse, 2007). Put simply, by having complete faith that enlightenment comes 
from within and not without, practitioners cease to be bound by the idea of walking a path and 
of seeing themselves as separate from their goal. As long as the mind—which is already 
innately enlightened and inseparable from the realm of liberation—seeks to find liberation 
outside of itself, there is no alternative other than for it to remain trapped in the domain of 
dualistic perception. Indeed, Buddhism asserts that everything the mind perceives is already 
liberated and of the nature of mind (Shonin et al., 2015b). A mind that separates its single entity 
into both a subject and object and then as a subject attempts to search for its object self, is 
destined to fail. Maintaining mindfulness of the fact that experience unfolds within the expanse 
of mind means that an individual is liberated, not being mindful of this means that they are 
deluded. Other than this, there is not a hair’s breadth of difference between a Buddha and an 
ignorant being (Norbu & Clemente, 1999). 
Therefore, ultimately, there is no ascending to liberation, and grasping after liberation 
or any of the fruits of spiritual practice only serves as a cause of attachment and further 
suffering. Mindfulness of the causes of cessation/liberation means remaining aware of this fact 
and of the need to abandon clinging—no matter how subtle:  
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Here Ānanda, a bhikkhu is practising thus … What exists, what has come to be, that I 
am abandoning. Thus he obtains equanimity. He delights in that equanimity, welcomes 
it, and remains holding to it. As he does so, his consciousness becomes dependant on it 
and clings to it. A bhikkhu with clinging, Ānanda, does not attain Nibbāna (Nanamoli 
& Bodhi, 2009, p.872; MN 106). 
 
The same principle applies to being attached to the idea of being a spiritual practitioner 
or of being a recipient of the lineage of mindfulness:  
 
Along with being a holder of the lineage of mindfulness comes a tremendous 
responsibility to keep the lineage teachings alive and authentic. However, the way to 
do this is not by trying to own or protect the lineage, but by letting go of it. This is 
because lineage is, and has to be, completely dynamic. As you grow in awareness, the 
teachings that are all around and within you change and present themselves in different 
ways. Therefore, if you want the lineage to endure and remain effective, then you have 
to allow it to evolve – and you have to evolve with it. The way to allow things to evolve 
is to simple be and allow experience to unfold without clinging to it. You have to 
understand that the moment you become attached to the lineage of mindfulness, it slips 
through your fingers and you cease being an authentic lineage holder (Shonin & Van 
Gordon, 2015b, p. 144). 
 
By not attaching themselves to situations, achievements or experiences, Buddhism 
asserts that mindfulness practitioners remain unbound to any time or place. In other words, 
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they establish as their home the present moment and enjoy freedom and refuge wherever they 
find themselves:   
 
The mindful ones exert themselves. They are not attached to any home; like swans that 
abandon the lake, they leave home after home behind (Dhammapada, 7, 91; 
Buddharakkhita, 1986, p. 37). 
 
In essence, the final four insight exercises of the Ānāpānasati Sutta provide a means of 
practising and establishing mindfulness of cessation and its causes. There are differing views 
amongst Buddhist scholars and traditions as to whether the experiences/realisations referred to 
in the final tetrad of the 16 Ānāpānasati Sutta exercises arise of their own accord (i.e., as a 
natural consequence of practising the foregoing 12 exercises), or whether they require a 
deliberate and subtle shift in meditative mode. It is our view (and experience) that the latter 
scenario is the case, but ultimately such differing opinions are of limited consequence. The key 
point is that having first calmed and immersed the body, feelings and mind in mindful 
awareness, the mind is then suitably disposed for insight to manifest. In order of appearance 
(i.e., beginning with exercise 13 and finishing with exercise 16), the insights that the 
Ānāpānasati Sutta refers to are a spiritual comprehension of impermanence, fading away, 
cessation, relinquishment. These spiritual realisations essentially describe the practitioner’s 
passage from the relative to the absolute realm and the inclusion of cessation and 
relinquishment in the 15th and 16th Ānāpānasati Sutta exercises refers, precisely, to the 
cessation and relinquishment of self and therefore of suffering that the practitioner experiences 
as they relax progressively further into their intrinsic wakeful state. 
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Conclusion 
As with all Buddhist practices, mindfulness is deeply connected to the Buddha’s teaching of 
the Four Noble Truths. The quintessential message of the Four Noble Truths is that until a 
sentient being attains spiritual liberation (the third truth), it will suffer (the first truth), and the 
only way to end this suffering is to walk the path (the fourth truth) that acts upon the causes of 
suffering (the second truth). A mindfulness practice that does not encompass and remain 
attentive to these four truths of existence cannot be said to embody the authentic Dharma. 
Suffering is a mark of existence, but by incorporating suffering into the sphere of mindful 
awareness, Buddhism asserts that suffering itself can become a causal agent of liberation. In 
other words, as demonstrated by the outcome of the DLA performed earlier in this chapter, 
within the truth of suffering exists the truth of liberation—and for that matter—the truth of the 
entire collection of the Buddha’s teachings.  
From a Buddhist perspective, practising mindfulness with a firmly embedded 
understanding of the principles implied and outlined by the Four Noble Truths helps the 
individual to remain acutely aware of why they are practising mindfulness as well as the 
severity of their predicament. Without such awareness, and without an unshakeable resolve to 
permanently uproot the causes of suffering, there is a distinct possibility that the mindfulness 
practitioner’s efforts will be in vain and their practice will remain at the superficial level. From 
a Buddhist perspective, this is the same as abandoning the spiritual path—a fate that the present 
author would argue is worse than death itself: 
 
For it is death in the Discipline of the Noble One, Sunakkhatta, when one abandons the 
training to the low life (Nanamoli & Bodhi, 2009, p. 866; MN 105). 
 
282 
 
Chapter 13. General Conclusion 
 
Thesis Provenance and Aims 
The past is history and no longer exists. The future never arrives. Life can only be experienced 
in the present moment. Mindfulness involves focussing awareness on the present moment and 
paying attention, in real-time terms, to psychological and sensory processes. Mindfulness 
derives from Buddhist practice where it is deemed to constitute a form of spiritual training. In 
Buddhism, mindfulness comprises one small part of the path to spiritual awakening. In recent 
decades, there has been a marked growth of interest in the West into the applications of 
mindfulness in applied psychological domains. In particular, there is growing interest into the 
applications of mindfulness in clinical settings where MBIs are increasingly being 
administered as frontline or adjunctive treatments (Van Gordon et al., 2015a).  
Although empirical findings indicate a role for mindfulness in the treatment of health-
related disorders, the rate at which mindfulness has been assimilated by Western society has 
given rise to concerns regarding the need to (i) consolidate and replicate research findings, (ii) 
clarify whether mindfulness (i.e., as it is used in contemporary MBIs) continues to bear any 
resemblance to the Buddhist model of mindfulness, (iii) investigate potential adverse effects, 
(iv) control for performance bias in MBI intervention studies, (v) formulate comprehensive 
training and supervision curricula – that are informed by the traditional meditation literature – 
for secular MBI instructors, and (vi) investigate the Buddhist position that mindfulness has 
limited utility when isolated from the supporting meditative and spiritual techniques that would 
traditionally accompany it. 
 The present PhD thesis sought to address some of these issues by complementing an 
ongoing program of empirical enquiry exploring the clinical utility of a newly-developed 
second generation of MBI. SG-MBIs frame mindfulness as a spiritual or psycho-spiritual 
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practice and employ a greater range of meditative techniques compared to FG-MBIs. The thesis 
introduced several novel psychological theories that explicate the key stages of an SG-MBI-
based treatment model as well as a model of mental-illness that is compatible with both 
Buddhist and Western psychological paradigms. The thesis also undertook empirical 
investigations to assess the efficacy, versatility, and flexibility of an SG-MBI known as MAT. 
MAT represents the first SG-MBI to be developed and tested in research settings and has been 
the subject of empirical investigation since 2010.  
 
Reflection on Methods and Research Designs 
MBIs are typically multi-component interventions that may include (for example): guided 
mindfulness exercises, guided loving-kindness and compassion meditation exercises, group 
discussion, psycho-education, yoga, one-to-one discussion with the programme facilitator, a 
CD of guided meditations to encourage at-home practice, and a full or half-day silent group 
retreat. Given that each of the above techniques arguably have therapeutic utility in their own 
right, determining why MBIs are effective is problematic because they have numerous ‘active 
ingredients’. 
Adherence to a ‘what works’ approach to alleviating symptom severity would mean 
that establishing which specific intervention components are most effective is of limited 
importance. However, for the purposes of developing more ‘therapeutically streamlined’ MBIs 
and advancing scientific understanding of how the human mind responds to specific 
psychotherapeutic techniques, it is necessary to establish the active ingredients of a given 
intervention. Despite this, MBI study designs have typically failed to identify whether it is 
mindfulness (i.e., as opposed to other therapeutic agents) that is primarily responsible for 
therapeutic change.  
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One means of overcoming this methodological limitation is to employ a purpose-
designed ‘active’ control condition (i.e., a control intervention that mirrors the main 
intervention in terms of its design, but does not include any mindfulness or meditation 
techniques). When designing an active control intervention for MBI efficacy studies, in 
addition to matching the design of the target and control interventions (i.e., minus the inclusion 
of mindfulness techniques), it is important to match the ‘competency’ of the intervention 
instructor. For example, some meditation studies employing active control conditions have 
used an experienced clinician and/or meditation teacher to deliver the target intervention, whilst 
leaving a relatively inexperienced student to administer the control intervention (e.g., Pace et 
al, 2010, 2011).  
The need to overcome these methodological issues played an important role in 
influencing the design of some of the studies conducted as part of this PhD.  More specifically, 
in the RCT reported in Chapter 8, the same instructor was used to delivered both MAT and the 
active comparison condition. To control for potential bias on the part of the instructor, 
participants in each intervention condition were asked to rate the instructor’s levels of 
enthusiasm and preparation. To the present author’s knowledge, the aforementioned RCT 
represents the only active-controlled RCT of an MBI to implement this specific procedure. The 
decision to control for an ‘instructor effect’ was taken because as discussed in Chapter 7, it is 
the present author’s view that the mindfulness instructor is one of (if not) the most active 
ingredient in an MBI. This view is supported by findings from qualitative studies where MAT 
participants have reported that the spiritual competency of the instructor influences their level 
of commitment to the training program (Shonin et al., 2014a, Shonin & Van Gordon, 2015a; 
Van Gordon et al., 2016b). 
285 
 
 Given the focus on treatment efficacy in the aforementioned CONSORT-guided RCT, 
the present PhD thesis employed a range of research designs in order to derive meaningful 
information as to the acceptability, feasibility, and flexibility of MAT. More specifically, a 
mediation analysis (Chapter 8) investigated the mechanisms of action that underlie therapeutic 
change induced by MAT. A qualitative investigation using IPA (Chapter 9) elicited rich 
empirical data in terms of the ‘life-world’ that participants experience when undergoing a SG-
MBI treatment model. A clinical case study (Chapter 10) provided an in-depth account of the 
assessment, case formulation, and treatment phases of an SG-MBI-based psychotherapy 
model. Finally, a non-randomised controlled trial (Chapter 11) built upon findings from an 
earlier clinical case study (Shonin et al., 2014d) and examined the feasibility of using MAT for 
treating workaholism. Whilst acknowledging the need for replication studies (as well as studies 
targeting other health-related disorders), the range of research designs employed in the present 
thesis is deemed to provide a rounded assessment of the clinical utility of MAT. 
 
Key Contributions to Knowledge 
The empirical findings from this PhD thesis indicate that SG-MBIs (and more specifically 
MAT) may be effective treatments for a range of health-related disorders including FMS, work 
addiction, and sex addiction. Furthermore, secondary outcomes from the empirical component 
of the thesis indicate that MAT can lead to improvements in psychological distress, sleep 
quality, civic engagement, non-attachment (to self and symptoms), and job satisfaction. These 
findings complement outcomes from earlier studies of MAT that indicate it can lead to 
improvements in (for example) job performance, goal attainment, decision-making 
competency, problem gambling symptomatology, schizophrenia symptomatology, positive 
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affect, negative affect, and dispositional mindfulness (Shonin et al., 2014a, 2014b, 2014c; 
2014d; 2015a; Van Gordon et al., 2014a). 
 Other examples of how the theoretical (i.e., Section A), empirical (i.e., Section B), and 
practice-focussed (i.e., Section C) components of this doctoral thesis have advanced scientific 
knowledge in a pioneering way are as follows:  
• Prompting an international program of empirical investigation into SG-MBIs (i.e., as a 
means of addressing some of the limitations of FG-MBIs).  
• Providing theoretical and empirical support for a novel definition of mindfulness that 
acknowledges its spiritual properties and that is increasingly being utilised in the 
academic literature.  
• Defining the key components of SG-MBIs as well as the factors that distinguish them 
from FG-MBIs. 
• Delineating the key attributes of mindfulness from a Buddhist perspective and offering 
recommendations in terms of integrating them into contemporary mindfulness-based 
interventions. 
• Explicating the relationship between mindfulness and emptiness, and demonstrating how 
the emptiness principle could challenge some central assumptions of Western 
psychological thought.  
• Conceiving and providing preliminary empirical evidence for a new psychological theory 
(called Ontological Addiction Theory) that posits ‘addiction to self’ as a third category 
of addiction (i.e., in addition to chemical and behavioural addiction). 
• Eliciting rich quantitative and qualitative data to feedback into, and refine the design of, 
the secular MAT intervention.  
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• Empirically demonstrating the role of self-attachment in the onset and maintenance of 
mental illness. 
• Conducting the first ever controlled study to evaluate the effectiveness of a treatment 
administered to individuals suffering from workaholism, and advancing scientific 
understanding regarding the design of suitable interventions for treating behavioural 
addiction. 
• Conducting the first ever empirical study to use mindfulness as a treatment for sex-
addiction. 
• Delineating how an in-depth understanding of a Buddhist model of suffering can inform 
the effective practice of mindfulness as well as its use in clinical settings. 
 
Limitations 
Findings from this PhD need to be considered in light of their limitations that are delineated in 
detail throughout the main body of the thesis (See Section B).  A more general limitation of the 
PhD is that although SG-MBIs have been presented as a means of addressing some of the 
limitations of FG-MBIs, findings from the present doctoral project do not allow direct 
comparisons to be drawn as to the relative treatment effectiveness of FG- versus SG-MBIs. 
Accurately drawing such conclusions would require the conducting of head-to-head 
comparison studies in which the FG- and SG-MBI protocols are delivered under identical 
research conditions (although it is acknowledged that effect size calculations as part of 
rigorously conducted meta-analytical studies could provide an approximation of relative 
effectiveness). Thus, the thesis could be criticised for relying too heavily on supposition as to 
the necessity for SG-MBIs (Shonin, 2015).  
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Implications and Future Directions 
Notwithstanding the lack of studies directly comparing FG-MBIs with SG-MBIs, SG-MBIs 
constitute an important development in mindfulness research and practice because, at the very 
least, they provide service-users—including those interested in (or belonging to) Eastern 
contemplative traditions—with a treatment option that more closely follows a traditional (but 
secular) approach to mindfulness practice (Shonin, 2015). Furthermore, it may be that FG-
MBIs and SG-MBIs can co-exist or complement each other because they are based on different 
delineations of mindfulness and employ distinct treatment models (Van Gordon et al., 2015b). 
 Findings from this PhD thesis indicate that SG-MBIs may have applications for 
treatment of a diverse-range of health disorders. It appears that the more spiritual approach 
embodied by SG-MBIs plays an important role in terms of their treatment efficacy. This is 
significant because FG-MBIs have generally been reluctant to acknowledge any spiritual 
affiliation and have largely presented mindfulness as an exclusively psychological technique. 
There are no doubt important psychological and attentional aspects to mindfulness and it is 
correct to identify and evaluate these under research conditions. However, there can reach a 
point where the conceptual and empirical reductionism of mindfulness means that its use in 
Western research and applied settings fails to capture the essence of what mindfulness was 
traditionally intended to embody. Moving forward, a key challenge for the scientific 
community will be to embrace the need to undertake programs of empirical investigation to 
explore the possibility that some of the most active ingredients of mindfulness operate on the 
meta-physical rather than the psychological or biological plane. 
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